Stabilizing the technoscientific witness: a history of controversy, medicolegal practice, and the Ontario sexual assault evidence kit by Quinlan, Andrea Genevieve Ruth
STABILIZING THE TECHNOSCIENTIFIC WITNESS: 
A HISTORY OF CONTROVERSY, MEDICOLEGAL PRACTICE, AND 
THE ONTARIO SEXUAL ASSAULT EVIDENCE KIT 
ANDREA QUINLAN 
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO 
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 




©Andrea Quinlan, 2013 
ABSTRACT 
Over its thirty-four years in Ontario, the Sexual Assault Evidence Kit (SAEK) has 
gained credibility as the objective technoscientific witness of sexual assault. This 
dissertation traces the Ontario Sexual Assault Evidence Kit (SAEK) and how it gained 
stability through ongoing anti-rape activism, technoscientific and legal controversy, and 
shifting medicolegal practice. It draws on 62 interviews with medicolegal professionals 
and rape crisis centre workers in Ontario, archival data, media articles, and medicolegal 
texts to examine how the SAEK was (re )assembled in meaning and in material form 
alongside new technologies, medicolegal practices, spaces, actors, and expertise. 
The dissertation's theoretical/methodological approach is guided by Donna 
Haraway's diffraction metaphor and tools from Actor-Network Theory. The study 
diffracts the SAEK to examine it as a historicized actor involved in medicolegal practice 
within shifting heterogeneous networks of medical and legal professionals, anti-rape 
activists, survivors/victims, and texts, tools, and technologies. This dissertation argues 
that the design, credibility, and continued use of the contemporary SAEK as a 
technoscientific witness has been fuelled by legal histories and practices based on 
distrusting women who report sexual assault. 
Several key questions are examined in detail: how did the contemporary SAEK 
gain stability as the technoscientific witness of sexual assault, how were the SAEK and 
its medicolegal network assembled and reassembled, for what purposes, and for whose 
benefit? By untangling the histories of the SAEK, this study charts the historical and 
contemporary controversies amongst scientists, nurses, doctors, lawyers, and feminist 
11 
rape crisis centre workers about who should use the SAEK, where and how they should 
use it, with what tools and technologies, and for what and whose purpose. Through this 
history, the dissertation finds that the contemporary SAEK's stability benefits many 
medicolegal actors but few survivors/victims. By offering a historicized account of the 
SAEK, this study contributes to existing literature on the SAEK, anti-rape activism in 
Ontario, and forensic and medical technologies. The dissertation diffracts the SAEK to 
contribute to future feminist efforts to imagine more ethical and responsible ways of 
assembling medicolegal technologies and practices around sexual assault. 
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"The Technoscientific Witness" 




In the late 1960s and 1970s, Canadian feminist activists were bringing women's 
experiences of rape into public awareness. Some women gathered in public forums to 
share personal experiences; others wrote theory and conducted empirical studies on the 
deficiencies of medical and legal practices. Activists established community-based rape 
crisis centres and built expertise in feminist, anti-rape peer advocacy to fill the void of 
medical services and legal protections for women who had been raped. In the flurry of 
this activity, anti-rape activists began organizing to transform medical and legal 
practice. 
Forty years later, in 2013, there is an elaborate medicolegal network of expert 
services, actors, practices, and technologies for treating, investigating, and prosecuting 
sexual assault. Within this network, the Sexual Assault Evidence Kit (SAEK), 1 a 
standardized forensic tool for collecting evidence, has gained credibility as the 
technoscientific witness of sexual assault that objectively identifies and convicts sexual 
offenders. In this elaborate network of practices and technologies, medical and legal 
actors continue to disbelieve many women who report sexual assault and see them as 
non-credible witnesses of their own experiences (Doe, 2012; Crew, 2012; Pamis & Du 
Mont, 1999). Ironically, many of the anti-rape activists in rape crisis centres who 
1 The SAEK is the forensic evidence collection tool used in sexual assault cases in Ontario. Other 
jurisdictions use different names such as, rape kits, sexual assault kits, crime kits, forensic kits, sexual 
assault forensic kits, sexual investigation kits, and sexual assault care kits (Du Mont & White, 2007). 
Appendix A lists all acronyms that I use in this dissertation. 
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instigated changes in medical and legal practice in the 1970s have been pushed to the 
margins of practices within this contemporary network. This dissertation begins with the 
questions: How did this network come to be? And how did rape crisis centre workers2 
come to be situated in its margins? 
Answering these questions requires a detailed tracing of the complexities, 
uncertainties, and controversies that surround medicolegal practice and technoscientific3 
objects. It requires attending to practices that involve human and non-human actors 
building networks of action. In this dissertation, I chart this history of network building 
through the history of a single forensic evidence collection tool: the Ontario SAEK. As I 
will show, the SAEK bears the traces of medicolegal network building, ongoing anti-rape 
activism, shifting medico legal practice, and technoscientific controversy. 
To trace the SAEK and its medicolegal network, I employ Donna Haraway's 
(1997, 2000) diffraction metaphor and use tools from Actor-Network Theory (ANT), an 
approach for tracing shifting networks of material relations between human and non-
human actors in technoscientific practice (Law, 2004; Latour, 2005). I diffract the 
contemporary SAEK by illustrating it as a historicized actor involved in shifting 
2 I use the name rape crisis centre to refer to community-based organizations that provide advocacy, public 
education, and support for survivors/victims. Since legal reforms in 1983 that removed rape from the 
Canadian Criminal Code, many centres have adopted new names, such as sexual assault crisis centres and 
sexual assault survivors' centres. For clarity, I use the name rape crisis centre throughout this dissertation. I 
use rape crisis centre workers to refer to staff and volunteers who work as advocates for women who have 
experienced sexual assault. I also use the broader term, anti-rape activists, to refer to feminist and women 
liberation organizers, scholars, lawyers, and advocates involved in political work around rape. 
3 I draw the term technoscience from Bruno Latour (1987) and Donna Haraway (1997), who both argue 
that the division between science and technology is a construction that is often, in practice, collapsed. For 
Haraway (1997), the term technoscience offers a "non-hyphenated energy ... [that] mimes the implosion of 
science and technology" (p. 51 ). This is the understanding of technoscience that I use. 
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medicolegal networks of medical and legal professionals, anti-rape activists, 
survivors/victims, and texts, tools, and technologies. 
I trace the SAEK's thirty-four year history in Ontario and examine how it was 
reassembled in meaning and in material form alongside new technologies, medicolegal 
spaces, actors, and expertise. I sketch the shifting relations between rape crisis centre 
workers, the SAEK, and medico legal practice and examine how the rise of medicolegal 
experts, expert spaces, and expertise around sexual assault coincided with medicolegal 
actors displacing rape crisis centre workers from the SAEK' s network and transforming 
feminist rape crisis centre advocacy and agendas. I illustrate medical and legal actors' 
efforts to stabilize4 the SAEK as the technoscientific witness of sexual assault in 
medicolegal networks and how these efforts were tied to legal histories and practices of 
labeling women reporting sexual assault as inherently unreliable and non-credible 
witnesses. Through these histories, I argue that the SAEK' s credibility as the 
technoscientific witness of sexual assault was fuelled and maintained by medicolegal 
practices that involve distrusting women reporting sexual assault. 
The Contemporary SAEK 
The SAEK is a standardized forensic tool used in Ontario to collect bodily fluids 
and to document physical injuries on a survivor/victim5 of sexual assault. The SAEK 
contains swabs for collecting traces of foreign bodily fluids, vials for urine and blood 
samples, envelopes for hair and foreign debris, paper bags for clothing, and standardized 
4 As I elaborate below, this term is drawn from Science and Technology Studies (STS), where it has been 
employed in varying ways (Latour, 1987; Akrich, 1992; Star, 1991; Bijker, 1997). 
5 I provide a justification and definition of this term below. 
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forms for detailing injuries. Nurses and/or doctors conduct SAEK exams, which involve 
multiple steps of swabbing, plucking, and combing, a process which can last as long as 4-
6 hours (Parnis & Du Mont, 2002). Medical experts can analyze SAEKs to determine the 
degree of force that a perpetrator used and forensic scientists can analyze SAEKs to 
identify perpetrators of sexual assault, confirm recent sexual activity, and to demonstrate 
a survivor's/victim's inability to legally consent due to the influences of alcohol and 
drugs (Du Mont & White, 2007). 
In Ontario, the SAEK is designed, distributed, and analyzed by the Ontario Centre 
of Forensic Science (CFS), which is a publically funded and administered forensic 
laboratory under the Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services. 
The lab analyzes forensic evidence in crimes against persons and/or property (Centre of 
Forensic Science, 2013 ). Outside of Ontario, other laboratories design and analyze sexual 
assault kits.6 These kits are similar to the SAEK and Canadian laboratories use similar 
practices to analyze them (Quinlan, 2008). In this study, however, I focus on the history 
of the standardized SAEK in Ontario to sketch the specificity of this technoscientific 
object and its medicolegal network. 
Medicolegal networks 
I situate my discussion of the SAEK in medico legal networks. I use the term 
medicolegal because it usefully collapses the lines between medicine and law and 
conveys how medical and legal practices are entangled. I draw the term networks directly 
6 Here, I use the generic name, sexual assault kit, to refer to kits in other jurisdictions. In Quebec, sexual 
assault kits are analyzed by the Laboratoire de Sciences Judiciaires et de Medecine Legale du Quebec. In 
other parts of Canada, sexual assault kits differ in design and contents across jurisdictions but all are 
analyzed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Forensic Identification Services or RCMP-
contracted private DNA laboratories (Quinlan, 2008; Quinlan, Fogel, & Quinlan, 2011). 
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from ANT. As I describe in greater detail in chapter 2, ANT scholars have defined 
networks as "webs ofrelations" (Law, 2007, p. 1) between human and non-human actors 
who are related through their practices. This study illustrates how networks are not 
inherently stable, but constantly shifting and changing form through varying practices. 
In the contemporary medicolegal network there are many actors involved in the 
SAEK's work: nurses, doctors, police, forensic scientists, lawyers, texts, tools, and 
technologies, and to varying degrees, anti-rape activists and survivors/victims. This 
dissertation shows how within this network, the flurry of activity, uncertainties, and 
controversies around the SAEK and sexual assault moved from rape crisis centres to 
hospital emergency wards to scientific laboratories and legal courtrooms. It examines 
how material things - texts, tools, technologies, DNA profiles, treatment centres, etc. -
shaped the SAEK and its network. 
Through this changing network, I illustrate how rape crisis centre workers were 
pushed to the margins of SAEK practices and situated as non-users of the SAEK. 
Additionally, I show how survivors/victims were similarly pushed to the margins and 
situated as implicated users of the SAEK. 7 In doing so, I examine how shifting networks 
redefine relations between actors. 
The technoscientific witness. 
In the criminal courtroom, according to legal scholar Sheila Jasanoff (1998), 
"seeing is an essential precondition for believing" (p. 717). Whose sight counts as 
credible in court is often a site of negotiation (Jasanoff, 1998). This precondition that 
7 I describe both of these terms in greater detail in chapter 2. 
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Jasanoff describes, in which legal actors believe only what they can see, is intensified in 
sexual assault cases when legal actors label women reporting sexual assault as non-
credible and untrustworthy witnesses of their own experience. For sexual assault to be 
believed in criminal courtrooms and police investigations, it must not only be described, 
but it must also be seen by a witness who legal actors deem credible. At one time, this 
requirement was quite literally encoded in Canadian sexual assault law. Prior to 1983, an 
independent witness's testimony, in addition to other corroborative evidence, was 
commonly required for a sexual assault conviction (Back.house, 2008). Although this 
requirement was written out of the Criminal Code of Canada in 1983, its remnants remain 
in medicolegal practice (Feldberg, 1997; Pamis & Du Mont, 1999; Doe, 2012). 
I begin this dissertation with the assertion that the contemporary SAEK acts as a 
witness of sexual assault in the medicolegal network. Although the SAEK does not 
witness literal acts of sexual assault, I show in this study how the SAEK witnesses8 
sexual assault as it is defined in medico legal practice as visual traces of bodily fluid and 
physical injury. On the basis of the act of witnessing, the SAEK provides a witness's 
testimony9 of sexual assault after forensic scientists have analyzed its contents of bodily 
fluids and medical experts have interpreted its documentation of physical injuries. I argue 
that contemporary legal actors commonly see this technoscientific testimony as being 
more objective and credible than women who report sexual assault. 
8 Here, I deliberately use the verb witness in relation to the SAEK to illustrate the possibility of a non-
human object acting. This notion comes from Actor-Network Theory. Significant to this approach is the 
understanding that non-human actors do not act alone. Instead, they act in a network of action that is 
composed of many actors. I describe this idea in greater detail in chapter 2. 
9 Again, this construction grants the SAEK agency. I expand further on how the SAEK speaks and is made 
to speak in chapter 5. 
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In this dissertation, I ask the questions: How did the SAEK gain stability as the 
technoscientific witness of sexual assault? How were the SAEK and its medicolegal 
network assembled and reassembled? For what purposes? And to whose benefit? I chart 
the controversies amongst scientists, nurses, doctors, lawyers, and feminist rape crisis 
centre workers around the questions of who should use the SAEK as a witness of sexual 
assault, where they should use it, with what tools and technologies, and for what, and for 
whose purpose. By doing so, I illustrate how the SAEK as the credible technoscientific 
witness gained stability in the contemporary medicolegal network. In the concluding 
chapters of this dissertation, I argue that the SAEK's stability benefits many medicolegal 
actors but few survivors/victims. 
SAEK Literature 
There is a limited body of scholarly research on sexual assault kits, particularly in 
Canada. Much of the research has focused on the development and effectiveness of 
professional groups associated with sexual assault kits (Stermac & Stirpe, 2002; Du Mont 
& Parnis, 2003; Sievers, Murphy & Millers, 2003; Campbell, Patterson, & Lichty, 2005), 
the institutional settings where sexual assault kit exams are done (Sampsel, Szobota, 
Joyce, Graham & Pickett, 2009; Hatmaker, Pinholster, & Saye, 2002), and the influence 
of sexual assault kit evidence on arrest and conviction rates (Feldberg, 1997; McGregor, 
Du Mont, & Myhr, 2002; Johnson, Peterson, Sommers, Baskin, 2012; Campbell, 
Patterson, Bybee, & Dworkin, 2009). This work has generally focused on the users, 
settings, and effects of sexual assault kits and in so doing, has left the sexual assault kit 
itself largely untouched. 
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In recent years, some scholarly and activist researchers have moved the focus 
onto the sexual assault kit. Most notably in Canada, Janice Du Mont (now White) and 
Deborah Pamis' formative research on the SAEK examines levels of standardization in 
the Ontario SAEK exam (Pamis & Du Mont, 2002; Du Mont & Parnis, 2003), the 
technologies used in the SAEK exam (White & Du Mont, 2009), the discretionary uses of 
the SAEK (Du Mont & Pamis, 2001 ), and the values tied to the SAEK (Parnis & Du 
Mont, 1999; 2006). Building on this work, Jane Doe (2012) has examined the efficacy 
and harms the sexual assault kit causes through the perspectives of women who have 
experienced the kit exam, and their advocates. These formative studies in sum have 
focused on contemporary uses, perceptions, and consequences of the sexual assault kit. 
The literature on the sexual assault kit, Canadian and otherwise, has raised 
questions about how the SAEK came to be and for what and whose purposes. More 
specifically, existing work has raised questions about the historical controversies and 
practices that shaped the SAEK' s meaning and material form and the contemporary 
medico legal practices in which the SAEK has stability. By turning my attention directly 
to the SAEK and its shifting medicolegal network, this dissertation builds on existing 
work to provide a historicized account of the assembly of the SAEK as the 
technoscientific witness of sexual assault. 
Tracing Objects and Histories of Practice, Controversy, and Stabilization 
By framing this study around a single technoscientific object, I draw on a well-
established tradition in Science and Technology Studies (STS) and feminist STS in which 
technoscientific objects and their histories have been the focus of much critical inquiry. 
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Work in this tradition challenges the view that technoscientific objects are simply 
outcomes of technical or scientific discovery by arguing that objects arise from complex 
interplays of technical, scientific, social, political, economic and cultural processes 
(Winner, 1986; Latour, 1987; Law, 2002). Langdon Winner's (1986) well-known article 
on the politics of technological artifacts illustrates how artifacts are not only the effects of 
political, social, and cultural processes, but also have effects, and are therefore not neutral 
and are instead, inherently political. He shows how political, social, and cultural 
conditions that shape an artifact's development are embedded in their design and play out 
in their use. Adopting a similar orientation, some feminist STS scholars have examined 
histories and politics embedded in technoscientific objects that act on (women's) bodies, 
such as the pap smear (Singleton, 1996, 1998; Casper & Clarke, 1998), the IUD 
(Dugdale, 2000; Takeshita, 2012), the cervical stabilizer (Hasson, 2012), birth control 
pills (Aengst & Layne, 2010), and the tampon (Vostral, 2011). While this feminist work 
on technology has made significant strides into medical technologies, less attention has 
been given to forensic technologies. 
In other branches of STS, some scholars have investigated forensic technologies, 
such as fingerprinting (Cole, 2001) and forensic DNA typing (Rabinow, 1996; Gerlach, 
2004; Lynch, Cole, McNally, & Jordan, 2008). Although the SAEK is a forensic 
technology, it is distinct from other forensic technologies in several ways. Fingerprinting 
and DNA analysis use bodies to construct truths about crime; however, they do not act on 
9 
bodies as the SAEK does. IO The SAEK physically touches and at times hurts bodies in 
ways that other forensic technologies in the laboratory do not. It is, unlike many other 
forensic technologies, an object that entangles not o~ly science and technology, but 
medical and legal practices as well. By examining the SAEK, a forensic medicolegal 
technoscientific object that acts on (mainly female) sexually violated bodies, this 
dissertation contributes to existing STS literature on forensic technologies and feminist 
STS literature on medical technoscientific objects and women's bodies. 
Tracing histories. 
My focus on the SAEK's history is drawn from STS and feminist STS traditions. 
Many scholars in these fields have used historical analyses to show how science and 
technology "might have been otherwise" (Hughes, 1971, p. 552). Shapin and Schaffer' s 
(1985) history of the development of experimental science, and the many others that 
followed on the pasteurization of milk (Latour, 1988), the development of the bicycle 
(Bijker, 1997) and the rise of the IUD (Takeshita, 2012), have used history to reveal the 
uncertainties, controversies, and negotiations that are involved in assembling scientific 
knowledge and technological objects. In this tradition, this dissertation charts the SAEK's 
history to suggest that it "might have been otherwise" (Hughes, 1971, p. 552). 
Donna Haraway's (1997, 2000) diffraction metaphor guides my historical 
investigation. For Haraway, diffraction is a tool for producing feminist accounts of 
technoscience. It involves, "see[ing] both the history of how something came to 'be' as 
IO The SAEK acts on not only survivors'/victims' bodies, but also, in some cases, on their emotions, 
psychologies, minds, politics, etc. In this study, I am interested in the "semiotic materiality" (Law, 2004, p. 
15) of the SAEK, which I describe further in chapter 2. This focus directs me to the material and physical 
relations the SAEK has with other actors, such as sexually violated bodies, and the meanings that have been 
and continue to be made from these relations. 
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well as what it simultaneously is" (Haraway, 2000, p. 108). Diffraction, according to 
Haraway, is a way of "make[ing] a difference" (Haraway, 1997, p. 16) in the 
technoscientific worlds that we study, a way of "interfering" (Haraway, 1991, p. 101) 
with technoscientific objects to seek out more ethical and responsible alternatives. In this 
study, I diffract the contemporary SAEK to ask how it came to be, what it is, and in the 
concluding chapter of this study, what the SAEK might be. 11 
To diffract the SAEK, I adopt the descriptive approach in Actor-Network Theory 
(ANT) that involves tracing science and technology "in the making" (Latour, 1987, p. 4). 
Seeing how technoscience is made, according to Latour and other ANT scholars, requires 
thick description of complexities, uncertainties, and instabilities between actors and 
within practices and networks (Akrich, 1992; Law, 2004; Latour, 2005). Akrich (1992) 
describes this approach as "the inventory and analysis of the mechanisms that allow the 
relation between a form and a meaning constituted by and constitutive of the technical 
object to come into being" (p. 209). 12 I argue that through this descriptive approach, it is 
11 These seemingly simple questions - how the SAEK came to be, what it is, and what it might be - risk 
conveying the SAEK as a singular object. Haraway, however, does not use them in this way and nor do I. 
For her, diffraction is a way of seeing historical and contemporary complexities, multiplicities, and 
uncertainties in an object. These questions simply guide her diffracted analysis. In this spirit, I employ 
Haraway's questions to guide my venture into the SAEK. This dissertation illustrates how the SAEK is not 
a singular object and is rather a multifaceted technoscience with many histories and possible futures. 
12 Importantly, this approach combines what Akrich (1992) calls "inventory" (p. 209), or description, with 
analysis. In ANT studies, description and analysis are not easily separated: the theoretical analysis is part of 
the empirical description, as many ANT scholars have demonstrated (Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Callon, 
1986; Latour 1988; Singleton, 1988; Akrich, 1992; Mol, 2002; Law, 2002; Latour, 2010). This particular 
aspect of ANT is common to many branches of Science and Technology studies (Shapin & Schaffer, 1985; 
Bijker, 1997; Cole, 2001; Takeshita, 2012) and has intellectual roots in Ludwik Fleck's (1935) early history 
on the development of scientific facts and Thomas Kuhn's (1962) historical analysis of scientific 
revolutions. Law (2008) explains this when he says "how Kuhn describes science resonates with his theory 
of science. Theory, he is telling us, cannot be detached from its instances ... theory and data are created 
together" (p. 629). 
11 
possible to see how the material form of the SAEK came to have meaning as the 
technoscientific witness of sexual assault in medicolegal practice. 
Tracing practice, controversy, and processes of stabilization. 
Studying scientific practice, or what scientists actually do, has a long tradition in 
STS, which arose from Thomas Kuhn's (1962) formative work on scientific revolutions 
and other notable works that followed, such as Shapin and Schaffer's (1985) historical 
study of experimental science and Latour and Woolgar' s (1986) study of practices in a 
scientific laboratory. These works illustrate how science is an activity; a process of 
constructing knowledge. I take up this tradition by examining medicolegal practice: what 
nurses, doctors, police, and lawyers do to investigate sexual assault, treat 
survivors/victims, and prosecute and defend those charged. By examining medicolegal 
practice historically, I reveal how practices have changed through technoscientific and 
legal controversies between scientists, nurses, doctors, lawyers, and anti-rape activists. 
Controversies, according to many STS scholars, reveal how science and 
technoscientific objects are developed through ongoing negotiations, disputes, and 
uncertainties amongst actors involved (Latour, 1987, 2005; Epstein, 1996). Some STS 
scholars have shown how controversies about technological objects are resolved when 
actors reach consensus about an object's design and purpose (Akrich, 1992). Some have 
called these moments of consensus about objects points of stabilization (Latour, 1987; 
Akrich, 1992). Stabilized technologies, in this view, are those "in which the conflict and 
heterogeneity inherent in technology building is overcome ... and the social relations 
which lie behind the technology are made either invisible or unquestionable" (Halfon, 
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1998, p. 802). 13 Within this tradition, stabilization often appears to be a static outcome of 
controversy. 
Other scholars have argued for more fluid understandings of stabilization. In 
Bijker' s (1997) history of the bicycle, he suggests that technological development is a 
process that involves "degrees of stabilization" (p. 271 ), where consensus building about 
an object's design and purpose is non-linear, tenuous, and easily disrupted with new 
controversies. 14 Star (1991) proposes a feminist intervention into stabilization when she 
argues that technologies and networks are only stable for some actors. She writes, "a 
stabilized network is only stable for those who are members of a community of practice 
who form/use/maintain it" (p. 44). Actors who are not part of a community of practice, 
she argues, but who rely on stabilized technologies and networks, rarely feel their 
stability. 
In this dissertation, I adopt these more fluid readings of stabilization. Here, 
stability is not a static place or a definitive outcome of controversy. Instead, like Bijker 
(1997) and others in this tradition, I use stability to characterize historical moments when 
many actors reach consensus about an object's design and purpose. Stabilization in this 
dissertation is a non-linear process that can be easily disrupted with new controversies, 
actors, expertise, and practice. Like Star, I do not assume that consensus about a 
stabilized object and network is universally shared. Instead, I show how technologies and 
13 This understanding of stabilization stems from some branches of ANT (Latour, 1987), which have 
proposed that complexities in science and technology can become black boxed and hence invisible after 
controversies have been resolved, and some branches of the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) 
(Pinch & Bijker, 1987), which have proposed that controversy in technology building can be overcome and 
closure can result. 
14 However, he does also suggest elsewhere that the common outcome of degrees of stabilization is closure 
where controversies and uncertainties about a technological object are resolved (Pinch & Bijker, 1987). 
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networks can be stable for some actors but not for others, something which I explore 
further in chapter 6. 
By untangling the SAEK's histories of stabilization, practice, controversy, its 
historical and contemporary complexity will become visible. I hope that interfering with 
the contemporary SAEK in this way will contribute to future feminist efforts to imagine 
more ethical and responsible alternatives. 
A Partial History 
This study is a partial documentation of the SAEK's history. Partial histories are 
not failed or inadequate histories. Rather, as Law (2003) reminds us, "any way of 
imagining technologies is partial" (p. 2). According to Law (2004), method is a process 
of bringing certain actors, practices, and relations into the visible foreground and pushing 
others into the invisible background. While partial histories may be inevitable, they come 
with risks. 
By focusing on the medicolegal practices, I risk erasing survivor's/victim's 
experiences of medicolegal practice. To avoid this, I provide glimpses into the 
experiential to ensure that survivors' /victims' experiences are not completely invisible in 
this account. I insert pieces of survivor's/victim's narratives of their experiences with the 
SAEK in between and inside my own text. 15 I situate these experiences on the page so 
that they seemingly interfere with the flow of practice. In doing so, the text's placement 
visually illustrates how medicolegal practice can at times operate in full disregard of 
15 I have collected these narratives from survivors/victims in Ontario through oral history interviews and 
publically available archival and textual sources. The narratives have been inserted in the text according to 
their date and content. 
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women's experience of the SAEK exam. These narratives are not meant to represent all 
survivors' /victims' experiences of medicolegal practices. Rather, they give a sampling of 
what some have been. 
I also punctuate my text with a series of historical texts from archival sources. In 
doing so, I illustrate some of the textual actors in the SAEK's ever-changing medicolegal 
network. 
Notes on Language 
I employ particular terms in this dissertation to describe sexual violence, and 
individuals who experience and perpetrate it. While there are many vibrant scholarly 
debates over this terminology, charting them in full is beyond the scope of this work. 
However, a brief reporting of some of these debates is necessary to situate my own 
language in its broader context. 
Rape and sexual assault. 
Throughout this dissertation, I refer to both rape and sexual assault to reflect the 
historical shifts in language in the SAEK's 34 years in Ontario. As I describe, rape in the 
1970s was an offence under the Criminal Code of Canada and a term that many anti-rape 
activists used to convey the gendered nature of sexual crimes against women. However, 
this usage changed part way through the SAEK's history, when rape was removed from 
the Criminal Code and replaced with sexual assault. Rape had been narrowly defined as 
unwanted vaginal penetration, a definition that sexual assault offences broadened to 
forced sexual activity. Some feminist scholars have argued that the specificity of rape and 
the generality of sexual assault make both terms unhelpful to feminist scholarship and 
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activism (Sheehy, 1999; Doe, 2012). However, in this dissertation, I use both terms as 
actors used them in the historical moments I describe. My usage depicts the shifts in 
discursive terrains of law and anti-rape activism. 
Survivor/victim. 
I use the term survivor/victim to refer to women who have experienced rape 
and/or sexual assault. In the past two decades, there has been heated controversy amongst 
feminist scholars over the term victim (Wolf, 1993; Allard, 1997; Lamb, 1999; Atmore, 
1999; hooks, 2000; Doe, 2012). While some argue that victim can be useful in labeling 
violence and conveying a shared experience of male violence amongst women (Lamb, 
1999), others contend that it connotes passivity and denies women's agency (Wolf, 
1993). Some feminists of colour argue that the term fails to take into account racialized 
and classed experiences and falsely assumes a homogenous gendered experience of male 
violence (Allard, 1997; Collins, 1996; hooks, 2000). As an alternative to victim, many 
scholars, rape crisis centre workers, and activists and have adopted the term survivor in 
the hopes of emphasizing women's agency and strength (McCaffrey, 1997). Some 
feminist scholars have, however, criticized both survivor and victim for limiting women's 
narrative agency and for implying a passive female body that is victimized by or survives 
the active male body (Spry, 1995; Doe, 2012). 
In the face of scholarly debates on language, multiple studies have found that 
women who have experienced sexual assault identify themselves and their experiences in 
varying ways (Reavey & Gough, 2000; Young & Maguire, 2003; Ovenden, 2012). 
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Young & Maguire (2003) found that some women feel that survivor acknowledges 
agency, whereas others feel that it presupposes a recovered state that they do not feel they 
portray or embody. In their study, some women identified as survivors, others identified 
as victims, and still others identified as neither survivors nor victims. In response to this 
evidence and the lively scholarly debates about language~ Young and Maguire, along 
many other scholars, have called for new, more inclusive language for women who have 
experienced sexual assault (Kelly, Burton, Regan, 1996; Reich, 2002; Doe, 2012). 
Exploring innovative language for sexual assault would mark an important 
contribution to sexual assault literature; however, it is beyond the scope of this work. 
Instead, in this dissertation, I adopt the imperfect term survivor/victim. The forward slash 
serves a distinct purpose. It acknowledges that women's identities in relation to their 
violent experiences can be complex, multiple, and changing. The term survivor/victim 
offers the possibility of women claiming one or both identities and the forward slash 
proposes the possibility that women may claim identities in between or beyond survivor 
and victim. 
Adult women as survivors/victims. 
This study concentrates on women who experience and report sexual assault. In 
adopting this focus, I do not mean to suggest that men do not or cannot experience sexual 
assault. There is a growing scholarly recognition of male experiences of sexual violence 
(Graham, 2006; Light & Monk-Turner, 2009; Ralston, 2012). However, Canadian 
victimization surveys and crime statistics continue to illustrate that women experience 
substantially higher rates of sexual assault: the most recent estimate is that women are 5.6 
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times more likely to be sexually assaulted than men (Brennan & Taylor-Butts, 2008). 16 
Scholars have also found that women are far more likely than men to seek medicolegal 
services (Washington, 1999; Light & Monk-Turner, 2009). In light of these current 
understandings, I use the female pronoun to refer to survivors/victims accessing 
medicolegal services. I narrow my focus even further to adult female survivor/victims. 
Medicolegal practices and sexual assault laws for youth and children are markedly 
different than for adults, and are beyond the scope of this study. 17 
Perpetrators of sexual assault. 
I use the term perpetrator to refer to those who commit sexual assault. I do not 
adopt the legal terms suspect or accused to refer to those before a trial, or offender to 
refer to those who have been found guilty as a result of a trial. This language is based on 
the assumption that truth about sexual assault can only be found in the courtroom and not 
in women's reports of sexual assault. Instead, I assume that in most cases women's 
reports of sexual assault are true and so I adopt their definitions of the men who sexually 
assault them. 
16 Crime and victimization survey statistics are based on sexual assaults that people report to police and 
data collectors at Statistics Canada. Anti-rape activists have argued for several decades that women rarely 
report sexual assault and have shown that women of colour, women experiencing poverty, and women with 
disabilities and mental health diagnoses are significantly less likely to report their experiences of sexual 
assault (Griffin, 1971; Clark & Lewis, 1977; Doe, 2003; Johnson & Dawson, 2011). Any statistical 
estimate based on reported sexual assaults is therefore, at best, a glimpse into a much larger and pervasive 
issue. 
17 In Canada, the age of sexual consent is 16. For this reason, in cases involving survivors/victims under 
16, physical evidence of sexual activity from the SAEK exam is usually read as evidence of guilt. The 
technoscientific witness thus carries greater weight in cases involving youth and children. Beyond 
differences in legal definitions, medico legal practices around the SAEK differ for youth and children. In 
Ontario, pediatricians must conduct SAEK exams on youth and children in hospitals that offer pediatric 
care. Additionally, different SAEK protocols and timelines exist for forensic evidence collection from 
youth and children. Exploring the SAEK in relation to youth and children would require a separate and 
detailed analysis. 
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I use the male pronoun to refer to perpetrators of sexual assault. This is not to 
suggest that women do not and cannot perpetrate sexual assault; however, this gendered 
language reflects the current statistical estimates that men commit the vast majority 
(97%) of sexual assaults in Canada (Brennan & Taylor-Butts, 2008). 
A Road Map 
In the following chapter, I outline the study's theoretical/methodological 
approach. I describe how I use tools from ANT to diffract the contemporary SAEK and 
its meaning as the technoscientific witness. I also explain the samples and the methods of 
data collection and analysis I use in this study. 
Chapters 3-5 sketch the history of how the SAEK and its meaning as the 
technoscientific witness of sexual assault came to be. In chapter 6, I use this historical 
sketching of the SAEK to explore what the contemporary SAEK is and how it works in 
contemporary medicolegal networks. As a way of conclusion, in chapter 7, I explore what 
the SAEK could be in future networks. Taken together, these chapters perform what 
Haraway suggests diffraction implies: examining "the history of how it came to be, as 
well as what it simultaneously is" (Haraway, 2000, p. 108), and, my addition, what it 
could be. 
I begin my history of the SAEK in the 1970s, a decade ofrising anti-rape 
activism, heated controversies over medicolegal practice, and changing forensic 
technologies and sciences. Alongside all of this movement in the 1970s were firmly 
entrenched legal histories and practices in which legal actors labeled women reporting 
sexual assault as unreliable witnesses. Chapter 3 traces these entangled histories and 
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charts the design of the first SAEK in Ontario. I use Akrich's (1992) notion of 
"inscription" (p. 208) to describe the SAEK' s design as a process that involved inscribing 
meanings, practices, and histories into the first Ontario SAEK in 1979. I argue that in this 
design work, medicolegal actors imagined a technoscientific witness of sexual assault 
that promised to give testimony that legal actors would deem credible. 
Chapter 4 charts the medicolegal efforts in the 1980s to stabilize the first SAEK in 
Ontario as the technoscientific witness of sexual assault. I illustrate the controversies that 
the SAEK prompted amongst medicolegal actors and rape crisis centre workers. Through 
this, I sketch how medicolegal actors used the SAEK in varying ways and how it enacted 
new meanings of rape and sexually violated bodies. I examine the rise of new expertise, 
experts, and expert spaces around the SAEK and trace how these developments 
contributed to redefining the SAEK, medicolegal practice, and rape crisis centre 
advocacy in medicolegal networks. This chapter shows how the SAEK was reassembled 
through controversy, legal reform, and shifting practice, and how through this history, the 
SAEK gained stability as the technoscientific witness of sexual assault. 
In chapter 5, I explore how the SAEK was destabilized and restabilized in the late 
1980s and 1990s with the introduction of forensic DNA analysis. I describe how the 
technoscientific witness of sexual assault was transformed into a genetic technoscientific 
witness that, in the eyes of medico legal actors, gave more objective and reliable accounts 
of sexual assault. I show how the genetic witness was stabilized amidst legal battles 
around women's credibility in the sexual assault courtroom, opposition from some anti-
rape activists, and legal and technoscientific controversies around forensic DNA analysis. 
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Chapter 6 turns to the contemporary SAEK and its medicolegal network. In this 
chapter, I ask: how does the SAEK act in the contemporary medicolegal network, for 
what purposes, and to whose benefit? I trace the shifting terrain of medicolegal practice 
and expertise in which the SAEK acts and is enacted as the credible and objective 
technoscientific witness of sexual assault. In this chapter, I describe how police and 
defence lawyers routinely rely on the technoscientific witness to test the veracity of 
women's reports of sexual assault. Through an analysis of contemporary medicolegal 
practice, expertise, and continued technoscientific controversies, I argue in this chapter 
that the SAEK has stability as the technoscientific witness that benefits many 
medicolegal actors but few survivors/victims. 
I conclude the dissertation in chapter 7 where I briefly sketch how the SAEK and 
its networks may (de )stabilize in the years to come. I explore possible future shifts in the 
SAEK and its networks as a way of imagining more ethical and responsible ways of 
enacting the medicolegal technologies and practices around sexual assault. 
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Chapter 2 
Diffracting the Sexual Assault Evidence Kit 
This chapter outlines the theoretical/methodological approach that I use in this 
study to diffract the contemporary Sexual Assault Evidence Kit (SAEK). I begin the 
chapter by describing a set of diffraction tools that I have assembled from Actor-Network 
Theory (ANT) and outline how I use these tools to create feminist interference patterns 
in the SAEK. I then explore my situated use of these tools and how it shapes what of the 
SAEK I can see and feel. I conclude by outlining the methods and samples that this study 
employs. 
The Diffraction Metaphor 
Tracing entangled histories and contemporary uses of a technoscientific object 
calls for new epistemological metaphors, according to Haraway (2000) and Law (2004). 
Both contend that well-used metaphors, such as representing or reflecting, falsely imply 
an "innocent" (Law, 2003, p. 6) act of observing phenomena from afar. Untangling the 
SAEK' s histories will not be innocent and will instead involve meddling and 
"interfering" (Haraway, 2000, p. 101) with the contemporary SAEK and its meaning as 
the technoscientific witness. To guide this work of untangling the SAEK, a metaphor that 
conveys how my methodological treks through the SAEK' s histories and contemporary 
uses might "make a difference" (Haraway, 1997, p. 16) would be more useful. For this 
project, I employ Donna Haraway's (1997, 2000) diffraction metaphor. 
Haraway proposes diffraction as an optical metaphor for seeing and interfering 
with technoscientific objects. She draws her understanding of diffraction from Newton's 
experiments on the physics of light waves and Goethe's experiments with diffraction 
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crystals (Haraway, 2000). As Haraway (2000) describes it, when a literal beam of light is 
shone through slits, or diffraction crystals, as Takeshita (2012) has later expanded, the 
light becomes fragmented into many smaller rays of coloured light. If a screen is held 
close by, patterns of coloured light rays will appear on the screen. These patterns, 
according to Haraway (1997), represent the "interference patterns" (p. 14) the slits or the 
crystal has made in the single beam of light. Diffraction, for Haraway (1997, 2000), is a 
useful metaphor for the methodological practice of breaking up the solidity of 
technoscience. It involves fragmenting singular visions of technoscientific objects to 
reveal what has been obscured or made invisible within their histories and contemporary 
uses. 
I use the diffraction metaphor to guide my efforts to see and interfere with the 
contemporary SAEK. Following the metaphor, the contemporary SAEK, its meaning as 
the credible technoscientific witness, and current material form, make up a single beam 
of light. By holding up several crystals, or as I call them, diffraction tools, to the 
contemporary SAEK, I can see the many smaller rays of light that make up the 
contemporary SAEK. I can see how the SAEK's meaning and material form came to be, 
as well as the many things that the SAEK simultaneously is. Even further, I can see how 
the SAEK gained stability that benefits many medical and legal actors but few 
survivors/victims. This diffraction work creates interference patterns, in which the many 
rays of the SAEK's history and present use become visible. 
Creating interference patterns in technoscientific objects affects them and the 
worlds they inhabit. Here, according to Haraway (1997), lies the political imperative 
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within diffraction work. She writes, "what we need is to make a difference in material-
semiotic apparatuses, to diffract the rays of technoscience so that we get more promising 
interference patterns on the recording films of our lives and bodies" (p. 16). Adding to 
this, Law (2008) states, "the question becomes: how to interfere in and diffract realities in 
particular locations to generate more respectful and less dominatory alternatives" (Law, 
2008, p. 637). Following Haraway and Law, I do not diffract for diffraction's sake. 
Instead, I diffract the contemporary SAEK in the hopes of creating interference patterns 
that may contribute to imagining more ethical and responsible ways of assembling the 
SAEK and medicolegal practices. Like Haraway, I call these types of interference 
patterns, which are geared towards finding more ethical and responsible ways of 
assembling technoscience,feminist interference patterns. 
Tools for Diffraction 
I draw my diffraction tools from Actor-Network Theory (ANT), which is a 
theoretical/methodological 1 approach in Science and Technology Studies (STS) for 
tracing human and non-human actors and their relations in technoscientific practice. After 
describing my ANT diffraction tools in detail, I consider their utility for making feminist 
interference patterns in the SAEK. 
Diffraction tools make a difference to the types of interference patterns that are 
made. When a technoscientific object is diffracted, not all of its rays will be visible; some 
will be vibrant and colourful, while others more pale and transparent. The tools that are 
1 As I describe later on, many scholars have asserted that ANT is neither a theory nor a method. I suggest 
that ANT blurs the division between theory and method: it is a theory of method and a methodology of 
theory. To reflect this understanding, I refer to ANT as a theoretical/methodological approach. 
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used to diffract, coupled with a researcher's situated use of those tools, will have an 
effect on which rays become most visible, and consequently, the interference patterns that 
are made. The diffraction tools I have assembled from ANT and my situated use of them 
have had an effect on what parts of the SAEK' s entangled histories and contemporary 
uses are visible in this study. For this reason, it is necessary to critically examine these 
tools and how I have put them to use in this study. 
Actor-Network Theory. 
ANT has been described as a "semiotics of materiality" (Law, 1999, p. 4), an 
approach for tracing material relationality in technoscientific practice: how actors (both 
human and non-human) are enacted, brought into being and assigned meaning, within 
sets of relations. This understanding of material relationality has guided many ANT 
studies on a vast array of topics, such as military aircrafts (Law, 2002), bodies with 
atherosclerosis (Mol, 2002), the UK Cervical Screening Programme (Singleton, 1998), 
and the pasteurization of milk (Latour, 1998). Beyond this loosely shared commonality, 
ANT has been more humbly described as a "toolkit for telling interesting stories" about 
technoscientific practice (Law, 2007, p. 1 ). Here, I will be digging through ANT' s toolkit 
in search of the right tools with which to diffract the SAEK. 
Much time has been spent amongst ANT scholars bemoaning ANT' s name 
(Latour, 1999; Callon, 1999; Law, 2004; Law, 2006). Despite having the word theory in 
its name, some scholars have gone to great lengths to argue that ANT is not a theory in 
the sense of being an explanatory framework upon which to hang empirical data (Callon, 
1999; Latour, 2005; Law, 2007). Nor, many contend, is the word network meant to imply 
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that ANT is a methodology that stipulates a particular shape into which empirical data is 
squeezed (Latour, 1999, 2005). Even further, some scholars have regretted the fact that 
ANT has a name because it misleadingly implies a fixed approach with a singular 
definition (Law, 1999; Law, 2006). As Law (2007) says, "I have talked of 'it,' an actor-
network theory, but there is no 'it'" (p. 1). Law (1999) leaves ANT open for translation 
and fluidity. 2 He says, 
only dead theories and dead practices celebrate their self-identity ... insist upon 
their perfect reproduction ... [ANT] is diasporic. It has spread, and as it has spread 
it has translated itself into something new, indeed into many things that are new 
and different from one another (p. 10). 
In this study, I rely on Law's optimistic and promising reading of ANT. I do not claim 
that this study is an ANT study, ifthat could in fact be claimed. Rather, it is a study that 
borrows and in so doing, translates, some existing ANT tools for the purposes of 
diffracting and making interference patterns in the SAEK. 
Diffraction tools. 
Heterogeneous actors. 
If there were a methodological dictum for ANT, it would be that seeing 
technoscience in action - or, in the making - requires that researchers trace work 
amongst both human and non-human actors (Sismondo, 2010). Technoscientific work, 
many ANT scholars have argued, is heterogeneous, and thus necessarily involves the 
2 Law's (1999, 2004, 2006, 2007) generous reading of ANT is in many ways a contrast to Latour's (1987, 
2005) formative descriptions of ANT. Despite Latour's (2005) claim that his texts are merely 
"guides ... [that] offers suggestions rather than imposing" (p. 17) themselves, they outline a set of strict 
methodological and theoretical rules for ANT studies. For this reason, I follow Law's reading of ANT more 
closely. 
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non-human (Star & Griesemer, 1989; Callon & Law, 1997; Latour, 2005). Callon and 
Law (1997) describe this further, 
Often in practice we bracket off non-human materials, assuming they have a 
status, which differs from that of a human. So materials become resources or 
constraints; they are said to be passive; to be active only when they are mobilized 
by flesh and blood actors. But if the social is really materially heterogeneous then 
this asymmetry doesn't work very well. Yes, there are differences between 
conversations, texts, techniques, and bodies. Of course. But why should we start 
out by assuming that some of these have no active role to play in social 
dynamics? (p. 168) 
Using this as a starting point for investigating the SAEK, it is possible to see the diverse 
group of human and non-human actors involved in medicolegal practice: forensic 
scientists, police, nurses, lawyers, rape crisis centre workers, survivors/victims, 3 and the 
SAEK, and other tools, texts, and technologies. 
For Latour (2005) and many other ANT scholars, actors are those people, 
animals, and things that exert influences and leave traces on and within technoscientific 
work. Actors build alliances with other actors to make technoscience. In this study, I 
draw on this understanding to see the SAEK as an actor that aligns with various other 
actors in medicolegal practice to create both witnesses and testimonies about sexual 
assault that many legal actors see as credible and objective. The fact that the SAEK aligns 
with others is particularly significant, as it is this that makes the SAEK an actor. Actors 
3 Rape crisis centre workers and survivors/victims participate in medicolegal work in different ways than 
other actors included here. I discuss this further below. 
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do not exist alone. Instead, they exist relationally, for as Mol (2002) says, "to be is to be 
related" (p. 54). 
Seeing the SAEK as an actor shifts my methodological focus away from 
perceptions and experiences of the SAEK to the object itself. In Mol's (2002) work on 
disease, she argues that focusing on doctors' and patients' perceptions or interpretations 
of disease leaves the disease untouched. She writes, 
All interpretations, whatever their number, are interpretations of. Of what? Of 
some matter that is projected somewhere ... This is built into the very metaphor of 
'perspectives' itself. This multiplies the observers - but leaves the object observed 
alone. All alone. Untouched. It is only looked at. As if it were in the middle of a 
circle. A crowd of silent faces assembles around it. They seem to get to know the 
object but with their eyes only. Maybe they have ears that listen. But no one ever 
touches the object (p. 12). 
Following this argument into the SAEK literature, it could be said that much of the 
existing work on the SAEK, which has focused on perceptions and consequences of the 
SAEK's use, has left the SAEK itself untouched. The risk of this kind of analysis, 
according to Mol, is that the object becomes "very solid [and] intangibly strong" (p. 12). 
If the aim is to diffract the SAEK and make interference patterns in its contemporary 
meaning and material form, I should not adopt a methodological focus that makes the 
SAEK appear more solid. Mol proposes an alternative. 
Mol (2002) suggests that interpretations and perceptions must be understood as 
"talk" (p. 12), as meanings that are made about an object and not as single truths about 
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what an object is made of. This approach, she asserts, must be coupled with a 
methodological foregrounding of practices and materialities. In this form of analysis, 
objects are actors participating, and being brought into being, in practice. Seeing the 
SAEK as an actor whose meaning and material form has been brought into being in 
medicolegal practice fragments its solidity: it becomes an object that could have been, 
and more optimistically, could be otherwise. 
By seeing the SAEK as an actor, I can understand its role in medicolegal practice 
differently. No longer is it a passive object that human actors use. Instead, the SAEK 
becomes an active object that works alongside human actors and participates in 
medicolegal practice as a technoscientific witness. While the SAEK is literally put to 
work by human hands, it simultaneously exerts influence on what those human hands do 
in the course of making technoscientific witness testimonies about sexual assault. In 
order to understand how the SAEK came to be and what it simultaneously is, I argue that 
the SAEK must be understood as an actor with a long history of participating in 
medicolegal practice. 
Taking the SAEK to be an actor raises the important question: what does it mean 
for a non-human actor to act? In Latour' s (2005) accounts, the non-human actor is just as 
capable as the human actor of leaving traces and exerting influence. Haraway (1997), 
however, notes a danger in over-anthropomorphizing the non-human actor. She says "our 
relationality is not of the same kind of being. It is people who have the emotional, ethical, 
political, and cognitive responsibility inside these worlds. But nonhumans are active, not 
passive, resources or products" (Haraway, 2000, p. 10). Although in this study, I 
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understand the SAEK to be an actor in medicolegal practice, I do not do so to release 
human actors from their responsibility for ethical medicolegal practice. Instead, as I 
argue, positioning the SAEK as an actor that has been brought into being through practice 
demands accountability and responsibility. amongst medicolegal actors for the SAEK and 
its use as the technoscientific witness of sexual assault. 
Actor-networks. 
Actor-networks refer to the "webs ofrelations" (Law, 2007, p. 1) between human 
and non-human actors. This term does not specify a particular shape (Latour, 2005), nor 
does it imply a functional one (Law, 2003). Rather, it highlights the relationality between 
actors involved in technoscientific practice. Actor-networks, according to Latour (2005), 
should be viewed as "work-nets" (p. 132) of heterogeneous actors working alongside one 
another in technoscientific practice. 
In this study, I sketch how nurses, police, lawyers, anti-rape activists, 
survivors/victims and the SAEK work alongside one another within what I am calling a 
medicolegal network. As I show, this medicolegal network has shifted historically with 
relational shifts in the SAEK and medicolegal practice. I argue that through these shifting 
networks, the contemporary SAEK gained stability as the technoscientific witness that 
does not benefit all survivors/victims. 
The two diffraction tools, actor and actor-network, work together in this study to 
describe what the SAEK is and what it works within. In order to see how the SAEK came 
to be, two other tools are needed. 
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Enactment. 
To examine how the SAEK has been brought into being in medicolegal networks, 
I need a diffraction tool that draws attention to action. One commonly used descriptor in 
STS is construction. I could use this descriptor to suggest that the SAEK has been 
constructed in different ways throughout particular historical moments.4 However, as 
both Mol (2002) and Law (2004) have argued, the term construction can imply that 
practice in the past and can suggest that an object has already been put together and 
finalized in meaning and in material form. As I illustrate in chapter 6, the contemporary 
SAEK has stability as the technoscientific witness for some actors but not others, most 
particularly many survivors/victims. Using construction might erase the instability the 
SAEK has for many survivors/victims in medicolegal networks. Instead, I need a tool that 
will highlight how the SAEK has been, and for some actors continues to be unstable. I 
need tools that allow me to trace how the object itself has been brought into being 
through practice. 
Mol (2002) offers the term enactment as a descriptor for seeing how objects are 
assembled in meaning and often in material form within practice. Enactment, unlike 
construction she argues, draws attention to ongoing action, and as Law (2008) says, 
"shift[s] the verb from making to doing" (p. 635). With enactment, it becomes possible to 
see how objects are brought into being in multiple ways across different sites. Mol traces 
how the diseased body is enacted in different hospital locations: in the examining room, 
4 This framing resonates with two traditions in STS: the Social Construction of Technology, which 
emphasizes how technologies are constructed within social relations (Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch, 1989; Klein 
& Pinch, 1999), and the Social Shaping of Technology (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999), which draws 
attention to how the social and the technical are co-constructed. 
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the diseased body is pain and visible symptoms, whereas in the pathology lab, the 
diseased body is what is under the microscope. The diseased body thus becomes what 
actors define and assemble it as in practice. 
In this study, I take Mol' s notion of multiple enactments and stretch it to fit a 
historical narrative. I examine how the SAEK has been enacted in multiple ways 
historically. By looking at the multiple historical and contemporary enactments of the 
SAEK in medicolegal networks, I will show how the SAEK and its network have 
changed historically. 
Tracing enactments of the SAEK in medico legal networks requires that I examine 
material relations that the SAEK has with other actors in medicolegal practice and trace 
the meanings that have been formed out of these relations. I examine the shifting 
relations the SAEK has had with anti-rape activists, nurses, doctors, lawyers, and forensic 
scientists, and survivors' /victims' bodies, and trace the new meanings for the SAEK and 
medicolegal practice that has arisen from these changes. 
I suggest that enactments of the SAEK in medico legal practice corresponded with 
enactments of survivors' /victims' bodies as crime scenes. By suggesting that 
survivors' /victims' bodies are enacted in medicolegal practice, I do not mean to diminish 
their material existence outside of medicolegal practice. Nor do I wish to imply that 
survivors/victims have no claim over their own bodies. Instead, I use enactment to place 
the focus on the SAEK's work on the sexually violated body in medicolegal practice, 
and, in so doing, illustrate the stakes of medico legal practice. In looking at enactments in 
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practice, I am not only looking at what is done, but also how those actions assemble and 
give new meaning to the SAEK and the sexually violated bodies it acts on. 
Enactment not only locates my analysis in practice, but also offers something 
more optimistic. If the SAEK, and other actors like the sexually violated body, are 
enacted in practice and are not fixed results of actions in the past, then alternative and 
perhaps more ethical and responsible modes of assembly become theoretically possible. I 
explore this discussion of alternative enactments of the SAEK in the chapter 7. 
I use enactment as a diffraction tool to highlight the practices through which the 
SAEK has gained its contemporary material form and meaning as the technoscientific 
witness. I employ another tool from ANT in order to see how the SAEK has come to be. 
Traces. 
Latour (2005) argues that sociologists investigating technoscience must study the 
traces that actors leave behind. Mialet (2012) puts it clearly, "Latour's innovation was to 
direct our attention to the traces left by human and things circulating through the 
collective, a kind of. .. materialization of their presence and action" (Mialet, 2012, p.458). 
The sociologist's work, according to Latour (2005) is to follow actors' traces in order to 
see technoscientific practice and the objects that are enacted within it. I adopt this 
approach to follow the traces the SAEK and other medicolegal actors have left within the 
SAEK' s entangled histories. 
The notion of traces allows me to diffract the SAEK in two ways. It offers a 
directive for how to follow the SAEK through time and space by directing my attention 
to the material signs of the SAEK's presence, such as texts, technologies, and changes in 
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practice and protocols. Additionally, the notion of traces offers an image of what the 
SAEK does: the SAEK combs the sexually violated body for traces of sexual assault. As I 
show in this study, the practices around the SAEK for seeing and collecting traces, and 
the definitions of what constitutes a trace of sexual assault have changed through 
technoscientific controversies and legal reform, alongside changes in the SAEK' s 
meaning and material form. 
The 'Right Tools'5 for Feminist Interference Patterns? 
The diffraction tools that I draw from ANT have shaped which rays of the SAEK 
are visible in this study and which rays have faded into the background. Much is at stake 
when choosing diffraction tools. The pertinent question thus becomes: what effect do 
diffraction tools drawn from ANT have on my ability to make a feminist interference 
patterns in the SAEK? 
Many feminist scholars have argued that ANT is in opposition to, or at least in 
tension with, feminist politics and scholarship (Haraway, 1997; Casper & Clarke, 1998; 
Star, 1991; Wajcman, 2000). No doubt this is at least in part fuelled by Latour's 
reluctance to cite feminist scholars (Harding, 2008) and his adamant critiques of what he 
calls "critical sociology" for putting politics first (Latour, 2005, p. 250). Feminist 
scholars have reproached ANT for being limited to perspectives of powerful scientists 
and technicians (Star & Griesemer, 1989; Star, 1991; Wajcman, 2000), for being 
"insufficiently radical" (p. 452), and for ignoring marginalized actors and their restricted 
5 I borrow this phrase from Casper and Clarke (1998), who use it in the context of describing scientific 
tools that have been constructed to be understood as "the right for the job" (p. 255). "Rightness," in this 
instance, is not a moral position, but instead, a constructed meaning. Tools are made to fit the jobs they are 
meant for with "tinkering strategies" (p. 255). I argue that ANT's rightness for the job of making feminist 
interferences requires some tinkering strategies. 
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access within the actor networks of technoscience. As Star ( 1991) puts it, "Latour and 
Callon's work has opened up a whole new way of analyzing technology ... but seem[s] to 
sidestep traditional questions of distribution and access" (p. 42). 
While these critiques might, for some, dispel all hope of ANT tools being made 
useful for feminist interference patterns, I suggest instead that some "tinkering strategies" 
(Casper & Clarke, 1998, p. 255) open new possibilities. Several questions inspire and 
guide my strategies to tinker ANT tools to make them useful in this feminist diffraction 
of the SAEK. 
Who counts as an actor? And why actor-networks? 
Many feminist STS scholars have shown that when ANT grants epistemic 
privilege to marginalized actors, the shapes of actor-networks change (Star & Griesemer, 
1989; Star, 1991; Clarke & Montini, 1993; Casper & Clarke, 1998). Star (1991) proposes 
that the marginalized6 actor should serve as a point of entry into an actor-network for the 
"voices of those suffering from the abuses of technological power are among the most 
powerful analytically" (p. 30). For Star, and other feminist STS scholars, the "non user" 
(Star, 1991, p. 38) or the "implicated user" (Clarke & Montini, 1993, p. 42) of technology 
is a more powerful point of analytical entry, which, according to Takeshita (2012), 
combats the invisibility of women and invites an analysis of power. I adopt this approach, 
but only partially. 
6 Star, along with others making similar arguments about ANT, has used the term marginal. In keeping 
with this, throughout this dissertation, I refer to actors who have been made marginal. 
35 
The primary focus in this study is on medicolegal actors who might be described 
as non-marginal:7 nurses, doctors, police, forensic scientists, and lawyers. However, I do 
include, to varying degrees, two overlapping groups of actors who I argue were and are 
often situated on the margins of medico legal practice around the SAEK: rape crisis centre 
workers and survivors/victims. 8 Contemporary rape crisis centre workers, I argue, have 
been largely situated as non-users of the SAEK. They are not involved in consultations, 
design work, or training on the SAEK, nor do they literally use the SAEK in their work, 
as nurses, scientists, and lawyers do. I show how rape crisis centre workers' positioning 
in relation to the SAEK arose out of historical action. Rape crisis centre workers did not 
begin as non-users. Instead, this status was negotiated and was enacted in practice. 
Similarly, contemporary survivors/victims, I argue, have been positioned as 
implicated users of the SAEK. As I explain, survivors' /victims' capacities to act in the 
SAEK exam is often limited by many things and as such, they are more often involved in 
the SAEK exam as the subjects of the SAEK's action. However, this is not an inherent 
status. Instead, it emerged in history and as a result of medicolegal practice. 
While I do include some of the actors who have been put on the margins of 
medicolegal practice, I have not used their marginality as an analytical entry point into 
the SAEK and its medico legal networks, as Star (1991) suggests. Instead, I focus on 
showing how their marginality was enacted in practice. In doing so, I follow Michael 
7 I do not use this term to suggest a stable non-marginal status amongst all of these actors. These actors are 
instead non-marginal in relation to many rape crisis centre workers and most survivors/victims. However, 
as I show in this study, their relational status as non-marginal has been enacted in practice and at times, has 
been the subject of controversy. 
8 As I explain in the next chapter, some rape crisis workers are survivors/victims of rape and sexual 
violence, and therefore these groups are not mutually exclusive. 
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Callon's (1986) suggestion that "science and technology are dramatic 'stories' in which 
the identity of actors is one of the issues at hand" (p. 198). I illustrate how the 
designations of non-user and implicated user of the SAEK were subjects of historical 
controversies and results of medico legal practice. I suggest that showing how actors 
come to be marginal through practices is a more optimistic approach than what some 
feminist STS scholars have proposed. If marginality is a product of practice, it could have 
been, and could be, otherwise. 
Although I do include some actors who have been made marginal, my primary 
focus is on medicolegal actors who are most often not on the margins of medico legal 
practice. I am interested in these actors' practices and efforts to stabilize the SAEK and 
its meaning as the technoscientific witness of sexual assault. I suggest that tracing non-
marginal actors can reveal the practices through which. technoscientific objects gain 
stability that does not benefit all actors. I propose that feminist interference patterns in the 
SAEK can be made by tracing medico legal actors' practices that enact the SAEK in 
medicolegal networks. Revealing complexities of practice is a necessary step towards 
imagining alternatives. 
Whose traces should I follow? 
According to Latour (2005), a "slogan for ANT" (p. 12) is to follow actors' traces 
and, in so doing, "grant them back the ability to make up their own theories of what the 
social is made of' (p. 11 ). The sociologist, he claims, should not impose her own 
theories, but rather follow actors' own understandings of the worlds they inhabit. In the 
context of studying medicolegal actors, such as nurses, doctors, police, forensic scientists, 
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and lawyers, I run the risk of silencing my own critical, feminist voice in this study if I 
give actors full capacity to "make up their own theories" (p. 11) of what the SAEK and 
medico legal practice is made of. If my aim is to create feminist interference patterns in 
the SAEK, I cannot afford to let medicolegal actors solely define the traces I follow or 
the theories I sketch. Most medico legal actors already have a great degree of power to 
define what the social is made of - they do not need me to grant them any more. My aim 
is instead to follow actors' traces with a critical eye to not only what they include, but 
also what they do not include. I guide my steps through the SAEK's entangled histories 
with questions that Latour does not ask: What actors have the resources and the power to 
leave traces? What actors cannot leave traces? Who defines what traces count and get left 
behind? And how do visible and invisible traces impact the narratives that I can tell? 
Whose enactments count? Whose do not? And Cui Bono ?9 
Making feminist interference patterns in the SAEK requires deeper questions than 
just what objects get enacted through what practices. I diffract the SAEK with larger 
questions in mind. I focus on what objects get enacted through whose practices, for what 
purposes, and to whose benefit? As Jasanoff (2012) says of ANT, "there is room in that 
project to ask not only who wins and who loses in particular struggles over 
representation, but who benefits and to what end, by what means, and at how great a 
cost" (p. 439). Using these questions as a starting place, it becomes possible to see the 
stakes that different enactments and practices around the SAEK have, and for whom. 
9 This phrase, which means "to whose benefit." comes from Susan Star (1991), who uses it to propose a 
different analytical starting point for ANT. She says, "I think it is both more analytically interesting, and 
politically just to begin with the question, cui bono? than to begin with a celebration of the fact of 
human/non human mingling" (p. 43). It is this question that inspires my "tinkering" of ANT tools. 
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Situated Diffraction 
My interference patterns in the SAEK are shaped not only by the diffraction tools 
I have used, but also by my situated use of them. They are shaped by how I am 
"situated"10 (Haraway, 1991, p. 183), in terms of both my social positioning as a young, 
white, female academic and my positioning in relation to my object of study. I argue that 
my situatedness shapes the rays of the SAEK that I can see and, going further, the rays 
that I can feel. 11 
Obscured rays. 
The feminist scholar's work in diffracting technoscientific objects is to make 
visible the many rays of a technoscientific object (Haraway, 1997, 2000). However, what 
about the rays that the feminist scholar cannot see and that are obscured from her view? 
The SAEK is commonly kept out of view from non-medico legal actors. The 
contemporary SAEK is considered by most to be the property of the medico legal system 
and is therefore heavily guarded by its users. 12 The SAEK's invisibility raises an 
important question for diffraction: how do we diffract an object whose many rays are 
kept invisible? And, how does this shape the kinds of interference patterns that can be 
made? 
Seeing medicolegal practice and the human and non-human actors involved in it, 
is contingent on negotiating access. The medicolegal system has many formal 
lO I draw this term from Haraway's (2000) description of situated knowledges, which draw attention to the 
"embodied nature of all vision" (p. 188). 
11 Here, I refer to physical and emotional feeling. I explain this further below. 
12 In the 62 interviews that I conducted, I was only once given the opportunity to see a SAEK. There are 
few pictures of the Ontario SAEK on the internet and the forms within it are not made available to the 
public. I was forced to use an Access to Freedom oflnformation request to obtain some of the texts within 
the SAEK. 
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mechanisms that keep their practices largely invisible. Many medicolegal actors, both 
human and text, are not allowed to speak to researchers without the permission of a 
higher authority. Police, forensic scientists, and crown attorneys require approval from 
their supervisors before they can participate in research. Hospital staff members are 
similarly governed by hospital ethics boards, which scrutinize research and researchers 
before granting researchers access and allowing staff members to participate. Many 
medico legal texts are kept out of reach of the non-medico legal actor and can only be 
obtained if approval is sought and granted through formal procedures like the Canadian 
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, a process that does not always 
yield results (Yeager, 2006; Larsen & Walby, 2012). 
Many critical scholars have argued that researchers' situated locations influence 
their ability to negotiate and obtain access to actors within powerful institutions (Hom, 
1997; Anderson-Levy, 2010). In his recent work on law, Latour (2010) seemingly sailed 
into the French supreme courts to conduct his legal research uninhibited, just as he did in 
the science lab in the early 1980s (Latour & Woolgar, 1986). My access story was not so 
easy. Being a young, white, female scholar, my legitimacy and credibility as a researcher 
and a scholar was often questioned and used as the basis for determining my degree of 
access. 13 Gatekeepers assessed the level of threat that both I and my research posed to the 
stability of the SAEK and its medico legal networks. As one potential participant 
demanded, "are you looking at technology as a good thing, a bad thing, or what?!" When 
13 My identities also worked in other ways that occasionally helped to facilitate my entry. In a few cases, 
participants seem to read my youth, whiteness, and femaleness as signs that I was not threatening. Some 
referred to my dissertation as "your school project," language that is more often reserved for children and 
youth. With this frame, some participants saw me and the dissertation as innocent and non-critical and 
granted me access as a result. 
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my answers failed to pass access tests like these, potential participants and their 
supervisors sometimes refused to give me access or imposed additional institutional 
mechanisms for scrutinizing research, such as hospital research ethics board protocols 
and review. 
These access-regulating practices obscure many of the SAEK's rays. Diffraction, 
in this context, becomes a more complicated task. It involves creative "muckracking," a 
term Gary Marx proposed in 1972 for the work of uncovering institutional practices that 
are deliberately kept from public view. It requires more resourceful efforts to access 
"hidden and dirty data" (Marx, 1984, p. 78) about medicolegal practice. And, above all, it 
requires recognition that, despite all efforts to make them visible, many of the SAEK's 
rays will remain obscured. 
Felt rays. 
In her list of questions for feminist technoscience, Haraway ( 1991) asks, "what 
other sensory powers do we wish to cultivate besides vision?" (p. 194). In cases where 
technoscientific objects are difficult to see, Haraway's question opens up the possibility 
of considering other ways of creating interference patterns. In what follows, I ask if 
physical and emotional feeling might be another sensory power for diffraction. When 
technoscientific objects are diffracted, where do the rays of the objects go? In Haraway's 
description of diffraction, the rays only become visible and decipherable, but are never 
explicitly felt. I propose that some rays may diffract into researchers' bodies and that this 
may shape the feminist interference patterns that they make. 
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Although the theme of technoscientific objects acting on and alongside bodies is a 
common one in feminist STS (e.g., Casper & Clarke, 1998; Dugdale, 2000; Vostral, 
2011; Hasson, 2012), the relationship between researchers' bodies and technoscientific 
objects has rarely been explored. There are a few exceptions. Both Takeshita (2012) and 
Singleton (1996) briefly describe their bodily relationships to the objects they study, 
which are the IUD and the cervical smear. In both narratives, they describe the positive 
ways their objects have acted on their physical bodies. 'While this points in the direction 
of felt technoscientific objects, I wish to go further. I am interested in ways that 
technoscientific objects can act on researchers' bodies in more nuanced and sometimes 
negative, although not necessarily unproductive, ways, and how this might influence 
diffraction. 
Researching sexual violence can be emotionally consuming, physically depleting, 
and dispiriting. The close and prolonged contact with stories of brutal bodily violence can 
leave inerasable marks. Campbell (2002), narrating her research team's experience of 
researching rape, writes, 
We mourn for the victims and ourselves: our loss of innocence, safety and well-
being. Bearing witness to these stories of trauma was painful, and we became 
saturated with hurt. The constant contact with rape reminded us that we too could 
be victimized (p. 11 ). 
Campbell (2002) sketches how she and her research team "felt rape" (p. 11) through five 
emotions: loss, pain, fear, anger, and hope. Stanko (1997) tells a similar story of feeling 
her own emotional exhaustion and pain during her research on violence against women. 
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Both women argue that understanding felt emotions must be a central part of researching 
violence against women. Going further, I suggest that subject matters, or objects of study, 
can be felt not only through emotions, but also through a researchers' situated body, 
sometimes in ways that are physical, with physiological effects. I suggest that these felt 
responses can serve as important sensory powers for diffraction. 
While I have never felt the SAEK in the same physical, painful, and intrusive way 
that many survivors/victims have, I have felt the SAEK during my research. 14 In 
suggesting this, I am proposing a more abstracted understanding of feeling, whereby 
technoscientific objects are felt through the narratives that are written about them, the 
protocols that exist for their use, and the practices that shape them. Being situated in a 
female body, I understand the kit to be a technoscientific object that was originally 
designed for my body. Reading the kit's protocols and associated practices is hard to do 
without imagining how they might act on my own body, and how this might feel. Reading 
about the SAEK's protocol to pluck 50 head hairs and 12 individual pubic hairs 
(Provincial Secretariat for Justice, 1979c) or about physicians forcefully inserting un-
lubricated speculums into women's vaginas (Williams & Williams, 1973) is difficult to 
do without feeling a twinge in the body, a squeamishness, almost an imagined pain. 
Alongside these bodily responses, listening to the misogynist, victim hating and blaming 
talk that at times crept into my interviews with police and lawyers was difficult to 
14 By suggesting this, I do not mean to diminish women's experiences of the SAEK. The way that I have 
felt the SAEK is significantly different than how many survivors/victims have felt the SAEK. 
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stomach. 15 At times I had to stop reading, transcribing, and listening to cry, laugh, or just 
breathe. 
Stanko (1997) and Campbell (2002) argue that emotional responses need not 
threaten our research, but can instead serve as methodological resources. I suggest this is 
true of all felt responses, including not only emotional, but physical as well. If 
technoscientific objects can be felt, they can be seen and diffracted in different and 
sometimes more effective ways. Law (2000) argues, "the body is so important: for it is a 
detector, a finely tuned detector, a detector of narrative diffraction patterns. It is an 
exquisite and finely honed instrument that both detects and performs patterns of 
interference between modes of ordering" (p. 27). My felt responses to the SAEK provide 
another sensory power beyond vision that shapes how and why I diffract and the feminist 
interference patterns that I make. To honour and make use of my own experiences of 
feeling the SAEK, I recorded them as data, logging them alongside the medicolegal 
traces that I followed. I now tum to a description of the other bodies of data this study 
uses and the methods that I employed to assemble them. 
Methods 
The SAEK is a technoscientific object that is particularly difficult to trace through 
historical and contemporary medicolegal networks. Compounding the difficulties of 
access, much of the SAEK' s history has been erased or forgotten. High turnover rates in 
15 My use of a bodily descriptor here is purposeful. 
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forensic nursing and sexual assault policing16 makes it difficult to find people whose 
memories of the SAEK extend beyond a few years. Since the SAEK is a relatively new 
technology (34 years old), many of the texts that have historically mediated and recorded 
its use have not yet found their way to the archives. To sketch the SAEK's histories, I had 
to uncover and thread together many traces of practice; This historical "muckracking" 
(Marx, 1972, p. 1) required a large sample of interview data, both oral history and 
contemporary, as well as textual data, both archival and current. 
My reliance on interview and textual data departs from the ANT tradition of using 
participant observation to study scientific practice (Mialet, 2012), which was largely 
initiated by Latour and Woolgar's (1986) formative laboratory ethnography. Participant 
observation of contemporary practice is near impossible in the medicolegal system, due 
not only to known ethical issues of witnessing trauma as a form of data collection, but 
also to institutional assurances of medical confidentiality and privacy, liability, and 
accountability to the legal system. As for the historical traces of the SAEK, only oral 
history and textual data collection are possible. To diffract the SAEK, I thus use a 
combination of data. 
Interviews. 
I conducted sixty-two 17 semi-structured interviews with medicolegal actors and 
rape crisis centre staff in 26 cities and communities across Ontario (see Appendix C for 
16 Many participants in this study spoke directly to high turnover rates in sexual assault policing and 
nursing. Both fields involve on call work, with pay that for some does not outweigh the emotional drain the 
work can cause. This is discussed more in Chapter 6. 
17 Sixty of 62 interviews were conducted for the purposes of this study. I added two interviews with 
forensic scientists in Ontario, which I conducted in a previous study on a similar topic (Quinlan, 2008), to 
this study's sample. Because in this study, I was only given permission to speak to one forensic scientist 
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sample distribution). The participants' geographical locations of the participants stretched 
as far east as Ottawa, west as Thunder Bay, north as Kenora, and south as Niagara Falls. 
The participants included rape crisis centre workers (both currently employed and 
retired), Sexual Assault/Domestic Violence Treatment Centre (SACTC) 18 medical staff 
(sexual assault nurses, a doctor and a social worker), police (investigators, forensic 
identification officers, and 0 PP administrators), victim service staff, and lawyers (crown, 
defense, and civil attorneys). Prior to any participant recruitment, I sought and obtained 
ethics approval from the York University Ethics Board (see Appendix E for ethics 
approval certificate). To increase diversity and geographical representation in the sample, 
I used both purposive and snowball sampling techniques. 
All participants were given a code, which included a letter indicating their role in 
medicolegal networks and a unique number (eg. Pl, SANE2). I use these participant 
codes to identify participants throughout this dissertation (see Appendix B for complete 
list of codes). 
Participation in research is highly regulated in medical and legal institutions, often 
through formalized research approval processes (Pamis, Du Mont, & Gombay, 2005; 
Rowe, 2007). These processes limit researchers' access to institutional practice and 
monitor and at times, prevent employees' participation in research. I used a variety of 
techniques to negotiate access, some of which involved going through, and others around, 
and one forensic lab manager, these two additional interviews with forensic scientists provided a necessary 
supplement to this study's data. 
18 This acronym, which denotes Sexual Assault Care and Treatment Centre, reflects the original name these 
centres held before they began offering domestic violence treatment in 1998 (KPMG Consulting, 1999). 
For consistency, I refer to SACTCs throughout this dissertation. 
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formalized approval processes. This combination of access strategies was crucial to 
tracing the SAEK. 
Contact information for individual police officers and forensic scientists is not 
readily available online. To gain access to these groups, I sought formal approval from 
directors of the Ontario Centre of Forensic Science to interview forensic scientists and 
from 10 police sergeants in sexual assault units across Ontario to interview police. I sent 
these supervisors and directors an outline of the research, the interview questions, and 
proof of York University's Ethics Board's approval of the study. 19 I explicitly stated that 
I was interested in conducting my own recruitment. However, all the supervisors and 
directors selected participants for me. 
To recruit medical staff and crown attorneys, I adopted a different approach. 
Instead of seeking formal approval through the hospital ethics boards to access the 
medical staff and the Ministry of the Attorney General to access crown attorneys, I 
contacted participants directly through the SA/DVTC websites and the Ministry's online 
directory of crown attorneys. I selected participants purposively to ensure breadth in 
geographic representation. 
Defense lawyers, victim service employees, and rape crisis centre workers 
generally do not require formal approval to participate in research. I obtained contact 
information for defense lawyers through Google and the Directory of Certified 
19 The challenges of researchers gaining access to police have been well documented (Hom, 1997; Rowe, 
2007; Dafnos, 2012) and while parallel challenges for forensic scientists have not been explored to the 
same extent, similar challenges exist. By including a description of my study on York University letter-
head, my list of interview questions, and proof of university ethics approval in my access requests, I aimed 
to strategically present both myself, and the research project, as credible and institutionally sanctioned. This 
proved to be a relatively successful strategy for gaining access to both of these groups. 
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Specialists in Criminal Law produced by the Law Society of Upper Canada. I found 
Victim Service employees in online victim service directories. I recruited rape crisis 
centre workers through the Ontario Coalition of Rape Crisis Centres list serve and by 
email and phone. I obtained several names of retired lawyers and rape crisis centre 
workers from archival records and sought their contact information through online 
searches and phone inquiries. 
Although the focus of the study is not on the survivor's/victim's experiences of 
the SAEK, three participants identified themselves as survivors20 during the course of my 
interviews and shared their experiences of the SAEK exam with me. In all three cases, 
the participants had heard about the study from others and contacted me, asking if I 
would be interested in hearing their stories. I did not want to say no. I handled this data 
differently from the rest. I ensured that these participants were given the chance to review 
and revise the interview transcript and provide feedback on any parts of my writing 
where their words appeared. These additional steps were taken to ensure that I used these 
stories in respectful and accurate ways, which honoured the participants' experiences and 
their willingness to share them with me. 
The geographical breadth of the sample, as well as restrictions on time and 
resources, precluded me from conducting all interviews in person. While I conducted 
some interviews in person (13), others were done over the phone (44) and email (5). 
Interview length ranged from 30 minutes to two and a half hours, with a mean of one 
hour. All participants signed an informed consent form prior to the interview and were 
20 All three of these participants were or are rape crisis centre workers. Given this, and the fact that they all 
identified as survivors, I refer to these participants as survivors/advocates. 
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asked for permission to be audio taped throughout. The majority of the interviews, short 
of two phone interviews and four email interviews, were audio taped. All participants 
were offered a copy of the transcript. 
Texts. 
In addition to interview data, I collected and analyzed a variety of archival and 
contemporary texts. I collected archival documents from six archives across Ontario, 
which spanned national, provincial, municipal, and institutional levels: National Archives 
of Canada, Archives of Ontario, City of Toronto Archives, Clara Thomas Archives and 
Special Collections (York University), the Miss Margaret Robins Archives (Women's 
College Hospital), and the Canadian Women's Movement Archives (University of 
Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections). I used online archival search engines and 
consultations with archivists to generate lists of relevant archival materials, which I 
viewed onsite. The texts I collected included reports, contracts, manuals, pamphlets, 
posters, internal memos, letters, press releases, newspaper clippings, audio recordings, 
and a training video. 
To gain access to other historical and contemporary texts, I used several different 
methods. Through online databases, I collected legal case files ( 45), media articles (170), 
newsletters from the Provincial Network of Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence 
Treatment Centres (26), and issues from Broadside, a Canadian feminist newspaper (18), 
medical and forensic science journal articles, and national, provincial, and municipal 
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government reports. I used Access to Information requests21 to access both historical 
archival texts and contemporary texts. 
Tours. 
To supplement the interview and textual data, I conducted several tours of 
medico legal spaces. These tours provided depictions of the tools and technologies·that 
work alongside the SAEK and the spaces that they all work within. I toured a Sexual 
Assault Care and Treatment Centre (SACTC) with a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner to 
see an unoccupied medical exam room, and counseling and waiting rooms. The nurse 
showed and described the SAEK and its accompanying forms, along with many of the 
medical tools and forensic lights involved in the forensic exam. While I did not see these 
devices in action, they were brought to life through the nurse's vivid description. 
Additionally, I toured two sexual assault police investigation units where I was saw both 
interrogation and interviewing rooms, as well as the general office where investigators 
work. I was also given a brief tour of the Centre of Forensic Science Receiving Office, 
where SAEKs are initially processed when they arrive at the CFS. While the tours of the 
police units and forensic offices did not include descriptions of the tools used, they 
provided me with visual pictures of the spaces and actors that work with the SAEK. I 
used detailed notes and in some cases visual sketches to record what I observed during 
these tours. 
21 Many scholars have shown that requests for information under the Canadian Freedom oflnformation 
and Protection of Privacy Act are a useful research tool for critical scholarship on institutional practice 
(Yeager, 2006; Larsen & Walby, 2012). Through such requests, it becomes possible to obtain institutional 
traces that would otherwise be unobservable. 
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Tracing obscured practice. 
During the interviews, tours, and textual gathering, I was often confronted with 
descriptions of the SAEK and its medico legal networks that obscured medico legal 
practice with abstracted terms and generalized accounts of efficacious institutional action. 
These accounts not only erased action, but also conveyed an arguably idealized image of 
medicolegal networks as being collaborative, effective; and empowering for 
survivors/victims. Smith (2005) suggests that abstracted institutional accounts, in which 
practice is obscured, are crucial sites of interrogation for the critical feminist scholar. 
Drawing on some of Smith's techniques as well as my own, I developed several 
approaches to address these abstracted descriptions when I encountered them. 
Medicolegal practices were obscured during my interviews with medicolegal 
actors when they summarized their work with abstract and abbreviated descriptors, such 
as "our process" or "our protocols." Following Smith's (2005) work, Campbell and 
Gregor (2002) suggest that abstracted generalities can be hazardous for researchers 
investigating practice because they can blur, and at times, completely eliminate actual 
doings. They suggest that researchers should ask participants to speak in narrative terms 
to describe the specifics of their work, the steps taken, the materials used, and the time 
required, so as to ensure that the account is "no longer ... an abstract undertaking" (p. 72). 
In many interviews, I adopted this approach by encouraging participants to give narrative 
accounts of practice with questions such as, what are the steps involved in a forensic 
examination?, what tools do you use when you analyze forensic evidence?, and how have 
the materials in the SAEK changed and what initiated these changes? When participants 
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used abbreviations, I asked them to describe the work behind the abbreviations. The 
interview questions I used in all the interviews followed this similar theme. The questions 
were, however, not standardized, and instead were built on one another to thread together 
depictions of medico legal practice. 22 
In addition to abstracted generalities, institutional success stories of caring, 
effective, and empowering services for survivors/victims of violence often crept into my 
interviews with medicolegal actors. Police asserted that their units were "victim-
centered," victim services volunteers stated that they are "very big on letting the victim 
choose their path" (V3), and nurses claimed that the "fundamental principle" of 
SA/DVTC units is to "not only empower them [survivors/victims], but to leave all of the 
choices up to them" (SANE7). These descriptions portray medicolegal practice as safe 
and functional and erase the ways that medicolegal practice can be otherwise for some 
survivors/victims. To capture a more nuanced picture of medicolegal practice in my 
interviews, I interrogated moments of interaction between institutional actors by asking 
participants to comment on the practices of other actors. I asked nurses to describe what 
police officers say to survivors/victims at the hospital and asked forensic scientists to 
describe how lawyers speak to them about forensic evidence. By asking actors to narrate 
stories about each other, success stories were occasionally broken down and the 
controversies and tensions within practice became more visible. 
22 This approach to interviewing stems from Dorothy Smith's (2005; 2006) Institutional Ethnography (IE), 
which is a methodology that aims to map relations that coordinate and organize institutional action. 
Although this study is not guided by IE's explicit interest in mapping "ruling relations" (p. 227), which are 
those social relations that are mediated through institutional texts, I adopt some of IE's interview 
techniques for investigating institutional action. 
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Like the interviews with medico legal actors, many of the government, medical, 
and legal texts reflected sanitized depictions of institutional accomplishment and success. 
For example, in 1978 at the Ontario Consultation on Rape Honourable George Kerr, the 
Provincial Secretary for Justice, announced to his audience of police, doctors, lawyers, 
and rape crisis centre staff that the recent rise in rape statistics could only mean that "your 
efforts in supporting victims of this despicable crime are proving successful" (Provincial 
Secretariat for Justice, 1978, p. 6). Expressing a similar sentiment in 2003, the provincial 
coordinator of the Ontario Network of SA/DVTCs, wrote to the member centers in her 
quarterly newsletter, "the progressive development of our programs demonstrates your 
dedication and care to women, men and children who have been sexually or physically 
assaulted. We've certainly come a long way!" (Macdonald, 2003, p. 1). These depictions 
construct medicolegal practice as effective, collaborative, and accountable and erase what 
actors actually do in the course of their work. 
In order to interrogate practice through these texts, I used several different 
methods. I filed Freedom of Information requests to access texts that contained narratives 
of action, such as meeting minutes and memos. I also used the many texts that I gathered 
against one another. I used critical accounts from feminist archival documents, 
contemporary feminist reports, and survivors' /victims' narratives to interrogate and 
critically read institutional success stories. For texts where neither strategies were 
available, I adopted a feminist "ethnographic attitude" (Haraway, 1997, p. 190) to guide 
my reading, which ensured that I was attentive to questions about how practice can work 
to benefit some but not all. 
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My final method of interrogating practice involved overlapping textual and 
interview data collection. In several interviews, I used historical and contemporary texts 
as interview cues to illicit discussion about medicolegal practice. Interview cues can help 
ignite memory (Kuhn, 2007) and encourage participants to move away from "well-
rehearsed stories" (Stephanson, 2005, p. 37). In some cases, I introduced the textual cues 
and in others, the participant had brought cues to the interview. For several of the oral 
history interviews, I introduced media files and archival reports to the discussion and 
asked participants to comment on their contents. In all cases, I chose texts that the 
participants had been at one time familiar with, such as reports from meetings they 
attended or media quotes reporters had taken from them over thirty years ago. In other 
interviews with contemporary medico legal actors, participants shared some of the texts 
that they use in their work, such as the SAEK forms, volunteer training booklets, and 
promotional pamphlets. In all of these interviews, the texts helped to mediate the 
discussion away from generalities and towards the specifics of practice. 23 In speaking to 
the text's content, the participant often provided a story behind its lines, one that avoided 
abstractions and highlighted action and feeling. 
Methods for Assembly 
According to Law (2004 ), many existing social science methods for data analysis 
do a poor job of capturing the "messiness" (p. 5) of technoscientific practice. As Latour 
(2005) argues, these methods often encourage us to reduce complexity into "neat little 
pots" or themes (p. 141 ). Law (2004) concurs, but is perhaps more generous when he 
23 Smith (2005) describes this approach in her discussion of Institutional Ethnography. 
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says, "these methods are often extremely good at what they do, [but] they are badly 
adapted to the study of the ephemeral, the indefinite, and the irregular" (p. 4). To see the 
messiness and historical contingency of practice, both Law and Latour argue that we have 
to undo many of our old habits. 
Diffraction calls for a different set of methods. Methods that reduce historical 
traces into a finite number of commonalities and/or themes have limited use for 
diffraction, as they are more likely to diminish complexity than to reveal it. Instead, 
diffraction calls for methods that make complexities visible. I used various techniques to 
assemble the traces that I found into a detailed story about the SAEK. I "assembled" 
(Latour, 2005, p. 7) rather than analyzed. Assembly, unlike analysis, blurs the distinction 
between collecting data and making sense of it by folding the two processes into one. 
Assembly is the work of building stories about technoscientific objects and their histories 
and contemporary uses. 
I transcribed all interviews verbatim, resulting in 630 single-spaced pages of 
interview transcription. I examined the interview transcripts and textual data with a 
particular eye to the historical moments when the story shifted, when controversies 
erupted and practices changed. When these moments were identified, I used three 
different means of assembling a historical narrative of the SAEK. 
Maps. 
Following the approach some ANT scholars have taken (e.g., Halfon, 1998; Berg, 
1998), I literally mapped medicolegal networks and controversies as a tool for 
interrogation. I created a visual map of the medico legal actor-networks the SAEK works 
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within as a preliminary step into the data I collected. In these images, I aimed to map how 
medicolegal practices hang together, in some ways that were coordinated and in others 
that were conflicted in controversy (see Appendix D). While this type of mapping did 
help me visualize many important medicolegal actors, practices, and controversies, the 
boxes and arrows that I used seemed to impose an unintended linearity and simplicity on 
the SAEK's story. This pointed to a need for other forms of visualizing. Visual mapping 
thus served as a preliminary step towards a more complex analysis of the complexity of 
practice and controversy. 
Images. 
As a way of exploring my felt responses to the SAEK, I experimented with other 
visual forms, ones that were not confined to boxes and arrows and used more creative 
modes of expression. Through the course of this study, I kept a sketchbook of drawings 
and paintings that I would turn to in moments when I wanted to capture my emotional, 
psychological, and physiological responses to the SAEK (see image on page vii). I used 
this artistic work as an "alternate writing technology" (King, 1994, p. 2) for exploring the 
felt effects of my object. 
During my writing of this text, I used the images to remind myself about my 
relationship to the SAEK. They reminded me that the SAEK is not a distant thing that 
acts outside of the body, but is instead, an object that was designed to be used on bodies -
and perhaps my body - in ways that can be painful, distressing, traumatic, and even 
violent. I returned to these images during my writing to remind myself about how I feel 
about the SAEK and about how my felt responses were shaping my analysis. These 
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images reminded me of the "non-innocence" (Haraway, 1994, p. 63) of this project and 
the aims of my diffraction. 
Text as Laboratory. 
For Latour (2005), the academic text plays a crucial role in assembling stories of 
technoscience. He explains, 
Writing has everything to do with method ... the text, in our discipline, is not a 
story, not a nice story. Rather it's the functional equivalent of a laboratory. It's a 
place for trials, experiments, and simulations (p. 149). 
The chapters that follow served as my laboratories where I visualized different 
interference patterns in the SAEK. Once they appeared on paper, I assessed the patterns 
for their potential to make feminist interventions in the SAEK and searched for ways to 
make "more promising interference patterns" (Haraway, 1997, p. 16) in the SAEK and 
medicolegal practice. 
As will become apparent through the pages of this dissertation, assembling 
histories of technoscientific objects requires thick descriptions of controversies, 
uncertainties, and instabilities. This level of description is crucial to my project of 
diffracting the SAEK. Thick description is the means through which the SAEK's many 
diffracted rays become visible. Latour (2005) says there are no short cuts for an ANT 
study. Rather, this is "s/owciology" [emphasis in original] (p. 122) that requires trudging 
through shifting terrains of practice and controversy, much like, as Latour observes, the 
ant insect does over and through hills of dirt and grass. 
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Latour (2005) explains that "the reason for this change of tempo is that ... ANT 
claims to be able to find order much better after having let actors deploy the full range of 
controversies in which they are immersed" (p. 23). Only by tracing many of the 
controversies and instabilities involving the SAEK will I be able to discuss how it was 
assembled and given stability in medicolegal practice. In this approach, Latour states, 
"the search for order, rigor, and pattern is by no means abandoned. It is simply relocated 
one step further into abstraction so that actors are allowed to unfold their own differing 
cosmos, no matter how counter-intuitive they appear" (p. 23). Here, I search for order in 
the SAEK's history through a description of disorder. When I reach the end of my story 
about the SAEK, it will be clear how the tool came to be, some of the many things it 
currently is, and what it might be in the future. 
The following chapter opens the SAEK's history with the 1970s and the 
complexities, controversies, and tensions surrounding the design of the first SAEK in 
Ontario. In this chapter, I begin my story about how the SAEK came to be, and in later 
chapters, I trace the many things the SAEK and its network currently is and may be. 
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Chapter 3 
Inscriptions and Located Design: Anti-Rape Activism and the Emergence of 
The Sexual Assault Evidence Kit 
"Rape is too serious a crime to simply accept a woman's word" 
("OPP Rape Report Prepared Impartially," 1979). 
"No longer will we cry softly, padded by the courtroom walls. 
We will scream out our collective fear, anger, and rage" (Zook, 1980, p. 27). 
University of Ottawa Archives and 
Special Collections, Xi 0-1 
Copyright holder unknown 
An anti-rape protest in Toronto, n.d. 
The first Ontario Sexual Assault Evidence Kit 
(SAEK) emerged out of rising anti-rape activism, 
vibrant controversies about medical and legal 
practice, developing forensic technologies and 
sciences, and legal practices that were based on 
distrusting women reporting sexual assault. In this 
chapter, I chart the SAEK's design in the late 1970s 
by sketching the histories and practices that were 
"inscribed" (Akrich, 1992, p. 208) in the 
first SAEK. I "locate" (Suchman, 2003, p. 5) the 
SAEK' s design in particular actors, practices, 
controversies, and medical and legal actors' 1 claims about rape, women, and credibility. I 
argue that with the SAEK' s design, a technoscientific witness of sexual assault was 
devised, which medical and legal actors hoped would offer more credible testimony of 
sexual assault than the women who report it. 
1 In much of this chapter, I do not use the term medicolegal, and refer instead to medical and legal 
practices and actors. I do this deliberately to differentiate the period before the SAEK was introduced to 
Ontario from the period after, which I describe in chapters 4-6 where I use the term medicolegal. This 
language usage reflects that the SAEK's development marked a historical moment when medical and legal 
practices became formally joined in a technological object. 
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I begin this chapter by sketching the legal histories and practices in the 1970s that 
arose from legal actors not believing women reporting sexual assault and describe how 
medical evidence has been historically used in Canadian law to corroborate women's 
sexual assault reports. I then tum to the rise of the anti-rape movement in Ontario and 
describe how anti-rape activism challenged the medical response to rape and contributed 
to initiating the first SAEK. I trace the relations between anti-rape activists and medical 
and legal actors and illustrate how activists' expertise and marginality was enacted in 
medical and legal practice. I conclude the chapter by sketching the series of consultations 
between anti-rape activists and medical and legal actors where the SAEK was first 
proposed and later designed to reveal the contexts out of which the first SAEK emerged. 
In the 1970s, rape - defined in the Criminal Code of Canada as forced vaginal 
intercourse - was a common term that anti-rape activists used in public education and 
feminist literature (Brownmiller, 1975; Medea & Thompson, 1975; Clark & Lewis, 
1977). To reflect this historical context, I use the term rape throughout this chapter. I 
refer to the anti-rape movement2 to describe the interconnected political work that many 
feminist and anti-rape activists were involved in during the 1970s. I refer to anti-rape 
activists to describe the feminist and women liberation organizers, writers, and advocates 
involved in political work around rape. I also employ the more specific term, rape. crisis 
centre worker, to refer to anti-rape activists who worked in rape crisis centres. Some anti-
rape activists and rape crisis centre workers were themselves survivors/victims ofrape 
2 In using this term, I am not suggesting a homogeneous entity that existed outside of activists and their 
political work. Instead, I understand the anti-rape movement as I do medicolegal networks: as a collection 
of interrelated actors engaged.in collective work. 
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and sexual violence and had personal experiences of medical and legal practice that 
sparked and fuelled their political action. My references to anti-rape activists and rape 
crisis centre workers thus include politically active survivors/victims and their allies. As 
with the other chapters, I also insert segments of survivors' /victims' narratives in 
between and inside my own text to capture how some experienced medical and legal 
practice in the 1970s. 
Locating Design 
Locating technological design in particular actors, practices, and controversies has 
the potential to be a radical act of interference. According to Suchman (2003), technology 
stories that locate technological design in designers and users of technological objects 
can demand a renewed responsibility for what the objects are and how they are used in 
practice. In contrast, Suchman argues, stories that do not locate technological design turn 
technological objects into ahistorical commodities that are detached from the "sites of 
their production" (p. 5) and "obscure responsibility for the relations of technology 
production and use" (p. 6). In this chapter, I locate the SAEK's design to reveal a partial 
history of how it came to be, as a way of interfering with the contemporary SAEK and its 
meaning as the technoscientific witness. 
Technological design involves more than just the production of material objects. 
Instead, as Akrich ( 1992) argues, it involves "inscribing ... vision[ s] of the world in the 
technological content of the new object" (p. 208). By locating the design of the SAEK, I 
illustrate the histories and practices that became inscribed in the SAEK, focusing 
particularly on the distrust of women reporting rape, the demand for corroborative 
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medical evidence in rape cases, and the prevailing views of forensic science as objective 
and credible amongst legal actors. 3 
Technological design is not a singular process. As I show in this chapter, the 
design of the SAEK cannot be easily traced back to a single historical moment or actor. 
Rather its initial design was the result of many entangled histories of activist, medical, 
and legal action.4 The events that I trace here are not ordered chronologically, but instead 
represent many overlapping histories. 
Manufacturing Distrust: Histories of Rape Law in Canada 
The first Criminal Code of Canada of 1892 defined rape as an act of "carnal 
knowledge" (s. 266) committed by men against women who were not their wives. This 
definition remained relatively consistent until 1983, when it was significantly reformed. 
In 1970, the Criminal Code defined rape as follows, 
A male person commits rape when he has sexual intercourse with a female person 
who is not his wife, (a) without her consent, or (b) with her consent if the consent 
(i) is extorted by threats or fear of bodily harm, (ii) is obtained by personating her 
husband, or (iii) is obtained by false and fraudulent representations as to the 
nature and quality of the act (s. 143) 
This narrow definition excluded rapes committed by husbands, rapes of men and boys, 
and rapes and sexual assaults that did not involve vaginal penetration. Some of these 
3 In this chapter, I build on Feldberg (1997) and Pam is and Du Mont's (1999; 2006) analysis of the SAEK 
as a "cultural artifact" (2006, p. 76) that was built on values of technical rationality and rape mythology. I 
expand this analysis beyond values to trace the entangled histories and practices that were inscribed in the 
SAEK's meaning and material form. 
4 The SAEK was redesigned many times in its 34-year history in Ontario in ways that I describe in the 
subsequent chapters. In this chapter, I focus on the design of the.first SAEK. 
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exclusions were delineated elsewhere in the Code as general sexual offences, which 
included attempted rape (s. 145), indecent assault on a female (s. 149), and indecent 
assault on a male (s. 156). 
Rape trials in the 1970s were shaped by a common belief amongst many legal 
actors that women were inherently untrustworthy. Clarke and Lewis's ( 1977) detailed 
analysis of rape investigations and trials during this time reveals that legal actors 
routinely viewed women's reports ofrape with suspicion and as a result, women's 
credibility as witnesses was under constant challenge in court. Other accounts suggest 
that defense lawyers commonly used woman's sexual history to attack her credibility as a 
reliable witness (Backhouse, 2008). Defence lawyers often argued that a woman's sexual 
history implied her consent to all sexual acts, indicated her diminished moral character, 
and suggested that she would likely give false testimony (Clarke & Lewis, 1977). 
This practice rose directly out of 19th century English law where a woman's 
unchaste character was often used to determine her consent to the sexual act and her 
credibility as a witness (Macfarlane, 1993). The practice was solidified in 1904 in 
Wigmore's (1970) treatise on evidence, which stated that, "no judge should ever let a 
sex-offence charge go to the jury unless the female complainant's social history and 
mental make-up have been examined" [emphasis added] (p. 736). In 1971, on a CBC 
radio broadcast, a defence lawyer explained his colleagues' practices by saying, "very 
often a rigorous cross examination brings out the truth of the matter ... it's his word 
against hers ... so it can't be any other way." 
63 
In contrast, other people saw defence lawyers' practices as unnecessarily 
traumatizing and inherently inequitable. A survivor/victim on the same radio broadcast 
summarized defence practices in the 1970s by saying, "they are there to break you down 
as a woman." Doris Anderson, a well-known Canadian feminist, expressed a similar 
sentiment. She described the legal system in the 1970s by saying, "to get a conviction ... a 
woman had to have lived an absolutely blameless life, untouched by human hands" (p. 
1 ).5 
A woman's class location and racialization had a direct impact on how she was 
treated in the legal system. One rape crisis centre worker recollected that racialized, 
impoverished, and working class women were far less likely to be believed: police were 
more likely to dismiss their reports as unfounded and the courts more likely to dismiss 
their testimonies as false allegations (RCC4 ). According to one retired crown attorney, 
for a woman's testimony to be believed in the legal system, "you had to be practically ... a 
virgin who was kidnapped from the convent" (CA5). 
The deep mistrust of woman's reports of rape went beyond the courtroom and 
into police investigations as well. In 1975, Ontario police deemed 346 of the 860 reports 
of rape ( 40%) to be "unfounded," i.e. that no violation of the law took place or was 
attempted ("Police Crime Statistics," 1975). In the same year, police laid charges in 260 
5 The rape conviction rates for rape in the 1970s were drastically lower than those for other crimes. 
According to one report, the acquittal rate for most crimes was 15% in the mid- l 970s, whereas the 
conviction rate for rape cases was 15% (Canadian Broadcasting Cooperation, 1975). Clark and Lewis's 
(1977) estimate of the conviction rate in Toronto was even lower at 7%. They argue that low conviction 
rates in rape cases were a function of both courtroom practices and police investigation practices, which 
both hinged on beliefs that woman lied about rape (Clark & Lewis, 1977). 
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of the 860 Ontario rape cases (30%).6 According to Clarke and Lewis (1977), police in 
the 1970s were far less likely to believe a rape report and lay charges if a woman had 
been drinking or hitchhiking, was under 19 years of age or over 30, had no injuries, and 
was separated or divorced. Other historical evidence suggests that it was common 
practice for police officers to interrogate 
survivors/victims on the assumption that their 
report of rape was false (CBC, 1971). The 
"What I went through with the law, right 
from the first time I walked into the 
police office, was ten times worse than 
the actual rape" (Survivor/victim, CBC 
Radio, 1971). 
survivor/victim speaking in the 1971 CBC broadcast recalled what a police officer said, 
"he told me afterwards 'we tried to trip you up a lot. You don't know how many tricks 
we tried to pull on you to see whether you were lying."' 
The prevailing view of women as unreliable witnesses fuelled legal practices in 
which legal actors demanded independent corroborative evidence of rape. Police used 
corroborative evidence, which could include third party witnesses and/or medical 
forensic evidence, to determine if a case was unfounded and courts used corroborative 
evidence to determine if an accused was responsible for rape (Clark & Lewis, 1977). As I 
argue in this chapter, the requirement for corroborative evidence laid the foundation for, 
and became inscribed in, the design of the first sexual assault evidence kit. 
The corroborative evidence doctrine. 
The requirement for corroborative evidence in rape cases has deep roots in 
English common law, where notions of women as being untrustworthy and dishonest 
witnesses were first encoded in law (Tang, 1998; Backhouse, 2008). Sir Matthew Hale, a 
6 In the same year, the unfounded rate for other offences was significantly lower: assault (6.56%), robbery 
(8.18%), and breaking and entering (5.95%) ("Police Crime Statistics," 1975). 
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1 ?1h century jurist, has often been credited with penning one of the first legal arguments 
for the necessity of corroborating women's reports of rape. He stated, 
It is true, rape is a most detestable crime .... but it must be remembered that it is an 
accusation easily to be made, and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by 
the party accused, though never so innocent [emphasis added] (as cited in 
MacFarlane, 1993, p. 53). 
Hale's words became a doctrine that provided the legal justification to doubt women's 
credibility in rape cases and invited the legal requirement for corroborative, independent 
evidence that could prove the veracity of her testimony (Macfarlane, 1993). Three 
centuries later, Hale's doctrine continued to be a powerful influence in English and North 
American common law. This was evident in the words of one Canadian jurist in the late 
1960s, who wrote, 
Surely the simplest, and perhaps the most important reason not to permit 
conviction for rape on uncorroborated word of the prosecutrix is that the word is 
very often false ... Since stories of rape are frequently lies or fantasies, it is 
reasonable to provide that such a story, in itself, should not be enough to convict a 
man of a crime" [emphasis added] ("Corroborating Charges of Rape," 1967, p. 
1138). 
Following Hale's argument, this jurist argued that rape cases required more corroborative 
evidence than other offences because rape was "uniquely difficult to disprove" (p. 1139). 
Corroborative evidence was legally defined in Canada in 1916 as "independent 
testimony which affects the accused by connecting or tending to connect him with the 
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crime ... [I]t must. .. confirm ... not only the evidence that the crime has been committed, 
but also that the prisoner committed it" (R. v. Baskerville, p. 91). For much of the 20th 
century, this ruling served as the Canadian common law definition for corroborative 
evidence. Judges in the early 1970s were mandated to warn juries of the dangers of 
convicting a sexual offender without independent corroborative evidence that supported a 
woman's testimony and implicated the accused (Osborne, 1984). Backhouse (2008) notes 
that the requirement for corroborative evidence was "a substantial deviation from the 
general principles of evidence" (p. 171 ), which in most other cases, allowed jurors to 
determine a witness's credibility on the sole basis of their testimony in court and not on 
another's testimony. The additional evidentiary requirement of independent corroborative 
evidence in rape cases made them far more difficult to prosecute in the 1970s 
(Backhouse, 2008). The demand for corroborative evidence in Canadian courts opened 
up the informal requirements in rape cases for medical traces of a forced sexual act. 
Medical Traces of Rape. 
In 18th and 19th century English law, rape was defined as sexual intercourse with a 
woman that was "by force and against her will" (Macfarlane, 1993, p. 16), which was a 
definition that sparked the evidentiary necessity of medical traces of rape. Medical expert 
claims promoted this definition in the 19th century and popularized the myth that it was 
impossible to rape a woman without extreme force with claims such as the one expressed 
in 1815 in the Elements of Medical Jurisprudence: "you cannot thread a moving needle" 
(as cited in Macfarlane, 1993, p. 20). Macfarlane's historical research reveals that 
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medical evidence of vaginal penetration and injurious marks from force and violence was 
commonly required for conviction in rape cases. 
In Canadian law, this evidentiary requirement for visible signs of force was 
similarly adopted (Backhouse, 2008). While there was nothing in the Criminal Code that 
required evidence of force for a rape conviction, "judges and juries were historically loath 
to convict without evidence of substantial force and spirited resistance" (Backhouse, 
2008, p. 14 7). To be considered corroborative, the evidence had to stem from an 
"independent source" (R. v. Baskerville, 1916) outside of a woman's testimony. At the 
turn of the century, medical doctors routinely conducted forensic medical examinations 
on survivors/victims and gave testimony in court on whether physical evidence of force, 
as well as traces of semen and sexual disease, were present that could corroborate the 
report of rape (Dubinsky, 1993). According to Mills' (1982) study of medical journals in 
the 19th and 20th centuries, most doctors saw their role in rape trials as supplying 
objective truths against women who routinely lied about rape. 
Despite the medical evidence that began to appear in the 1970s that rape was not 
always violent and visible traces of rape were not always present (e.g. Burgess & 
Holmstrom, 1973), the evidentiary requirement of force and injuries held strong. Without 
medical evidence of injuries, convictions were unlikely (Kalven & Zeisel, 1972). Like the 
doctors at the turn of the century, medical doctors in the 1970s conducted medical 
forensic exams on survivors/victims to document any visible signs of violence and traces 
of semen that could corroborate a woman's testimony. The medical forensic exam in the 
1970s arose directly from the requirement for corroborative evidence in rape cases, and 
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the history of legal distrust of women, which the requirement rested upon. I argue that 
this history of distrust served as the impetus for developing a technoscientific witness of 
sexual assault and was inscribed in the design of the first SAEK. 
The year 197 6 marked the beginnings of what would be a significant reform in 
Canadian rape law in 1983. In 1976, the Criminal Code was amended to eliminate the 
requirement that judges warn juries about the dangers of convicting without corroborative 
evidence (s. 8).7 This change marked a partial step away from a long history of 
evidentiary requirements of visible signs of rape, but from many accounts, it did not 
significantly change legal practice (Clarke & Lewis, 1977; Osborne, 1984). Judges 
continued to warn juries of this practice, using the common law as justification, until 
1983, when the more significant legal reforms prohibited this practice (Osborne, 1984). 
Anti-rape activists resisted what they saw as the oppressive climate for 
survivors/victims of rape in the legal system in the 1970s. Their activism fueled rape law 
reform and helped to transform the medical and legal response to rape survivors/victims. 
It is to this resistance that I now tum. 
Sparks of the Anti-Rape Movement 
Broadside 
Reprinted with Permission 
Anti-rape Logo, ca. 1979 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the women's 
movement in Canada was in full swing. Drawing its 
momentum from what Rebick (2005) terms a "decade of 
7 Also significant was the new rule that stipulated that sexual history was only admissible with the 
permission of a judge, a ruling that marked the beginnings of what would become the rape shield law in 
1992 (Osborne, 1984). 
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revolutionary change" (p. 7) in the 1960s, the women's movement was developing its 
own language and analysis of gendered oppression. By 1966, the Equality of Women in 
Canada committee had formed, met, campaigned for, and won, a Royal Commission on 
the Status of Women, which developed 167 recommendations "to ensure for women 
equal opportunities with men in all aspects of Canadian society" (Royal Commission on 
the Status of Women, 1967, p. 13). New feminist literature in Canada, such as Chatelaine 
Magazine in the years 1957-1977 under the editorial leadership of Doris Anderson, and in 
the United States, Betty Freidan's (1963) The Feminine Mystique and Kate Millet's 
(1969) Sexual Politics, had inspired a new feminist consciousness and organizations 
across English-speaking North America. Many women's liberation groups emerged in 
Canada in the late 1960s, such as the Toronto Women's Liberation Movement, the 
Federation des femmes du Quebec, and the Vancouver Feminine Action League. Women 
were organizing women's caucuses in labour unions, instigating collective childcare, 
establishing safe houses for women fleeing from violence, and organizing to legalize 
abortion (Rebick, 2005). 
Out of this diverse movement, Cohen (1993) and others suggest that women 
discovered similar experiences of gendered oppression and violence at the hands of men. 
In feminist consciousness-raising groups, according to Cole (1989), women "uncovered 
the truth that sexual abuse was epidemic, not occasional, [and] more normal than 
marginal" (p. 12). Speak-outs provided a public forum for women to share stories of 
violence and instigated the public face of the anti-rape movement in the 1970s (Kinnon, 
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1981).8 With the release of Susan Brownmiller's Against our Will: Men, Women, and 
Rape in 197 5 and the first Canadian book on rape in 1977, Lorenne Clark and Debra 
Lewis's Rape: The Price of Coercive Sexuality, the anti-rape movement in Canada was 
well underway. 
One of the most visible signs of the anti-rape movement was the development of 
rape crisis centres (RCC) across Canada. In 1973, the first Canadian RCC opened in 
Vancouver under the name Vancouver Rape 
Relief.9 One year later, the Toronto Rape 
Crisis Centre (TRCC) opened its doors. The 
TRCC began with a few women and a small 
$8,000 grant from the city of Toronto (Parent 
as cited in Rebick, 2005). In one of the first 
advertisements for the centre, the TRCC was 
described as "a place where women who have 
THE TORONTO- RAPE CRISIS 
CENTRE NEE.DS YOU 
The TRCC neetfs 'wamen Wol'ur8 wlto 
have a pqliticol tmalysis of rape. Womd'n 
who are pra..Choicei who suppol'I tM I~ 
communtty~ struggle for equality •. and who 
·hllve a IHt.rlc und~rstonding of the atatw of' 
·women In O:tnada. 
For further information phone 9CJ4..7417. 
Broadside 
Reprinted with Permission 
Call for TRCC Volunteers in Broadside, 1979 
been raped can go and be helped ... where she can sit and talk with sympathetic women, 
[and] have a warm drink" ("Rape Crisis Centre Opening," ca. 1974, p. 1). In their first 
year, the TRCC took 2,600 calls from women seeking advice and support, and as the 
years followed, the numbers rose rapidly ("Brief Submitted," 1974). In the early years of 
8 While the 1960s and 1970s were decades when feminist consciousness around male violence solidified, 
the movement had historical roots that were much deeper. Gavey (2005) estimates that women's organizing 
against male violence and sexual exploitation began as early as the 19th century. Much of women's early 
activism around sexual violence in Canada is not well documented; however, Backhouse (2008) notes that 
as early as the 1900s, women were publically challenging existing rape laws and organizing for legal 
reform. 
9 Vancouver Rape Relief was predated by several rape crisis centres in the United States, the first of which 
was the Bay Area Women Against Rape that was organized in 1970 (Gornick, Burt, Pittman, 1985). 
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RCCs in Canada, many activists hoped their organizing would combat and eventually 
eliminate male violence. One recalled, "we all believed that we could put ourselves out of 
business" (RCC4). 
According to many historical records, RCCs in the 1970s sought to fill the 
"vacuum of services" ("The Experience of Rape Crisis Centres," ca. 1977, p.1) for 
survivors/victims of rape. One volunteer training manual (1977) states that RCCs aimed 
to provide women with "an alternative to dealing with often brusque, uncaring, 
superficial health and legal systems" (p. 2). Many centres began with women running 24-
hour crisis lines from their homes (RCC 10). Others rented space in community buildings 
and with primarily volunteer labour, they offered individual and group counseling and 
accompaniment for survivors/victims to the hospital, police station, and court. A member 
of the Ontario Coalition of Rape Crisis Centres ( 1991) wrote about these beginnings, 
There were no guidelines to draw from, other than our own and other women's 
experiences. We were faced with the necessity of developing our own training 
materials as well as developing expertise required to provide help to many 
different women (p. 1). 
For many anti-rape activists, the centres provided more than just a service for women. 
The centres were instead, according to one activist, "riding the wave of the women's 
movement" (RCC4) and were thus part of a larger feminist effort to develop alternate 
practices and discourses that challenged oppressive forms of power. Many centres 
offered "feminist peer counseling" (RCC4 ), which resisted medicalized expert definitions 
of therapy and insisted instead that women's experiential knowledge could be the basis of 
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support for other women. Deb Parent, an early TRCC member, explained in an interview 
with Judy Rebick (2005) that "the principle of peer counseling with a feminist approach 
was revolutionary ... every feminist service was a reaction to patriarchy" (p. 82). 
Many RCCs adopted methods of organizing from the women's and other social 
justice movements. Instead of depending on hierarchical structures, many centres 
organized as collectives (Cohen, 
1993). One activist described the 
collective model her centre used by 
saying, "the whole idea was to share 
the work, rotate the authority, and 
follow emerging leadership" 
(Lakeman in Rebick, 2005, p. 71). 
However, according to many anti-rape 
activists whom I interviewed, 
Rape. We're forthevictim. 
We're your local Rape 
Crisis Centre. Women who 
are trained to understand the 
trauma of rape victims and 
cheir families; women who 
are concerned about the 
treatment rape victims 
receive in our society. 
Our short term goal is 
to help during the crisis, with 
support, information and the 
protection of rights. 
Our long term goal is to 
stop rape, through public 
education of the conditioned 
attitudes that cause it. 
If you need us, we're 
here -24 hours every day. 
If you don't need us. we 
need you - to join in our 
effort and become a volunteer. 
See your phone book. 
Library and Archives Canada, RG 29 
Reprinted with Permission 
National Network of Canadian Rape Crisis 
Centres Advertisement, ca. 1978 
organizing as collectives did not come without its challenges. Another activist 
reminisced, "we were attempting to break down power structures ... and work across the 
table from each other ... sometimes this was very unyielding, [and] sometimes a fucking 
pain in the ass [laughs]" (RCC4). Some centres, largely as a result of pressures from 
funders, moved quickly to instituting a hierarchical model with a Board of Directors, but 
most maintained their collective model for much of the 1970s. IO 
IO In chapter 4, I discuss this further and outline some of the contextual reasons that some centres 
developed hierarchical models. 
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The RCCs in the 1970s became a hub of anti-rape activism in Canada. In addition 
to the centres' support work for survivors/victims, many rape crisis activists took on the 
task of educating the public and medical and legal actors about violence against women. 
According to one rape crisis 
centre worker, there was a 
prevailing mythology around rape 
that blamed the survivor/victim 
"Right from the very beginning I always spoke out as a 
survivor ... My mother was a nurse, and she had all these 
medical books with pictures of patients that had black 
strips over their eyes so you couldn't identify them. And I 
thought, no I am not going to be that. I will not wear that 
black strip over my eyes. I did nothing wrong, I have 
nothing to be ashamed about here" (SAJ). 
for the violence she (or he) experienced and labeled the rapist as a perverted stranger 
(RCC4). To counter this, many anti-rape activists drew on feminist analysis of rape that 
saw it as an expression of sexism: and act "by which all men keep all women in a state of 
fear" (Brownmiller, 1975, p. 4). Many argued that, "rape reaches women of all socio-
economic backgrounds and is a reality regardless of life-style" (Toronto Rape Crisis 
Centre, 1979, p. 3). 
Describing rape as a function of sexism politicized rape and may have challenged 
prevailing myths of the rare survivor/victim and the sick rapist. However, it glossed over 
the way that sexual violence can be also motivated by race, class, and ability, something 
which many anti-rape activists asserted in the following decades (e.g. Davis, 1983; 
Harris, 1990; Monture-Okanee, 1992). In the 1970s, however, most anti-rape activists 
were rallying around analyses of rape as a form of sexism and were challenging 
prevailing myths about rape in public educationals, media, and collective actions. 
(Pierson, 1993). Remembering this work, one activist said, "we were in unchartered 
territory" (RCC4 ). 
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Anti-rape public education work was met with much resistance. Some religious 
groups, according to Kinnon (1981), criticized the work for "threatening sexual morality 
and the natural order of things" (p. 71) and many schools prevented anti-rape educators 
from speaking to the students "on the grounds that they might create paranoia among the 
students" (p. 71). One activist recalled some of this resistance and said, 
when we talked about child sexual assault people would stand up in the room and 
tell us that we were lying ... and no matter how many times we would say here are 
the numbers, here are the stories, people would just refuse to believe (RCC4). 
Despite the opposition, political organizing around violence against women intensified. 
By 1977, there were eleven RC Cs across Ontario, and an Ontario Coalition of Rape 
Crisis Centres (OCRCC) had been initiated (Ontario Coalition of Rape Crisis Centres, n. 
d.). In 1978, a National Network of Rape Crisis Centres was formed ("Minutes of AGM," 
1978). With this collective strength, many anti-rape activists turned their attention to 
transforming medical and legal practice. 
"A pitched battle": Relations with institutional actors 
Many of the existing archival records on Ontario rape crisis centres in the 1970s 
portray a collaborative relationship between RCCs and medical and legal actors. In most 
of the publically available government records on rape services in the 1970s, rape crisis 
centres are figured as community-based extensions of medical and legal services. In the 
1979 provincial handbook on Helping Victims of Sexual Assault, rape crisis centres are 
depicted as a non-political service that collaborated with institutional actors to "provide 
continuity" (1979a, p. 37) in legal and medical services. This depiction is also mirrored in 
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many RCC's own promotional pamphlets, where their mandates included "co-operat[ing] 
with other institutions" (Rape Crisis Centre Hamilton, ca. 1978, p. 1) and providing "a 
valuable liaison" ("Why Invest," 1979, p. 9) between hospitals, police, and 
survivors/victims. 
These portrayals convey an uncomplicated relationship between RCCs and 
medical and legal actors. What these portrayals conceal are the tensions and struggles 
between RCCs and medical and legal actors in relation to anti-rape activists' efforts to 
institute change in medical and legal practice. As I show here, although there were times 
when medical and legal actors acknowledged and relied on anti-rape activists' expertise 
on rape, this was punctuated by practices that moved rape crisis centre workers to the 
margins of medical and legal practice. These tensions shaped the relations within which 
the SAEK was imagined, designed, and brought into being in medical and legal practice. 
In order to set the stage for the design consultations for the first SAEK, I trace the 
complex relations between anti-rape activists and medical and legal actors at three 
meeting points: 1) rape law reform, 2) training, and 3) rape crisis centre funding 
negotiations. 
Rape law reform. 
In the late 1970s, largely as a result of anti-rape activists' political work, efforts 
were underway to reform existing laws on rape and other sexual offenses. In 1975, anti-
rape activists from across Canada met in Vancouver and Ottawa to draft 
recommendations for the Law Reform Commission, the committee responsible for 
redrafting Canadian rape law (Vance, 1978). The activists made 24 recommendations, the 
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most significant of which proposed eliminating rape as a distinct offence in the Criminal 
Code and reclassifying it as a form of sexual assault in section 244 of the Criminal Code 
("Preamble," 1975). Many activists hoped that this reform would encode law with 
feminist understandings of rape as an inherently violent and not sexual act (Johnson & 
Dawson, 2011). 
Over the eight years of negotiations that ensued before the eventual 1983 rape law 
reform, many anti-rape activists actively lobbied to ensure that their political analysis of 
rape was represented in the revised Criminal Code (Sheehy, 1999). In corresponding with 
the Law Reform Commission and other government bodies, many anti-rape activists 
positioned themselves as experts on rape. In doing so, they enacted a radical 
reformulation of expert knowledge, one that rooted expertise in practical experience of 
advocating for rape survivors/victims. One collective of activists wrote, 
Rape crisis centres' staff and volunteers have acquired considerable expertise on 
the issue of rape and sexual assault. They have studied the law relating to the 
issue and have a wealth of practical experience in dealing with the implications of 
the law as well as implementation of the procedures and policies of institutions. 
Women who work in rape crisis centres are in a key position to recommend 
improvements in legislation concerning rape and sexual assault [emphasis added] 
("Relevance of Rape Crisis Centres," ca. 1977, p. 103). 
Anti-rape activists' experiential knowledge was at times recognized by medical and legal 
actors, not only during the negotiations around legal reform, but also during their efforts 
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to transform medical and legal practice. However, as I show, the extent to which medical 
and legal actors valued their expertise varied significantly. 
Training the troops. 
Many rape crisis activists saw themselves in direct opposition to the medical and 
legal systems responding to rape. In an interview with Scott Neigh (2012), Lee Lakeman, 
a well- known Canadian anti-rape activist, said, 
I think it is very important to realize that we have a relationship with the state that 
is not friendly, and we have a relationship with professions that is not 
friendly ... neither the police nor any ... profession is committed to establishing 
women's equality .... they are agents of the status quo, and so we are in a pitched 
battle (p. 83). 
The so called "battle" often took many forms, some which involved bending to 
requirements set by medical and legal actors. A training manual for rape crisis volunteers 
from 1977 described police and emergency room personnel as "people we can't afford to 
alienate" (p. 28). The manual outlined the importance of challenging oppressive medical 
and legal practice but also warned that volunteers' antagonism towards medical staff 
could "backfire" (p. 28), particularly on survivors/victims. According to one anti-rape 
activist, striking the balance between recognizing some medical and legal practices as 
unjust and resisting without confrontation was challenging for many (RCC 10). However, 
for those who struck the balance, it became possible to work to institute change in 
medical and legal practice from within. 
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In the 1970s, many rape crisis centres took on the responsibility of filling the void 
in workplace training on rape for police and hospital staff. They provided educational 
sessions that were built from political analyses of the anti-rape movement and the 
experiential knowledge anti-rape activists had gained supporting survivors/victims 
(RCC 10). At the time, rape crisis centres were the only organizations offering this kind of 
professional, expert training on rape. This work, however, often resulted in conflict. One 
retired crown attorney remembered, 
There was a certain amount of strain between the women's groups and the law 
enforcement administration of justice ... I think there is always a tendency to say 
... you can't tell me that I'm not doing a good job. And to be fair to myself and 
the people that I worked with, there was a certain amount of maybe 
overzealousness, stringency in the special interest groups that were trying to 
generate change (CA5). 
The accusation of stringency went both ways. Some rape crisis activists saw workplace 
training as ineffective in addressing the inequalities that medical and legal institutions 
perpetuated. In an interview with Judy Rebick (2005), Lakeman said, "at a certain 
point ... we stopped training cops and emergency room nurses, because these were black 
holes where you could be taken up forever" (p. 75). She went further in an interview with 
Scott Neigh (2012) by saying, "I think it is much more important to realize that these are 
hierarchies and what you have to do is affect the top ... You're not going to have much 
impact training the troops" (p. 85). While Lakeman's centre did not continue training, 
many other rape crisis centres did well into the 1980s (RCC12). Workplace training, as 
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well as advocating for legal reform, was, however, contingent on rape crisis centres 
having the necessary funding to survive, which, for many centres, was extremely 
uncertain. 
Funding rape crisis centres. 
Despite the growth of rape crisis centres in 1970s, many struggled to find 
adequate funds to support basic costs of rent, phone lines, and for some centres, one or 
two staff members. Most centres opened with funds from non-renewable, short-term 
government grants, but when these expired, centres had to turn to charities such as the 
United Way or private sector donations (Ontario Coalition of Rape Crisis Centres, 1979). 
In an effort to maintain their centre in the late 1970s, the Toronto Rape Crisis Centre 
sought and received donations from many unlikely sources such as Canadian Tire ($100), 
Proctor and Gamble ($200), and Imperial Oil ($1,000) (Chase, G., 1977, Chase to 
Alderman, July 26, 1977). While these donations provided some temporary support, the 
meager amounts threatened the sustainability of the centre and in 1978, the TRCC 
announced in a press release, "we currently have only about one third of the money 
required to operate for another year. We cannot sustain our present level of service 
without on-going funds for staff and core programs" (Toronto Rape Crisis Centre, 1978). 
TRCC' s funding challenges were shared by many others centres in the province 
(RCClO). At the National Day of Protest against violence in 1977, activists spoke to the 
funding shortages that threatened rape crisis centres: "we are faced with the loss of what 
little we have gained in the way of assistance to women ... this is not accidental. It is 
systematic. Women, always and everywhere, have had to accept the burden of worsening 
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economic conditions" ("National Day of Protest," 1977). In 1980, 11 out of the 14 
centres in the Ontario Coalition of Rape Crisis Centres were threatened with closure 
(Morton, 1980, Morton to Unknown, January 14, 1980). 
With increasing media attention on pending RCC closures across the province in 
the late 1970s, public pressure was applied to the provincial government to provide more 
permanent funding. The Women Teachers' Association of Ontario argued in their 
"Women in Crisis" report in 1980 that "the province must take responsibility for helping 
women who have been raped, assaulted, abandoned or are victims of incest" (Unknown, 
1980). 
According to many anti-rape activists I interviewed, the prospect of securing 
provincial government funding was, for many centres in the Ontario Coalition of Rape 
Crisis Centres (OCRCC), both promising and unnerving (RCClO; RCC12; RCC13). 
These activists recalled that although many viewed government funds as having the 
potential to save many RCCs from closing, it was also widely understood that 
government funds could be used to suppress and control feminist politics and activism. 
The Canadian Rape Crisis Centres' (1979) funding manual warned prospective grant 
writers, "if you accept the funds, you accept all the strings that are attached" (p. 9). 
Considering this possibility, one Ontario activist wrote about her deep concern that 
government funding could de-radicalize anti-rape activism and force rape crisis centres to 
become merely "appendages to the existing social service delivery system" ("The 
Experience of Rape Crisis Centres," ca. 1977, p. 5). Government funding agencies, she 
argued, "have their own hidden agendas" (p. 5). Despite these hesitations, the increasing 
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pressures from lack of funding led the OCRCC in 197911 to apply for $750,00012 from 
the Ontario Provincial Secretariat for Justice (PSJ). 13 
"Gloves from my mother. " 
The OCR CC funding application unleashed a series of funding negotiations 
between the PSJ and the OCRCC. OCRCC representatives (themselves rape crisis centre 
workers) were flown to Toronto and given rooms at the Delta Chelsea Hotel, where they 
stayed during the many days of negotiations (RCClO). One OCRCC fundraiser told me 
that early on in the negotiations, it became clear that the government's primary interest 
was in gaining access to the information that centres had on women's experiences of 
rape. She said, 
I think it was pretty clear to all of us that we were maybe going to have to do 
some things that we didn't want to do in order to keep the money ... I remember 
we sat in each other's hotel rooms ... into the middle of the night having those 
conversations ... convincing each other that we were doing the right thing 
(RCClO). 
According to this fundraiser, after lengthy discussion, the OCRCC representatives agreed 
that they would be willing to make some concessions; however, breaching the 
confidentiality they promised women would not be one of them. 
11 The OCRCC's first funding proposal in February 1979 was declined with a recommendation from the 
PSJ that the Coalition seek funding from community agencies instead ("Rape Crisis Centre may have to 
close," 1979). The Coalition publicized the PSJ's decision in the media and applied again in November 
1979. With the mounting public pressure, the PSJ conceded to negotiations. 
12 The OCRCC requested yearly salaries of $15,000 for each of the fifteen centres (Kitchener-Waterloo's 
centre had closed, but was included in the count) for three years (Ontario Coalition of Rape Crisis Centres, 
1979). 
13 The PSJ was the predecessor to the current Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional 
Services. 
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During the negotiation meetings, the fundraiser recalled, the OCRCC 
representatives tried to present themselves and the RCCs as non-threatening and 
apolitical. In preparation for the meetings, they solicited help from women politicians on 
how to dress, who told them, "if you tum them off by your appearance, they may not 
listen to what you have to say. If you are coming in to their world, you need to dress like 
you are in their world" (RCC 10). The fund-raiser I interviewed remembered this with 
laughter and continued the story by saying, 
So we did. Yah it's quite comical when you think back [laughs] ... But I remember 
borrowing gloves ... from my mother. Yup we wore gloves to the meeting. And 
you are talking about a group of women who didn't own a pair of white gloves 
[laughs] (RCClO). 
The fund-raisers presented the rape crisis centres as a service that the government had an 
obligation to support. The feminist politics and analysis that grounded many of the RCCs 
were, according to one fundraiser, intentionally kept out of view, as were the internal 
political debates within the OCRCC. 14 She explained, 
We rarely talked to them about it from a feminist point of view. And if anything, 
we worked together, if we thought somebody was a little bit out of control, under 
the table we would pat their hands. I remember doing that [laughs] (RCC 10). 
14 At the time of these negotiations, there were heated debates in the OCRCC on whether rape crisis centres 
should support and facilitate survivors' /victims' confrontations of their rapists. I discuss these alternative 
paths to justice in greater detail in chapter 4. 
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Through these moves, the fund-raisers enacted the OCRCC as a credible, apolitical 
service provider. With a smile, the fund-raiser recalled, "I don't think they had any idea 
who they were dealing with" (RCClO). 
In June 1980, the OCRCC was granted $450,000 over three years ("Statement," 
1980). The amount was significantly less than the OCRCC originally requested, and as 
was predicted, it came with many strings that the OCRCC had to confront in later years. 
However, in 1980, it offered much needed financial support for the RCCs in Ontario. 
The dynamics between the OCRCC and the PSJ in their funding negotiations 
were far more complex than the governments' historical records suggest. From the 
archival records and oral histories I have described here, it is clear that the talks were not 
purely collaborative, equitable meetings between service providers and funders. Instead, 
the funding meetings were complicated by tensions around political differences and plays 
of power. The government negotiators dictated not only the terms of the funding, but also 
the terms by which the negotiations took place. Activists used strategic devices to 
heighten their appearance of femininity and their class positioning to make themselves 
and RCCs appear less politically threatening. 
I suggest that the eventual government funding was a nod to RCCs' expertise 
around rape advocacy and support. However, it also placed RCCs in a largely dependent 
relationship to government funders. 15 This was the context in which many anti-rape 
activists were organizing to improve medical and legal treatment of rape 
survivors/victims and were engaged in consultations where the SAEK was imagined and 
15 I describe the effects of this dependent relationship further in chapter 4. 
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designed. To chart what led up to the design consultations for the SAEK, I now tum to 
the medical practices for rape survivors/victims in the 1970s. 
Contentious Medical and Legal Practice 
Technoscientific proof of rape. 
The 1970s saw some developments in forensic technology. Since the previous 
decade, forensic technology had, according to some forensic scientists, "undergone a 
revolutionary change" (Krishnan, 1978, p. xi) resulting from new technologies that 
offered increased magnification and precision in chemical analysis. 16 Forensic science, 
according to Dr. Krishnan, a scientist at the Ontario Centre for Forensic Science (CFS), 
had been "propelled into the modem age" (p. 5) by these new technologies, 17 which were 
inspired by increasing crime rates and resulting increases in criminal investigation 
funding in Canada and the United States. In 1978, Krishnan stated, "the analytical 
capabilities of a crime laboratory today in providing scientific evidence are indeed 
enormous" (p. xi). 
Alongside the developments in forensic technologies, Krishnan claimed that there 
was an "ever increasing demand for scientific evidence" (p. 9) in legal trials. He asserted 
that forensic evidence was valuable because it was impartial: it was, as he wrote, 
"objective by nature" (p. 9). He stated, "physical evidence by nature is not subject to 
16 Some of these techniques included: a) the scanning electronic microscop~, which unlike its predecessor, 
the optical microscope, could magnify objects up to 300,000 times, b) gas chromatography, a more precise 
technique for detecting and separating chemical compounds, and c) mass spectrometry, a more sensitive 
technique for identifying chemical compounds (Krishnan, 1978). 
17 In retrospect, Krishnan's proclamation might appear somewhat exaggerated. In some cases, the 
technologies he describes, such as gas chromatography, were born from only slight variations of those 
technologies that came before them. Krishnan's confident words are important, however, for they depict the 
excitement with which these new forensic technologies were greeted by the scientific community. 
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lapse of memory, confusion, and perjury, as are human witnesses" (p. 11). Reflecting this 
sentiment, one defense lawyer that I interviewed claimed that "science was worshipped" 
in the courtrooms of the 1970s and forensic scientific evidence, when it was available, 
was taken "as gospel" (DL6). It was assumed that forensic technoscientific evidence, 
unlike human witnesses, had the capacity to speak unbiased, objective truths about crime. 
Legal actors' assumption that forensic evidence was inherently objective fit neatly 
alongside their distrust of women's testimonies ofrape. According to some anti-rape 
activists' observations, legal actors commonly saw the medical forensic exam in rape 
cases as "proof ofrape" ("Training Manual," 1977, p. 63). Forensic trace evidence of 
semen, hair deposits, and drugs in the blood stream and medical evidence of scratches, 
bruising, and a broken hymen were taken to be important corroborative evidence that 
"substantiat[ ed] her story" of rape (p. 77). Medical forensic evidence was "almost a 
prerequisite for conviction" ("Present Laws," ca. 1980, p. 5). In the context of this 
valuing of forensic evidence, some survivors/victims of rape in the 1970s arrived in 
Ontario emergency wards to have medical care and forensic examinations. 18 
Medical practices and experts on the margins. 
For many rape survivors/victims, medical practices in response to rape in the 
1970s were everything from inadequate to thoroughly traumatic (Clarke & Lewis, 1977). 
One-third of survivors/victims who visited Ottawa hospitals in 1976 reported feeling 
18 The number of women who sought medical care was likely very few, and the number who sought the 
medical forensic exam likely even fewer. These numbers are not available in any public records, however, 
estimates can be made from other pieces of evidence. Reporting rates for rape in the 1970s were known to 
be extremely low, with estimates being as low as 5% (Brooks, 1975). To have a medical forensic exam 
done, a survivor/victim had to report their rape to the police, something that many were not prepared to do 
("Training Manual," 1977). From this, it can be assumed that the number of forensic medical exams 
conducted on Ontario women in the 1970s was low. 
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frightened and intimidated by the medical professionals who treated them (LeBourdais, 
1976). Some women reported feeling just as traumatized by their medical treatment as 
they were by their rape (Donadio & White, 197 4 ). According to some reports, many 
medical professionals met survivors/victims with "their own verdict" (LeBourdais, 1976, 
p. 102) about whether the rape had occurred and treated many women as if they "were 
the criminal" (Miller, 1980, p. 5). Williams and Williams (1974) described these 
practices through a dialogue they captured between two physicians discussing a 
survivor/victim seeking treatment: 
'A: I kind of doubt this one. I can't believe some of these women. B: It figures. 
You can't trust any of them- not even your own wife ... All a woman has to do is 
scream 'rape' - and a guy is ruined. A: Well what shall we do with this one? B: 
How about the biggest speculum we've got without any lubricant?"' (p. 391). 
These physicians' hostility and disbelief of the survivor/victim was, according to many 
other reports, far from unusual in emergency wards (Donadio & White, 1974; Burgess & 
Holmstrom, 1973; Miller, 1980; Kinnon, 1981). 
Popular conceptions ofrape as being either a female fantasy or a woman's fault 
filtered into medical practice. Some physicians reportedly told survivors/victims that 
"there is a fine line between rape and promiscuity" (Kinnon, 1981, p. 27), and others, that 
"there is no such thing as rape" (LeBourdais, 1976, p. 12). One survivor/victim had a 
gynecologist say to her, "a hospital should not be considered to be a counseling service or 
a haven for the unloved or the unwashed" (LeBourdais, 1976, p. 102). 
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Many historical records indicate that a survivor/victim's social location had great 
bearing on her treatment by medical actors and the extent to which her experience of rape 
was believed ("Training Manual," 1977). According to some anti-rape activists, 
physicians and nurses often treated middle class, married, white women as "one of their 
own" (RCC 1 O); however, racialized, impoverished, sexually active, young women were 
more commonly treated as either deserving or lying victims (RCC14). One Toronto 
gynecologist was quoted as saying "there is one type of woman I would have a hard time 
believing was raped: a woman between 16 and 26, on the pill and no longer a virgin" 
(LeBourdais, 1976, p. 102). 
Survivors' /victims' experiences in the emergency ward and their understandings 
of the medical system that arose from them were often pathologized and deemed to be a 
stage of the "rape trauma syndrome" (Burgess & Holmstrom, 1974, p. 981). 19 According 
to the medical descriptions of this syndrome, stage three featured survivors' /victims' 
experiencing a "silent suspicion ... [and] a sense of betrayal from those she looks to for 
support (i.e. police, medical professionals)" ("Training Manual," 1977, p. 51). With 
medical diagnoses such as these, survivors' /victims' experiences of trauma at the hands 
of the medical system could be easily discounted as fictional. 
In the emergency ward, many rape crisis centre volunteers were trained to work as 
"buffers" ("Training Manual," 1977, p. 43) between survivors/victims and the physicians 
and nurses that attended them. Being a "buffer" involved not only responding to the 
19 From the archival records on RCCs, the rape trauma syndrome, which was meant to describe women's 
experiences of rape trauma, appears to have been a mixed blessing for many activists. The syndrome 
provided a language that identified and legitimated women's experiences of rape trauma. However, it also 
pathologized and individualized the traumas of rape and the survivors/victims who faced them, which stood 
in contrast to the political understandings of rape many RCCs were forwarding. 
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survivors' /victims' needs, but also ensuring that medical staff offered appropriate and 
sensitive medical attention. One RCC training manual offered this instruction to 
volunteers, "you may have to make suggestions to medical folk ... about what to do and 
how to do it. Be firm but gentle ... say it nicely, but do say it. You may be averting 
disaster" [emphasis added] (p. 43). Training manuals instructed volunteers to remind 
physicians about their role; "remind him that he need only report on the medical 
information" ("Legal-Medical Procedures," 1983, p. 2), and how to use medical tools in 
appropriate ways; "request that the doctor warm the speculum for the examination" (p. 
2). 
With these training manuals that detailed the intricacies of forensic evidence 
collection, rape crisis centre volunteers likely knew more about evidence collection than 
many of the physicians conducting it, who at the time were receiving no formal training 
on the topic (FS 1 ). Although rape crisis centre volunteers in the medical exam room were 
most often observing medical practice ("Training Manual," 1977), they became directly 
involved when they followed the training manuals advice and gave physicians directions 
on evidence collection. From the training manual instructions, it is clear that volunteers' 
involvement in medical practice was complex. By directing physicians on how to collect 
evidence, rape crisis centre volunteers positioned themselves as experts in the medical 
exam. However, the training manual instructions suggest that volunteers' expression of 
expertise was tempered by differences in professional status between volunteers and 
physicians. The training manual instructed rape crisis centre volunteers to express their 
expertise in "gentle" and "nice" ways that did not threaten or challenge physicians' 
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medical expertise. The volunteers were thus the experts whose directions could be 
dismissed and whose presence could be ignored. They were the actors positioned both 
inside and outside of practice.20 In this sense, rape crisis centre volunteers in the medical 
exam, were experts who were often sitting on the margins of medical practice. 
The medicalforensic exam and traces of the subjective. 
Despite the value that legal actors placed on medical forensic evidence in rape 
cases, there were few standardized protocols for medical evidence collection (Williams & 
Williams, 1973, Hargot, 1982). While some standardized protocols began to appear in the 
United States in the early 1970s (Evrard, 1971; Fahrney, 1974), none appear to have 
existed in Canada until later in the 1970s. Evidence collection in Ontario rape cases was, 
according to one physician, "dealt with in a haphazard fashion" (Hargot, 1982, p. 126). 
According to one forensic scientist, there were no consistent procedures within or 
between Ontario hospitals at the time and individual physicians had largely unregulated 
discretion to collect medical evidence with whatever materials they saw fit (FS 1 ). 
Explaining this, one nurse said, "you just used what you thought was supposed to 
be ... give[n] to the police" (SANES). Spare swabs, vials, and envelopes in the emergency 
ward were likely used for swabbing, blood and hair collection, when individual 
physicians deemed these procedures appropriate. 
The lack of protocols for evidence collection was accompanied by lack of forensic 
training for medical professionals (Kinnon, 1981 ). Before the 1990s, emergency 
physicians and nurses in Ontario did not have formal training on the contamination of 
20 I borrow this notion of multiple membership from Star (1991), who uses it to describe marginal actors. 
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evidence and the preservation of samples (FS 1 ). Without much understanding of forensic 
evidence collection and preservation, the risks were high of samples being contaminated 
and/or molding before they arrived at the forensic lab (FS 1 ). 
According to many reports, insufficient training and a lack of protocols weighed 
heavily on many survivors/victims in 
emergency wards (Donadio & 
White, 1974; Kinnon, 1981). 
Lengthy delays and extended 
examinations in the emergency ward 
"When I went to the hospital there was a kit. My family 
doctor was allowed to collect the evidence, which on the 
one hand was good because I was probably more 
comfortable with him. But on the other hand, he didn't 
know anything about it, so it probably took him two or 
three times as long to even perform the evidence 
collection because he had to keep reading the 
instructions and he wasn't sure what he was doing" 
(SA3). 
were common for many survivors/victims (Kinnon, 1981 ). Many also reportedly found 
the forensic exam to be intrusive, painful, and traumatic (Donadio & White, 1974). The 
exam often included procedures such as plucking pubic and head hairs, clipping 
fingernails, drawing blood, 
photographing injuries and 
undergoing pelvic exams and 
"The whole process is so intrusive that it is probably a good 
thing I was in shock otherwise I'm not sure how I would have 
reacted to it" (SA3). 
vaginal aspirates (One day conference, ca. 1975).21 One survivor's/victim's description of 
the pelvic exam was quoted in several reports: "what he was doing was so similar to what 
just happened .. .it was too much the same, two times in one night .. .I didn't want anyone 
to look at me; I didn't want anyone to touch me" (Holmstrom & Burgess, 1979, as cited 
in Kinnon, 1981, p. 26). 
21 A vaginal aspirate is a method for collecting semen in the vaginal cavity. It involves filling the vagina 
with sterile water and then drawing the water out so it can be tested (SANES). Decades later, this approach 
was found to be ineffective in collecting semen (FS 1 ). 
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A reluctance to treat. 
Many physicians in Ontario were reportedly reluctant to conduct medical forensic 
exams on rape survivors/victims (LeBourdais, 1976). Physicians' reluctance was likely 
due to many things; however, according to Dr. Hargot (1982), much of it stemmed from 
physicians' lack of training in forensic procedures, their discomfort with becoming 
involved with legal proceedings, the minimal financial compensation they received for 
the exam and time in court, and their reluctance to spend the time the exams required. 
One rape crisis centre worker recalled, "I used to literally go through the phone book 
when I brought a sexual assault victim into the hospital. ... to find a doctor who would 
come in and do the exam" (RCC 10). Some survivors/victims were turned away from 
emergency wards and "forced to shop around for medical treatment" (LeBourdais, 1976, 
p. 103). One hospital administrator was quoted as saying that "the hospital 'doesn't 
encourage' rape victims to come in for examinations because doctors lose too much time 
when cases get to court" (Kinnon, 1981, p. 26). 
When survivors/victims and their advocates found a willing physician, it was 
often not a gynecologist, but an intern or resident staff (Clark & Lewis, 1977). According 
to Vance (1978), survivors/victims with no visible injuries or trauma were commonly 
considered to be low priority. One survivor/victim reportedly waited eight hours for a 
medical exam while the physician finished his office hours (Kinnon, 1981 ). These delays 
and refusals to conduct the medical exam, along with the lack of protocols and forensic 
training, presented tensions and challenges in not only emergency wards, but in court as 
well. 
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Forensic Evidence on Trial 
For those rape cases that made it to trial, of which there were few,22 forensic 
evidence from the medical exam was often contested and deemed inadmissible (Parnis & 
Du Mont, 2006; Feldberg, 1997). The lack of standardized protocols for evidence 
collection and handling often invited challenges about its "integrity" (Krishnan, 1978, p. 
16). Legal actors argued that the quality of forensic evidence was reduced by the long 
delays in evidence collection, which was reflected in many forensic scientists 
inconclusive findings about the presence of sperm after survivors' /victims' long waits in 
emergency wards (Kinnon, 1981 ). As the RCC volunteer training manual ("Training 
Manual," 1977) explained, "evidence is much harder to acquire if some time has passed 
and the evidence that does remain does not hold the same credibility as that which is 
'fresh"' (p. 68). When there was no available medical evidence, either as a result of 
physicians' reluctance to conduct the exam or degraded or moldy samples that could not 
be analyzed, rape trials often resulted in acquittals (Marshall, 1980). 
Courtroom challenges of forensic rape evidence revealed uncertainties about local 
medical practices. Without standardized protocols dictating medical practice, local action 
in emergency wards could more easily be labeled as unscientific and unreliable. Without 
a formalized system of coordination between institutional actors collecting and handling 
evidence (physicians, nurses, police, and forensic scientists), the evidence could be more 
easily dismissed as mishandled and contaminated. The subjectivities and "messiness" 
22 In 1972 in Canada, of the 1230 rape cases reported, only 119 ended up in court and only 69 resulted in 
conviction (Canadian Rape Crisis Centres, 1975). Provincially, the numbers were similar. In Ontario in 
1975, 860 rapes were reported and only 260 went to trail ("Police Crime Statistics," 1975). 
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(Law, 2004, p. 42) of medical practice that was not guided by standardized protocols was 
thus visible in the courtroom. These issues in the courtroom inspired calls for 
standardized medical evidence collection protocols. 
Designing the Sexual Assault Evidence Kit 
Several years before the standardized SAEK was introduced in Ontario, many 
were advocating for its creation. Among those advancing this case were many anti-rape 
activists and several feminist writers. When Clark and Lewis's ground breaking feminist 
book on rape was published in 1977,23 it exposed, among many other things, the lack of 
uniformity in medical practices for rape in Toronto hospitals. They recommended 
standardized medical protocols. Some rape crisis centre staff and volunteers used Clark 
and Lewis's assertion to advocate for medical protocols in their own communities 
(RCC 10). Their aim, according to one rape crisis staff involved, was "to make sure that 
when we got to court things weren't thrown out .... that you didn't give the defense the 
opportunity to challenge how the collection was done ... because you had something 
standardized, it wasn't individual based" (RCC 10). Many hoped that with the advent of 
standardized protocols, more forensic evidence would be deemed admissible and 
conviction rates would rise (RCC 10). 
Many of the arguments that RCC staff and volunteers forwarded for 
standardization tied standardized medical protocols to more sensitive responses to 
survivors/victims. Vance (1978) argued in her funding proposal to the National 
23 Clarke and Lewis's (1977) book, Rape: The price of coercive sexuality is considered to be the first 
Canadian book on rape. It provided comprehensive data on the medical and legal response to rape in 
Toronto. The book's wide-sweeping influence in the late 1970s is evident in both rape crisis centre and 
government policy archival collections, where it is repeatedly referenced as one of the definitive sources on 
rape. 
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Department of Health and Wellness, "standardizing protocols for the treatment of victims 
of sexual assault is necessary at every level. . .if the sensitive handling of all victims is to 
be assured" (p. 3). According to one RCC staff person who was active at the time, the 
motivations behind the argument for standardized procedures was, 
to make sure that regardless of the hospital that you went to, you were going to 
receive the same care, the same procedure was going to be followed so that if you 
did decide to go to court, you would have the same evidence, whether you were in 
St. Catharine's, Welland, or Niagara Falls (RCC12). 
For some activists, standardized protocols would mean better medical care and legal 
handling of rape. 
Standardized medical protocols for many activists held the potential of 
eliminating uncertainties about medical and legal practice and removing traces of 
individual action in medical forensic evidence. Stipulating particular steps and tools for 
evidence collection would make individual choice and the subjectivities of medical 
practice less visible to those outside of the exam room. By eliminating marks of the 
individual, it was believed that standardized protocols held the much larger promise of 
making forensic evidence appear more objective and credible in court. 
The arguments to standardize Canadian medical practice around rape coincided 
with developments of standardized protocols in the United States. In 1974, Dr. Fahrney, 
an Amerjcan physician, proposed a "sex assault kit" (p. 340) for emergency wards and 
vowed that it would "speed up the proper examination of the patient, the adequate 
collection of the medical evidence, the labeling of specimens, and [be] a method by 
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which the data can be submitted rapidly to law enforcement officials" (p. 340). This kit, 
he suggested, could be a solution to "one of the most difficult problems for the busy 
emergency physician to handle" (p. 340), which was in his estimation, the rape case. 
Tensions between actors: "Paradigms not of our choosing." 
In the late 1970s, some Ontario rape crisis centres began working with hospitals 
and police in their communities to develop medical protocols for rape treatment 
(RCC13). Not all rape crisis activists supported this work and controversies waged in 
feminist publications. Krin Zook (1980), in an article in the Canadian radical feminist 
newspaper Broadside, criticized the anti-rape movement's reliance on institutions to 
enact social change and condemned the efforts to transform medical and legal actors and 
their practices. She wrote, 
Rape crisis centres are developing as traditional institutions by rationalizing that it 
is important to show doctors, lawyers, police and social workers how to better do 
their jobs ... This supporting of institutions institutionalizes rape as an accepted 
social reality. This is only adjusting, not facilitating value changes (p. 27). 
Maureen Fitzgerald (1982) penned a direct counter to Zook's criticism in a later issue 
when she wrote, "there is a growing and understandable impatience with the band-aid 
solutions ... [however] ... when we put pressure on the state to provide services for women, 
we are putting the pressure where it belongs" (p. 4). These debates challenged the 
meaning of activism around medical responses to rape and addressed larger issues about 
the anti-rape movement's relationship to institutions and its role in transforming medical 
and legal practice. 
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For those rape crisis centre workers who did take up the struggle in hospitals, this 
work, for some, meant, "having to work in paradigms not of our choosing" (RCC4 ). In 
their negotiations with medical and legal professionals, rape crisis activists had to accept 
the value of the medical exam, at least enough to argue for its improvement. According to 
those I interviewed, some activists readily accepted the medical exam and forensic 
evidence as important tools that lent credibility to women's experiences of rape. 
However, others did not. One rape crisis staff explained, 
You could sort of see how things were going ... as long as the justice system and 
the media were going to refer to this as evidence, as long as the police felt that 
this was necessary in order to bring a case to trial ... then we wanted women to 
have the best care possible. But we didn't agree with the basic premise [of the 
medical exam] to begin with. I think that was often a position that the centre was 
in, we wanted to advocate on behalf of women, but the basic premise that we 
were working from was wrong (RCC4). 
Despite these internal struggles, the anti-rape movement had an undeniable influence on 
medical and legal practice, one that directly contributed to the development of the 
standardized Sexual Assault Evidence Kit. 
A project of inscription: "Just a bit of folklore." 
In November 1978, the Cooperative Care Project in the· Niagara Region was 
initiated (RCC12).24 The project's mandate was to test the value of a standardized 
24 Much of the detail in this section was collected from a phone interview with a RCC staff who read 
sections ofCARSA's Annual Reports from 1979 and 1980 to me. These reports are not publically 
available, and so I am indebted to this participant for her willingness to share them with me. 
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protocol for medical forensic evidence collection in rape cases. Driving the Cooperative 
Care project was the Niagara rape crisis centre, the Committee Against Rape and Sexual 
Assault (CARSA). Why CARSA took on the task of developing a standardized SAEK is 
unknown. However, it may be that CARSA's initiative was cultivated through its diverse 
Board of Directors, which included not only rape crisis staff but also nurses and police 
officers. 
In the months preceding the project's unveiling, experts gathered to design a 
standardized kit for evidence collection for the seven Niagara region hospitals. Elgin 
Brown, a forensic scientist from the Toronto Centre for Forensic Science, flew to St. 
Catharine's to hold a series of design consultations with Niagara police, physicians, and 
rape crisis centre staff (RCC 12). I found no record of what went on in these design 
meetings. If a record does exist, it is likely being stored in a private collection that is not 
publically available. However, from the traces of relations between anti-rape activists and 
medical and legal actors that I have charted so far in this chapter, it is possible to imagine 
how these design consultations may have unfolded. 
Anti-rape activists' expertise on rape was acknowledged to the extent that 
activists were invited to the design consultations. However, their marginal positioning in 
medical practice, coupled with the differences in professional status between many of the 
activists and the scientists, lawyers, and police, was reflected in the activists' limited 
capacities to shape the SAEK's design. One rape crisis centre volunteer, recalling her 
encounters with medical professionals at the time, suggested that the activists involved in 
the design of the SAEK likely had little input. She said, "the medical system was pretty 
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arrogant about 'they knew what was best"' (RCC13). Following this characterization, it 
could be imagined how the activists' expertise was overshadowed by the doctors' 
assertions about rape treatment, the police officers' claims about evidentiary 
requirements in rape law, and the scientists' statements about proper evidence handling 
and preservation. 
Designing the SAEK meant visualizing a new forensic tool that would standardize 
medical forensic evidence collection and act as the new credible witness of sexual assault 
in medicolegal practice. It involved selecting and assembling the swabs, envelopes, 
slides, and combs that medical actors could use to collect evidence, writing the 
standardized forms and training manuals that described the steps of evidence collection, 
and designing a container that would protect the evidence .collected. 25 The work involved 
imagining how a technology could be used to witness sexual assault, what this act of 
witnessing might entail, and what of sexual assault the technology would witness. 
By assembling swabs, envelopes, slides, and combs, the designers assembled a 
technology that would witness sexual assault through the visible traces on a 
survivor's/victim's body. The technology could not witness or capture less visible traces, 
such as her psychological and subjective experiences of rape. As I have shown, legal 
actors had long deemed women's articulated experiences of sexual assault as unreliable 
evidence and as a result, they often required visible evidence of sexual assault that was 
independent of a survivor's/victim's subjective experience. This emphasis on visual 
traces of sexual assault became reflected in the technology's material form. 
25 In chapter 4, I describe the SAEK's forensic script that arose from this design work, which stipulated 
how the tool was to be used, by whom, on whom, and with what purpose. 
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Legal histories and practices that were based on legal actors distrusting women 
reporting rape were inscribed in the SAEK's design. The evidentiary requirement for 
corroborative medical evidence and the legal definitions of rape as forced vaginal 
intercourse shaped the types and amounts of evidence that the SAEK was designed to 
collect. The complex relations between anti-rape activists and medical and legal actors 
shaped whose purposes the SAEK was intended to serve: it was to be a tool for medical 
and legal actors. The prevailing view of forensic science as objective and credible shaped 
the ways in which the SAEK would witness. These contexts were inscribed in the SAEK 
to produce a tool that medical and legal actors believed could be a credible 
technoscientific witness of sexual assault. 
Fallowing the design consultations, medical actors used the new standardized 
Niagara kit for eight months, after which the committee evaluated its use and sent the 
results to the Provincial Secretariat for Justice (RCC12). In the provincial consultations 
that followed, the Niagara kit and the Cooperative Care Project became the pilot for the 
provincial standardized SAEK. 
In CARSA's annual report in 1980, the president wrote, "we asked Robert Welch 
who was an MP here for official recognition of our work in developing the sexual assault 
evidence kit, which was to become the model for the provincial kit" (read to me by 
RCC12). According to the president's report, "due credit to CARSA was given." 
However, CARSA's involvement in the SAEK's does not appear in many official 
records. One forensic scientist I interviewed mused, "I think that an agency of police, 
maybe it was Niagara Police had a rudimentary kit that they put together ... and that may 
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have been the seed of making that idea come across the whole province. But that's just a 
bit of folklore" (FS 1 ). 
A Consultation on Rape 
In the late 1970s, news reports that rape rates were drastically increasing started to 
fill the media. In Toronto, the number ofreported rapes had reportedly increased by 37% 
between 1976 and 1977 (Provincial Secretariat for Justice, 1978).26 Archive records 
illustrate the flood of activity amongst police and government agencies to recast the 
statistics as inaccurate and misleading. The OPP released a report in 1978 that blamed the 
rise in rape rates on women's "promiscuous" and "indiscriminate behavior" (as cited in 
Kinnon, 1981, p. 71), which unleashed a wave of anger and protests from anti-rape 
activists ("Women march," 1977). The Provincial Secretariat for Justice added to the 
OPP report by claiming in media interviews that the apparent rise in rates was in fact 
illusionary (Unknown, 1978b ). In media interviews, government employees made 
comments such as, "it is important that alarmist statements not be allowed to remain 
unchallenged and that women across Ontario be reassured that their safety is not in great 
jeopardy" (Unknown, 1978b, p. 3) and "we continue to be very sensitive to the needs of 
actual rape victims, even though their numbers are small" (Welbourn & Lambert to D. 
Sinclair, December 1, 1977, p. 4). From the historical records, these statements appeared 
to do little to appease the public and public pressure mounted on the government and 
medical and legal systems to address the systemic issues in rape response ("Women 
march," 1977; Landsberg, 2011). 
26 In Toronto, 189 rapes were reported in 1976 and 263 in 1977 (Kerr, 1978, Kerr, G. to Jeffrey R., June 16, 
1977). 
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In response to this flurry of action, the Provincial Secretariat for Justice (PSJ) 
organized a Consultation on Rape in February 1978. According to some internal PSJ 
memos, the consultation organizers were determined to keep the Consultation relatively 
small, so as not to "give credence to the idea that the incidence of rape is rapidly 
increasing" (Welbourn & Lambert to D. Sinclair, December 1, 1977, p. 4). As a result, 
only 53 people were invited to the closed consultation. While most of the 53 participants 
were police, lawyers, doctors, nurses and forensic scientists, eight rape crisis centre staff 
appeared on the invitation list. Including rape crisis centres in the consultation signaled 
an acknowledgement of their expertise; however, it was only partial, which a letter from 
George Kerr, the PSJ clearly illustrates, 
... While we received an enormous number of requests to attend ... particularly 
from women's groups .... we did not accede to those requests ... because we wished 
the Consultation to be oriented to action and could foresee that the presence of a 
very large number of interested citizens carried with it the distinct possibility that 
Consultation could become a stage for political posturing, or for the achievement 
of opinions rather thanfacts, emotionalism rather than an objective and reasoned 
approach to a very real problem [emphasis added] (Kerr, 1978, Kerr, G. to Jeffrey 
R., June 16, 1977). 
The PSJ' s careful selection of consultation participants suggests that the PSJ's office 
wanted to control the content of the consultation. Kerr's references to political posturing 
and emotionalism were likely aimed at the "women's groups" to which he referred. By 
characterizing women's contributions in this way, he was able to rationalize restricting 
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the number of activists at the Consultation and dismiss the value and relevance of their 
expertise. 
The Consultation on Rape represented one of the first provincial efforts to 
formulate expert medicolegal knowledge and practices on rape. Much of the discussion 
revolved around developing a more coordinated, standardized medicolegal response to 
rape. The panel entitled the Initial needs of the victim centered on the problems for 
survivors/victims seeking medical treatment in emergency wards (Provincial Secretariat 
for Justice, 1978). Physicians' reluctance to treat survivors/victims, their lack of training 
in medical forensic evidence collection, and their "judgmental attitudes" (Provincial 
Secretariat for Justice, 1978, p. 4) in rape cases were problematized by the panel's 
participants. Most significantly, participants highlighted the lack of standardized 
protocols for medical forensic evidence collection as a serious concern. Out of this 
discussion arose the following two recommendations: "standardized protocol and 
procedure for hospital staff be established for victims of rape ... [and] the development 
and use of a standardized Rape Kit for all hospitals in the province is needed" (Provincial 
Secretariat for Justice, 1978, p. 5). 
At the Consultation's closing remarks, Don Sinclair, the Deputy Provincial 
Secretary for Justice, applauded the efforts of the participants (Provincial Secretariat for 
Justice, 1978). He stressed the need for a coordinated medicolegal response and more 
professionalized knowledge on rape. Responding to what may have been some adamant 
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critiques by the eight anti-rape activists present at the Consultation,27 Sinclair spoke 
about the dangers of criticism, 
The need for cooperation has been evidenced throughout the Consultation and to 
meet that need it is incumbent upon each of us to acknowledge that we are not the 
only players in the game and that others' roles are just as important as ours. We 
shall make no progress by criticizing the other players, the other agencies, the 
other government departments. Let us be self critical by all means but I think we 
lose our effectiveness and our credibility when, by direct accusation or by 
implication, we leave the impression that we (whoever "we" are) are doing the 
'right' things while others fumble or bumble or just don't care. Nobody has a 
monopoly of expertise or of good will in this area [emphasis added] (Provincial 
Secretariat for Justice, 1978, p. 10). 
Sinclair's remarks leveled the expertise in the room. His claim that "nobody has a 
monopoly of expertise" diminished rape crisis centre activists' claim to expertise and the 
wealth of knowledge on rape that rape crisis activists had gained. In so doing, Sinclair 
opened the opportunity for professional groups, who had, up until that point, largely 
ignored the problem of rape, to claim their own expertise on rape. Sitting on the cusp of 
what would be a rise in specialized knowledge on rape and sexual violence in the 1980s 
27 The available records on the Consultation present the views expressed as largely homogenized. 
However, from the tone and content of many other texts written by rape crisis activists at the time, it is 
likely that the activists at the Consultation forcefully advocated for survivors/victims through pointed 
critiques of medical and legal practice. I was unable to find any records on the Consultation that were 
written by anti-rape activists. The one box at the University of Ottawa Archives and Special Collections 
where these records are most likely to be is currently being processed and is not publically available. 
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and 1990s, Sinclair's claim laid the foundation for a surge in medico legal expertise in 
sexual violence. 
Following the Consultation, an Implementation Committee, consisting of 10 
Consultation participants, two of whom were rape crisis staff, worked to implement the 
recommendations from the Consultation (Unknown, ca. 1978a). Importantly, this 
committee, drawing on what had been designed in Niagara, set in place a standardized 
sexual assault evidence kit for the province of Ontario. 
Ontario's First Sexual Assault Evidence Kit 
The first provincial Sexual Assault Evidence Kit was assembled by rape crisis 
centre volunteers and staff. The Niagara rape crisis centre received a contract from the 
PSJ to prepare and pack 3,000 SAEKs for the province. One activist recalled, "I 
remember sitting with 3,000 boxes and just putting together all these kits, which then 
would have been distributed to the hospitals in the province" (RCC 12). Despite the 
hesitations that some rape crisis centre workers had with the SAEK and their complicated 
role as marginalized experts in medical practice, anti-rape activists became the designated 
actors to physically assemble the SAEK. 28 
The provincial government introduced the SAEK to Ontario on Friday, January 
16, 1981. 29 In the press release announcing its arrival, the Minister for Justice Policy, 
Gord Walker stated, 
28 This changed several years later, when the PSJ switched to a private contractor for SAEK preparation 
(FSM). 
29 The SAEK had been in use since 1979 (Provincial Secretariat for Justice, l 979a), but was formally 
introduced in 1981. Why the announcement of the SAEK was delayed by two years is not clear in the 
historical records. 
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Standardization of a sexual assault evidence kit is one further step in our efforts to 
help the victims of crime ... The extent of the consultation among practitioners in 
the health and justice fields demonstrates the seriousness we attach to finding 
better ways of helping the victims of sexual assault. ... This new kit should shift 
the responsibility for identifying evidence onto the experts in health and forensic 
science and thus alleviate some of the pressure on the victim, at a time of great 
emotional distress, to produce evidence of a criminal attack ... and provide the 
police with evidence necessary for a thorough criminal investigation [emphasis 
added] (Provincial Secretariat for Justice, 1981, p. 1 ). 
Walker used the development of the SAEK to claim that government and medico legal 
actors had an active interest in survivors/victims, despite what had been the noticeable 
absence of this interest throughout much of the 1970s. His claim that the SAEK would 
"shift responsibility onto the experts" (p. 1) foreshadowed the growth in expert 
knowledge and practice on sexual violence in the 1980s and 1990s. Most significantly, 
his statement conveyed the promise of the new technoscientific witness to produce 
objective, credible evidence of rape. 
The announcement of the SAEK expressed high hopes for the new medico legal 
tool. The SAEK was described as "a significant breakthrough in helping women prove 
sexual assault" (p. 2). Given the histories that were inscribed in the SAEK- the distrust of 
women reporting rape, the prevailing view of forensic science as objective and credible, 
and the evidentiary requirement for corroborative medical evidence - the extent to which 
the SAEK would prove to be a "significant breakthrough" for women is debatable. In the 
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following chapters, I examine how the SAEK worked for and on women within 
medicolegal practice throughout the SAEK's 34-year history in Ontario. In the next 
chapter, I explore how the SAEK and its meaning as the technoscientific witness gained 
stability in the Ontario medicolegal network. 
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Friday, January 16, 1981 
ONTARIO INTRODUCES STANDARD!'ZED FORENSIC 
EVIDENCE KIT TO· HELl? ··VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 
A standardized forensic·evidence kit has been develop~d 
in Ontario for use by doctors and nurses to improve.the· 
collection of .evidence in sexual assault ca.ses, 
.Gord Wal~er, Minister responsible for Justice Policy' in 
Ontario announced toCf:ay~ 
"The·standa?:'.dization of a sexual a~saul:-t evidence 
kit is one further step in ~ur effd:t:ts to help the 
victims of crime and sustain public confidence in 
the justice system," Mr. Walker, a staunch 
advo_cat~. of e~t~nding victim rights.,. co:r.unented; 
Archives of Ontario, RG 64 
Reprinted with Permission 
Press Release Announcing the first 
SAEK in Ontario, 1981 
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Stabilizing the Sexual Assault Evidence Kit in its Medicolegal Network 
"You could hear the gears of specialization grinding, the carving up of victim-
populations, the negotiations of turf the vying for funding, for prestige, for place. Never 
having heard it before, I did not then identify the hum and buzz as 
the sound of persons professionalizing" 
(Toronto Rape Crisis Centre/Multicultural Women Against Rape, n. d.). 
In just a few years after the first provincial Sexual Assault Evidence Kit (SAEK) 
was introduced to Ontario, the media were proclaiming the new tool to be "Ontario's 
most successful rapist trap" (Crawford, 1984, Al 3). 1 Media reports suggested that the 
SAEK had "revolutionized the way evidence [was] collected in sexual assault cases" 
(Al3). In 1984, the Minister for Justice Policy who had announced the SAEK three years 
earlier stated, "I have files inches thick with letter after letter praising the kit. This is a 
little success story in the collection of evidence" (Al3). These reports portrayed the 
SAEK as an already accepted technoscientific object that medicolegal actors trusted to 
Toronto Star, September 22, 1984 
Reprinted with Permission - Torstar Syndication Services 
1 Other reports expressed similar sentiments, claiming that the SAEK would "catch more rapists" ("Kit will 
Catch," 1981, A24), "help prosecute offenders [and] avert dismissals" ("In brief," 1981, PS), and ensure 
"victims' rights" (Speirs, 1981, CL8). 
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give reliable, credible testimony of rape. However, in this chapter, I illustrate that in the 
1980s, the SAEK was not immediately accepted by all actors in its network. Instead, the 
SAEK sparked many tensions and controversies between actors, which had to be 
overcome before the tool could be trusted and accepted in the medicolegal network. 
This chapter explores medicolegal efforts in the 1980s to stabilize (Latour, 1987; 
Akrich, 1992) the SAEK and its meaning as the technoscientific witness of sexual 
assault. I argue that behind the "success stor[ies]" (Crawford, 1984, Al3) of the SAEK in 
the media were a series of medico legal controversies about expertise, advocacy, 
medicolegal practice, and the SAEK. Through these controversies, this chapter shows 
how medical, legal, and government actors fought to stabilize the SAEK as a trusted and 
accepted tool in medicolegal practice. 
This is the point in my story about the SAEK where I begin to employ the term 
medicolegal. As I suggested in the previous chapter, the SAEK' s design was one 
historical moment when medical and legal practices became bound in a single 
technological object. In this chapter, I sketch how this new medicolegal technoscience 
sparked new controversies and uncertainties within its shifting network. 
The efforts to stabilize the SAEK occurred in the context of shifting dynamics 
within the anti-rape movement, evolving legal definitions of rape, and ongoing 
controversy amongst medico legal actors. This chapter examines how medico legal actors' 
sought to give the SAEK stability with new sexual assault expertise, experts, and expert 
spaces, and by marginalizing and displacing rape crisis centre workers in the SAEK exam 
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and enacting a forensic script for the SAEK.2 I describe the shifting relations between 
rape crisis centre workers and medicolegal actors and trace the "expert-community 
boundary work" (Jasanoff, 1998, p. 733) that displaced rape crisis centre workers in the 
SAEK exam and situated them as non-users of the SAEK.3 I investigate how medical and 
legal actors used the SAEK in medicolegal practice and how it enacted particular 
meanings ofrape and sexually violated bodies. I adopt Akrich's (1992) term, "scripts" (p. 
208) to describe the SAEK's forensic script that many medicolegal actors hoped would 
stabilize the SAEK in the medicolegal network and trace how the SAEK and its script 
were stabilized and destabilized in medicolegal controversy. These intersecting contexts, 
practices, and controversies, as this chapter illustrates, were all involved in stabilizing the 
SAEK in the medicolegal network. 
This chapter illustrates stabilization as a process of building consensus amongst 
many actors by negotiating controversies, tensions, and new actor relations within a 
network. Here, stabilization is not an outcome of resolved controversies, but is instead, an 
ongoing effort. By exploring the work in stabilizing the SAEK, I do not suggest that 
stabilization was ever achieved; that controversy ended or that design work stopped. 
Instead, as I show in later chapters, despite the efforts to stabilize the SAEK in the 1980s, 
2 Here, I am not suggesting that all medico legal actors wanted to or were part of stabilizing the SAEK. 
Instead, I am pointing to what was a rush of activity amongst many medico legal actors to stabilize the new 
tool in medicolegal practice. 
3 By exploring these tensions, I do not mean to suggest that these groups were mutually exclusive. In the 
1980s, some feminist (anti-rape) activists were active in law, as lawyers and judges, and in medicine, as 
physicians and nurses (Prentice, Bourne, Brandt, Light, Mitchinson, & Black, 1996). However, in this 
chapter, I am interested in the tensions between anti-rape activists working in rape crisis centres and 
medicolegal actors involved in the SAEK exam. Although there may have been some overlaps between 
these groups, in this chapter, I trace the tensions between them. 
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it continued to be destabilized and restabilized in medicolegal practice throughout the 
1990s and 2000s. 
I use the terms rape and sexual assault interchangeably in this chapter to reflect 
the shifting language of 1980s. As I discuss, rape was eliminated from the Criminal Code 
of Canada in 1983 and replaced with a three-tiered sexual assault offence. I use the term 
sexual assault to reflect this shift and the term rape to illustrate the political potency that 
the term rape maintained for many activists in the anti-rape movement. 
I begin this chapter by briefly sketching the medicolegal network that formed 
around the first SAEK.4 I then examine some of the shifts in the anti-rape movement in 
the 1980s as a way of sketching a backdrop for medicolegal efforts to marginalize and 
displace rape crisis centre workers in the SAEK exam. I then turn to the SAEK, and 
discuss how the SAEK' s forensic script enacted new meanings of sexual assault and 
victims' /survivors' bodies in medicolegal practice. I conclude by exploring how the 
newly formed expert space for SAEK exams, the Sexual Assault Treatment Centre, and 
the newly formed expert for SAEK exams, the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner, 
contributed to marginalizing rape crisis centre workers in the SAEK exam and to 
stabilizing the SAEK in its medicolegal network. 
A New Medicolegal Network 
The new SAEK quickly became part of medicolegal practice. By 1983, 82% of 
the hospitals surveyed by the Ontario Hospital Association had at least one SAEK in their 
4 Many of the actors who made up the SAEK's network were already related and acting around medical 
forensic evidence collection when the SAEK arrived in 1981, as my detailing in the last chapter showed. 
However, in this chapter I argue that the SAEK shook up those relations and in doing so, contributed to 
transforming them. 
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emergency ward ("A Report," 1983). In a handbook on the new SAEK, the Provincial 
Secretariat for Justice (l 979a) anticipated that the SAEK's design would standardize and 
coordinate forensic evidence collection and preservation and in so doing, eliminate some 
of the uncertainties in medico legal practice. The SAEK' s detailed protocol guided 
emergency physicians collecting evidence from survivor's/victim's bodies (Provincial 
Secretariat for Justice, 1979a). When a SAEK exam was completed, the SAEK's protocol 
instructed police to transfer the kit to the Centre of Forensic Science, where forensic 
scientists would analyze its contents and write a report detailing the analysis results 
(Provincial Secretariat for Justice, l 979a). Following this, SAEK reports were sent to 
investigating officers, and if the case proceeded to trail, the prosecuting lawyer and 
defence attorney. In some cases, lawyers used the laboratory results of the SAEK exam as 
technoscientific evidence of rape. 
The SAEK's travels through the medical exam room, police station, forensic 
laboratory, and courtroom sketched a path through what I am calling the SAEK's 
medicolegal network. The SAEK' s network in the early 1980s was made up of 
physicians, police, forensic scientists, lawyers, the SAEK, other tools and texts, and to 
varying degrees, rape crisis centre workers and survivors/victims. It is this network and 
its constellation of actors that shifted significantly in the 1980s through medicolegal 
controversy, changing practices, legal reform, and the development of medico legal 
expertise, experts, and expert spaces for sexual assault. 
These changes in the network reshaped the SAEK and the relations between its 
fellow actors. Survivors/victims became situated as the implicated users of the SAEK: 
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their bodies were implicated in the SAEK' s work, but in ways that afforded them little 
control. Rape crisis centre workers' positioning in medical practice changed through 
controversies and developing medicolegal expertise around sexual assault: they became 
situated as marginal non-users of the SAEK. This change in rape crisis centre workers' 
level and type of involvement with the SAEK occurred against a backdrop of shifting 
dynamics within the anti-rape movement. I tum to this now. 
Shifts in the Anti-Rape Movement 
The 1980s was a vibrant and 
transformative decade for the 
anti-rape movement. In the 
context of government 
pressures to professionalize and 
credentialize rape crisis 
Toronto Star, September 22, 1984 advocacy, the movement was 
Reprinted with Permission - Torstar Syndication Services 
reshaping its politics and identity 
and growing in strength and visibility. Outside of the rape crisis centres, some feminist 
lawyers were actively lobbying for legal change (Prentice et al., 1996). Inside rape crisis 
centres, new modes of organizing and resisting rape were being devised such as Take 
Back the Night marches, rape confrontations, and letters to rapists (Neigh, 2012). These 
developments were accompanied by internal tensions around the movement's identity 
and its relationship to medicolegal practice (Pierson, 1993). One activist described these 
changes by saying, "we ourselves were transforming and being transformed" (RCC14). 
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The shifts in the anti-rape movement in the 1980s occurred in the context of larger 
pressures to professionalize and credentialize women's organizations, advocacy, and care 
(Masson, 1998; Morgan, 2002). Medical professional and regulatory organizations were 
pressuring non-professional health care providers in the women's health movement, the 
lay midwifery movement, and some forms of alternative medicine to professionalize. 
These groups used medical licensing, regulations, and funding requirements to force 
professionalization (Morgan, 2002). Similarly, feminist peer advocacy within the anti-
violence movement5 was under attack from professionals in psychiatry and psychology, 
who were attempting to regulate and medicalize counseling services for women 
(Marriner, 2012). These pressures to professionalize were often solidified in funding 
negotiations, where funders could explicitly limit their funds to professionalized services 
(Cohen, 1993; Ng, 1996; Masson, 1998). 
This context set up the conditions in which rape crisis centre workers' expertise 
on rape - which for many, was based on peer advocacy, feminist politics, and for some, 
personal experience - became increasingly marginalized in medicolegal practice. It laid 
the ground for the rise of medicolegal expertise, experts, and expert spaces for sexual 
assault and set the context in which rape crisis centre workers were marginalized and 
displaced in the SAEK exam. In this section, I sketch some of the shifts in the anti-rape 
movement in the 1980s and the changing relations between rape crisis centre workers and 
government and medicolegal actors. To do so, I focus on two aspects of the movement: a) 
government funding requirements and how they shaped some of the practices in rape 
5 This term includes both the anti-rape movement and the movement around battered women (later termed 
domestic violence). 
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crisis centres, and b) some of the internal conflicts within the movement over its politics, 
identity, and relationship to medico legal practice. 
Rape crisis centre funding. 
The government funding that the Ontario Coalition of Rape Crisis Centres 
(OCRCC) won in 1980 was accompanied by a range of conditions and requireme.o.ts 
(Sinclair, 1980, D. Sinclair to S. Sahli, June 26, 1980).6 These conditions reshaped the 
organizational structures and practices within many rape crisis centres in Ontario, and in 
so doing, redefined how rape crisis centre workers and government and medicolegal 
actors were related. 
To receive $150,000 of yearly funding from the Provincial Secretariat for Justice 
(PSJ), the OCRCC had to agree to transform its structure and open rape crisis centres to 
government surveillance (Sinclair, 1980, D. Sinclair to S. Sahli, June 26, 1980). The 
funding agreement stated that the OCRCC had to immediately transform its collective 
organizational structure to a hierarchical one, which included a head office, an office 
manager, a full time fund-raiser, and a contracted "firm of chartered accountants and 
legal counsel to assist in conforming to all corporate requirements" (Campling, 1980, C. 
Campling to G. Walker, March 25, 1980). The OCRCC also had to agree to submit 
quarterly and yearly reports on the rape crisis centres' activities and finances (Sinclair, 
1980, D. Sinclair to S. Sahli, June 26, 1980). 
6 The funding conditions and requirements that the PSJ imposed were similar to those that other 
government funding agencies imposed on other women's organizations and services (for more discussion, 
see Cohen, 1993; Ng, 1996). 
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The PSJ' s funding requirements generated many uncertainties within the OCR CC. 
Some anti-rape activists argued that the collective spirit of the OCRCC was being lost 
with the newly imposed hierarchical order, which situated the OCR CC as a formalized 
body that individual rape crisis centres had to appeal to for funds (RCC 11 ). Others 
argued that the OCR CC had no choice but to accept the PSJ' s funding requirements 
because rape crisis centres were on the verge of closing due to lack of funds (RCC 10). In 
response, some rape crisis centres retained their collective structure, while others moved 
to hierarchical models (RCC4). 
Another set of tensions arose from the PSJ' s requirement that the OCR CC work 
cooperatively with medicolegal actors. The 1980 funding agreement stated that the 
OCRCC had to "explore mutually with the Secretariat the possibility of joining forces 
with other centres and/or agencies delivering services on a "crisis" basis [and] continue 
the Centre's efforts to develop closer liaison with hospitals" (Sinclair, 1980, D. Sinclair 
to S. Sahli, June 26, 1980). This funding requirement imposed expectations on anti-rape 
activists to develop cooperative and collaborative relationships with medicolegal actors. 
For some anti-rape activists, this expectation was naive and impractical. The Toronto 
Rape Crisis Centre/Multicultural Women Against Rape (n.d.) explained, 
This was often an unrealistic expectation since many hospitals and police 
forces ... wanted nothing to do with rape crisis centres. Rape crisis workers were 
often perceived as unprofessional, improperly trained, and threatening. The idea 
was that doctors, psychiatrists, and policemen knew far more than any woman off 
the street possibly could and should, therefore, be left alone to do their jobs (p. 5). 
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According to some of the anti-rape activists, the resistance to collaborative relations 
between anti-rape activists and medicolegal actors went both ways. Some anti-rape 
activists saw their work as oppositional to medical and legal systems, and therefore 
viewed the requirement to liaise with medicolegal actors as a government effort to 
depoliticize anti-rape activism and institutionalize anti-rape advocacy (RCC4; RCCl 1). 
The pressures on rape crisis centres to adopt government imposed models 
continued through the 1980s and 1990s, as many centres continued to struggle and appeal 
for funds (Pierson, 1993). Through various funding requirements, government agencies 
placed increasing demands on rape crisis centres to professionalize their advocacy and 
peer counseling services with psychologists and social workers. While some centres 
adopted this model, others did not (Marriner, 2012). Reflecting on why her centre refused 
to professionalize their services, one staff member said, 
We never required of each other that you have a degree. You don't have to be a 
social worker to do good work, to be an effective counselor or 
advocate ... [professionalized services] take advocacy out of the community ... and 
puts it in the hands of someone who is a trained professional (RCC4). 
In addition to the tensions government funding inspired within the anti-movement, other 
tensions arose among anti-rape activists around the movement's politics and identity. 
These debates reshaped the movement and its relation to medicolegal practice. 
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Recognizing difference. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, there were growing tensions within the anti-
rape movement around the recognition of differences between women on the basis of 
race, class, and disability (Pierson, 1993).7 Women of colour, disabled women, and 
working class and poor women challenged radical feminists' theorizing on rape as being 
hinged on a false universalism, which assumed sexism was a shared experience amongst 
women (Rowland & Klein, 1996). According to Michelle Landsberg (2011 ), a Canadian 
journalist who often wrote on women's issues, many white feminists resisted these 
politics. Pierson (1993) described this resistance when she said, "the dominant women's 
movement has been slow to come to terms fully with the implications of the fact that 
some women, by virtue, of class and race and able-bodiness, are more privileged and 
have more power than others" (p. 186). 
Some women of colour challenged the radical feminist analysis of rape as a tool 
of sexism by arguing that racism could not be disconnected from sexism in analyses of 
rape and sexual violence (Davis, 1983; Harris, 1990; Monture-Okanee, 1992). Some 
explicitly challenged white anti-rape activists for ignoring and silencing women of 
colour's experiences of rape (Davis, 1983). As Makeda Silvera said in a published 
conversation about racism and sisterhood, 
I'm sick of some of these white feminists when they talk about rape. It's always 
from their perspective - being knocked down somewhere in a dark alley or a park 
7 This is not to suggest that these tensions around difference were not present before the late 1970s or 
1980s. Women of colour, disabled women, and working class and poor women were always active in the 
anti-rape movement (Neigh, 2012). However, during this time period, tensions around the radical feminist 
position on rape as a shared experience were acutely visible. 
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and being raped. They never mention other kinds of rape, other abuse that women 
of colour and immigrant women experience (Bannerji, Brand, Khosla, & Silvera, 
1983, p. 8). 
In response, some white anti-rape radical feminists argued that feminist theories built 
from women's experiences were not racist or homogenous, but were instead, meant to 
include the diversity of women's experiences (MacKinnon, 2005). These debates waged 
not only in the pages of feminist literature, but also in the practices of the Ontario 
Coalition of Rape Crisis Centres. 
According to some rape crisis centre activists, in the OCRCC, women of colour 
often had to fight for representation in staff positions and at the Coalition's board meeting 
tables (RCC7; RCCl 1). One activist and woman of colour described her experience in 
the OCRCC by saying, "it was an ever struggling battle to have those discussions that 
moved from just a talk to action" (RCC 11 ). As a result of some of these struggles, the 
OCRCC reported in 1991 that rape crisis centres in Ontario were beginning to off er more 
services that accommodated some of the differences amongst women (OCRCC, 1991). 
However, according to several anti-rape activists, these tensions continued, as women of 
colour, disabled women, and working class and poor women continued to struggle for 
representation and a voice in the anti-rape movement (RCCl 1). These conflicts had a role 
in shifting the OCRCC's politics towards a focus on how women experience rape and the 
threat of rape differently (Cahill, 2001). Amidst these shifts were other tensions, in which 
the movement's identity, particularly in relation to medico legal practice, was being 
questioned. 
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Conflicted relations and strategies for resistance. 
In the late 1970s and 1980s, debates were intensifying in the anti-rape movement 
about rape crisis advocacy and its relation to medicolegal practice (Neigh, 2012; Pierson, 
1993). In particular, rape crisis centre workers were debating appropriate strategies for 
resisting male violence, and in so doing, were questioning the necessity of the 
medicolegal system and activists' relationship to it (Neigh, 2012). 
While some rape crisis centre volunteers and staff worked with medico legal 
actors to reform medicolegal practice amongst nurses, doctors, police, and lawyers, 
others refused to do this work, arguing that it represented an over reliance on 
institutionalized solutions to male violence (Zook, 1980). According to archival records, 
some Ontario rape crisis centres were growing increasingly frustrated with the 
inadequacies of medico legal practice and began devising alternative, non-medicolegal 
strategies for resisting male violence. The Toronto Rape Crisis Centre was one of these 
centres, and by 1986, they were offering survivors/victims several alternatives to 
reporting to the police and going to the hospital. In a brochure introducing these options, 
the centre wrote, 
As rape crisis workers and as women, we all know that the 'legal justice' system 
does not work for us ... taking control and taking action in ways that a woman 
determines to be best for her are essential parts of women's liberation. Part of our 
work in Rape Crisis Centres is to take knowledge and information gained from 
women's experience and put it together so we can offer as many options as 
possible to assaulted women (p. 1 ). 
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With this brochure, the TRCC offered women seeking alternatives to the medicolegal 
system three options: i) a personalized letter from the TRCC to a rapist to "let the rapist 
know that women will not be silent about rape, that what he had done is wrong, and [to] 
suggest that he seek counseling" (TRCC, 1986, p. 1 ), ii) a community postering initiative 
to warn a neighbourhood about a rape and "make the issue of violence against women 
public" (p. 2), and iii) a rape confrontation to allow a survivor/victim, along with a 
number of TRCC women, to confront her rapist to 
express how the rape had affected her. According to 
the TRCC, these alternatives "show we do not need 
men or institutions to 'act on our behalf; we know 
the experience of rape, we tell the truth and we are 
strong" (p. 2). 
Not all rape crisis centre workers agreed that 
the TRCC's strategies for resistance had a place in 
rape crisis centres and, according to some reports, 
many debates in the OCRCC ensued ("Agencies 
split," 1984). Some rape crisis centre workers 
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insisted that the strategies were dangerous and misplaced in the rape crisis centre 
(RCC 10). Others claimed that they were "wonderfully human" (Lakeman as cited in 
Neigh, 2012). In these debates, activists were actively questioning their relation to 
medicolegal practice and in some cases, resisting government pressures to create 
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collaborative relations with medicolegal actors. In so doing, rape crisis centre workers 
were questioning the movement's identity and its relation to medicolegal practice. 
In this context, advocates of the SAEK were continuing efforts to stabilize the 
SAEK in medico legal practice with the SAEK' s forensic script and medico legal 
expertise, experts, and expert spaces for the SAEK. As I show, through these efforts, rape 
crisis centre workers were increasingly displaced in the SAEK exam. 
Tools Standardizing Practice: The Sexual Assault Evidence Kit 
When the SAEK was first introduced to medicolegal practice in 1981, many 
government agencies and medicolegal actors anticipated that it would ease tensions 
amongst medico legal actors and enhance the efficiency of medicolegal practice in sexual 
assault cases (Provincial Secretariat for Justice, 1978; Ontario Hospital Association, 
l 983b ). The Ontario Hospital Association (l 983b) described the SAEK as a tool that 
would fill the void of expert knowledge on forensic evidence collection in cases of sexual 
assault. The Provincial Secretariat for Justice (1978) described the SAEK as a tool that 
would give forensic evidence greater value in cases of rape and reduce the pressures on 
physicians to give testimony on medical evidence collection. However, these hopes for 
the SAEK were not so easily realized. Stabilizing the SAEK in the medicolegal network 
required the work of many. 
In this section, I describe the first provincial SAEK and trace aspects of its 
forensic script that some hoped would stabilize the SAEK in the medicolegal network. I 
describe ways that the SAEK was used in practice and how it helped to enact particular 
meanings of rape, sexually violated bodies, and survivors/victims in medicolegal practice 
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that were often in contrast to those articulated within in the anti-rape movement. 
Following this, I describe the controversies, shifting practices, and changing laws that 
stabilized and destabilized the SAEK in the medicolegal network. 
Forensic scripts. 
Akrich (1992) argues that technological objects are embedded with "scripts" (p. 
208) that stipulate rules for action and meanings of use. Scripts, she states, emerge out of 
technological design where, as the previous chapter illustrated, particular "visions ... of 
the world" (p. 208) are inscribed in an object's material form. Timmermans and Berg 
(1997) build on Akrich's (1992) notion of scripts to describe medical protocols as 
"technoscientific scripts" (p. 275), which, they suggest, define a protocol's "actions, 
settings, and actors" (p. 275) and the relations between them. Technoscientific scripts, for 
Timmermans and Berg ( 1997), include not only prescriptions for action in medical 
protocols, but also the prescriptions for who performs the protocol, where, on whom, and 
with what purpose. I suggest that the SAEK was inscribed with a particular type of 
technoscientific script: a forensic script that specified and in so doing, shaped 
medicolegal action and the actors involved in it. 
Akrich (1992) suggests that when scripts are "acted out" (p. 222), a "network of 
technical objects and actors is stabilized" (p. 222). In the case of the SAEK, it was not as 
simple. The following reveals that the SAEK's forensic script was a dynamic set of 
prescriptions for action that were routinely challenged and reformulated through the 
SAEK's use. Many of these controversies over the SAEK's script had the effect of 
destabilizing the SAEK in medicolegal practice. 
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The SAEK and its forensic script. 
"My number was called and I'm wheeled into a medium-
sized room where three women in white lab coats are 
waiting. They speak softly, tell me their nurse and doctor 
names, [and] what they will do ... Like an annual 
physical, they light my eyes, touch me, bend, tap, prod 
and weigh me. They ask if I take medication, have 
attempted suicide, been admitted to a psychiatric 
hospital. If I have had children, abortions, recent 
consensual sex .... Then they ask me to tell my rape. They 
write everything down, record the data on forms with 
numbers and codes that have been waiting for me to be 
raped. All of this is standard procedure. The women who 
treat me explain everything in apologetic tones, whisper 
commands in powdered voices - things better not spoken 
too loud. They are efficient and distant as they spread a 
circular plastic sheet on the floor and ask me to stand on 
it and remove my robe. They brush the hair on my head 
and between my legs pluck[ing] fifteen pubic hairs by 
the root ... stirrups, gloves, stainless steel inside me, 
entering, expanding. From a nearby microscope a 
woman's voice says, "We've got sperm here, one's still 
alive. " I tell her to kill it and she looks at me and smiles. 
Everything is collected in vials and plastic or under 
glass, labeled with my name. All these pieces of me are 
placed in a kit to be touched and examined, probed and 
considered some more, somewhere, by someone, for 
something" (Doe, 2003, p. 13). 
The first provincial SAEK in 1981 
contained many tools and texts for 
documenting and collecting traces of 
rape: physical injuries, sperm, and 
foreign bodily fluids. The SAEK 
contained tools for evidence storage 
(bags for clothing, envelopes for hair 
and debris, and containers for urine 
samples), and tools for evidence 
collection (a hair comb, toothpicks for 
fingernail scrapings, swabs for vaginal, 
anal, and rectal samples, and a syringe 
and tubing plastic container for the vaginal wash) ("Contents of the SAEK," ca. 1981 ). 
The kit also included many texts for coordinating the SAEK's use: a consent form for the 
survivor/victim, a sexual assault history form for the assault details and the 
survivor's/victim's sexual history, a procedures form that described the SAEK guidelines, 
a forensic evidence form to document the samples collected, and a procedural booklet 
that described the SAEK in detail. 
The texts that accompanied the SAEK outlined prescriptions for how the tool was 
to be used, by whom, where, and under what circumstances (Provincial Secretariat for 
Justice, 1981 ). They detailed the SAEK' s forensic script. The texts stressed the 
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importance of closely following the script, as this would, the texts claimed, ensure greater 
efficiency and effectiveness of medico legal action in sexual assault cases. The SAEK' s 
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SAEK Forensic Evidence Form, ca. 1981 
procedural booklet stated, "if 
prescribed procedures are 
followed, it will be less likely 
that the acceptability of the 
evidence will be questioned in 
court" (Provincial Secretariat for 
Justice, 1978, p. 20). By 
providing rigid prescriptions for 
action, the PSJ and other 
medicolegal actors hoped that the 
SAEK's forensic script would give forensic evidence greater value in rape cases. 
The SAEK's protocol instructed physicians8 to follow the SAEK's forensic script 
regardless of a survivor's/victim's description ofrape or physicians' judgment of its 
truthfulness ("Procedures Form," ca. 1981).9 A sexual assault nurse recalled, "once you 
opened that kit, you were completing every single step in it. You were taking all your 
patients' clothes, you were plucking head hair. You were doing everything to that 
patient ... it was horrendous, it really was" (SANE4). The SAEK and its script dictated the 
8 As I describe later, in the early years of the SAEK, physicians were primarily responsible for the SAEK 
exam, with nurses acting as assistants. This was an aspect of the SAEK's forensic script that was later was 
a subject of controversy. 
9 Omission of SAEK steps was permitted; however, this could only be done if an investigating officer and 
physician agreed to its necessity and a detailed rational for the omission was provided in the SAEK 
documents ("Taking Care," 1990). 
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action in the SAEK exam room. The script simultaneously positioned the survivor/victim 
as the implicated user of the SAEK. By signing the SAEK consent form, she expressed 
her willingness, coerced or otherwise, to use the SAEK, or to have it used on her. 10 
However, upon signing the consent form, the SAEK's script denied her any control over 
the SAEK's work and situated her as a subject of medicolegal practice who was 
. 1 1 h . 11 s1mu taneous y on t e margms. 
The SAEK' s script reduced medical forensic exams to a series of standardized 
steps. Many hoped that stripping medical forensic evidence of any signs of medical 
actors' subjectivity would increase the likelihood that in the courtroom, it would appear 
objective, and therefore be more likely to be admissible (Provincial Secretariat for 
Justice, 1978). For many, the SAEK's script held the promise of stabilizing the SAEK's 
as the reliable and credible technoscientific witness of sexual assault. While there has 
been no historical analysis of whether the SAEK's forensic script did indeed increase the 
admissibility of medical forensic evidence in rape cases (Du Mont & Parnis, 2003), 
anecdotally, one crown prosecutor who practiced in the 1970s and 1980s suggested that 
after the SAEK was developed, medical forensic evidence was rarely challenged in court 
and was commonly deemed admissible. 
10 I write this with the acknowledgement that for many survivor's/victim's, consenting to the SAEK exam 
is complicated by police pressures and lack of information (see chapter 6 for further discussion). From the 
original SAEK consent form, it is unclear whether survivors/victims had the right to consent to a SAEK 
exam without immediately reporting a rape to the police. Although the consent form suggests that the 
decision to report and to have the exam were separate, the form provided no way for her to specify to which 
of the two options she was consenting to ("Consent Form," ca. 1981). The consent section on the Sexual 
History Form (ca. 1981) created further confusion by combining the consent to the SAEK exam with 
consent for medical personnel to report the rape to the police. From this, it can be assumed that in most 
cases, consent to the SAEK exam was tied to consent to police involvement. 
11 She was on the margins to the extent that she had little influence in or on practice, but she (or her body) 
was simultaneously the subject of medico legal practice. I describe this contradictory positioning in more 
detail below. 
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The SAEK's forensic script did not, however, immediately stabilize the SAEK in 
medicolegal practice. It was instead often the subject of controversy. Here, I trace three 
aspects of the script and some of the controversies that arose around them. 
Seeing identity in bodily traces. 
Part of the SAEK exam involved collecting foreign bodily traces from a 
survivor's/victim's body- blood, skin, hair, and semen-for the purposes of identifying a 
perpetrator ofrape ("Forensic Evidence Form," ca. 1981). This component of the SAEK 
reflected the common evidentiary requirement in 1970s rape cases for corroborative 
evidence that explicitly identified the perpetrator. As I illustrated in the last chapter, this 
legal requirement had been inscribed in the SAEK' s material design, most particularly in 
its detailed instructions for collecting identifying corroborative evidence. 
The practice of collecting bodily traces for forensic identification was propelled 
by common beliefs in forensic science that "it is almost impossible to commit a crime 
without leaving any physical evidence" (Krishnan, 1978, p. 12) and that physical 
evidence contained "clues to the circumstances of the crime and the identity of the 
offender" (p.12). Individuality, it was assumed, was reflected in the body, and therefore, 
could be seen in the bodily traces (Cole, 2001). These beliefs were visible in the SAEK's 
prescribed steps for combing the survivor's/victim's body for traces that could help 
identify a sexual assault perpetrator. 
In the early 1980s, the forensic identification methods in sexual assault cases were 
mainly blood, semen, and hair analysis (FSM; FS 1 ). These analyses were predominantly 
comparative and involved matching samples obtained in the SAEK to those collected 
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from the suspect or from where the rape occurred (FS 1 ). Through comparison, identity 
was surmised from visible similarities in hair types and/or matching blood types and 
groupings within blood and semen samples. 12 These techniques could not identify an 
individual but instead, identified a group of individuals that shared similar blood or hair 
types. This drastically changed with the introduction of DNA analysis in the late 1980s, 
which I describe in chapter 5. However, in the early 1980s, the forensic methods for hair 
comparison and blood typing and grouping were those that the SAEK's forensic script 
aimed to serve. 
"Painless" hair plucking. 
The SAEK's forensic script included a series of steps that involved combing and 
plucking a survivors' /victims' head and pubic hair. Physicians and nurses were to collect 
50 head hairs by either combing a survivors' /victims' hair, "rub[bing her] scalp 
vigorously" (Provincial Secretariat for Justice, 1978, p. 26), or plucking individual head 
hairs. Pubic hairs (a minimum of 12) were also plucked (Provincial Secretariat for 
Justice, 1978). Forensic scientists used the 62 plucked or gathered hairs to identify and 
differentiate foreign hairs found on the survivors' /victims' body (Krishnan, 1978). This 
part of the SAEK's forensic script was a subject of much debate. 
Controversies among physicians, forensic scientists, and some anti-rape activists 
over the efficacy of plucking pubic hairs began early in the SAEK's history (Martin, 
DiNitto, Maxwell & Norton, 1985; "Meeting Notes," 1983). These controversies featured 
opposing assertions about the levels of pain the procedure caused and its forensic 
12 I describe these methods in greater detail in chapter 5. 
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necessity. In 1982, at a meeting of physicians, forensic scientists, and government 
officials in Toronto, one physician asserted that the pain of plucking pubic hairs was 
excessive and should justify the removal of the step in the SAEK ("Meeting Notes," 
1983). The forensic scientist in attendance opposed this omission and argued that it was 
necessary to forensic hair comparison as it was a process that required "a total sample" 
(p. 5) including the plucked hair root. In this debate, forensic necessity prevailed and the 
step was not removed from the SAEK's forensic script. 
In the years following, some physicians attempted to recast the practice of 
plucking pubic hairs as not only necessary, but also relatively painless for 
survivors/victims (Hargot, 1985a). In 1985, Dr. Len Hargot described the ease with 
which pubic hairs could be plucked, 
This can be done very easily by grabbing the pubic hair with the fingers, telling 
the patient that this will be somewhat uncomfortable, and giving a very quick tug. 
This may not be as painful as it sounds. Local anesthetic may be administered at 
the discretion of the physician. However, we have found that this is not necessary 
when adequate explanation is given (p. 778). 
These claims were similarly made in the first training video for physicians and nurses on 
the SAEK, where a doctor was featured as saying to the survivor/victim, "this won't hurt" 
before he began plucking her pubic hairs (Slater, D., 1981, Slater to R. Comish, February 
12, 1981). 13 
13 The training video was titled Helping Victims and was released around 1984. l could find no copy of the 
video in provincial, municipal, or hospital archives. What I cite here is a letter from the Ontario Coalition 
of Rape Crisis Centres to the Provincial Secretariat of Justice, which describes the video in detail. 
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Some anti-rape activists challenged medical actors' assertions about painless 
plucking by arguing that not all survivors/victims felt plucking in the same way. In a 
letter to the PSJ, one activist wrote, "while the doctor may feel confident that plucking 
pubic hairs won't hurt, it is the victim who will experience any pain and it is her feeling 
that should be respected" (p. 1 ). Other feminist scholars asserted that the pain associated 
with hair plucking was "unnecessary suffering" (Martin, DiNitto, Maxwell & Norton, 
1985, p. 240) for the survivor/victim. Despite these contestations, medical claims of 
painless plucking and forensic claims of the necessity of total hair samples supported the 
inclusion of hair plucking in the SAEK's script for two decades until 2002, when it was 
finally removed from the SAEK' s script (FS 1 ). 
Seeing motility. 
In addition to the techniques for collecting hair, the SAEK's forensic script also 
included steps for collecting motile sperm. To collect sperm, physicians and nurses were 
instructed to use a vaginal aspirate, which involved filling and then removing 1 Oml of 
distilled water in a survivor's/victim's vaginal cavity (Provincial Secretariat for Justice, 
1978). Using the water from the vaginal wash, physicians and nurses would prepare a 
microscope slide, which they observed under a microscope in the exam room to 
determine if motile sperm were present in the vaginal cavity. Evidence of motile sperm 
could be used in court to indicate when sexual intercourse had taken place and to identify 
the time the rape had occurred. The SAEK procedures stated, "sperm motility is not 
usually present after 12 hours" ("Procedures Form," ca. 1981); if motile sperm were seen, 
it was assumed that a rape had occurred in the past 12 hours (Krishnan, 1978). 
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The scientific claims about sperm life in the vagina embedded in the SAEK's 
forensic script shaped the tool's usability. The SAEK procedures form stated, 
The most useful evidence is collected within 24 hours of the assault. .. When 48 
hours or more have elapsed between the time of the assault and the examination, 
the collection of specimens from body orifices will not generally yield useful 
information for court purposes ("Procedures Form," ca. 1981, p. 1 ). 
According to the SAEK's script, physicians were not to use the SAEK to take a vaginal 
aspirate, or oral, anal, and rectal swabs after 48 hours ("Procedures Form," ca. 1981 ). The 
SAEK's instructions suggested that there was scientific consensus over motile sperm life; 
however, medical and forensic science literature suggested otherwise (Astrup, Thomsen, 
Lauritsen, & Ravn, 2012). Some scientific reports claimed that motile sperm usually 
survived only eight hours in the vaginal cavity (Krishnan, 1978), whereas others claimed 
it could survive 72 hours (Hargot, 1982) and, still others, 96 hours (Evrard, 1971 ). 
Additional controversy surrounded the tools that physicians' used to see motile 
sperm in the SAEK exam. Hargot (1985a) suggested that the low-powered microscope 
that physicians commonly used led to many false negatives in motile sperm tests. Hargot 
argued that higher-powered microscopes and staining procedures in forensic laboratories 
were far more successful in identifying motile sperm. With this argument, Hargot 
challenged the conclusions that many physicians' were making about motile sperm in 
SAEK exams. In addition to steps for collecting samples of foreign bodily traces, the 
SAEK script also called for a detailed physical examination of the survivor/victim. 
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The SAEK seeing violence 
The physical exam component of the SAEK exam involved physicians producing 
visible representations of bodily violence. The SAEK procedures instructed physicians to 
"look for evidence of violence e.g. marks, bruises, lacerations, scratches, [and] fractures" 
(Provincial Secretariat for Justice, 1978, p. 26) and draw and describe what they observed 
on the body map detailing the "location, 
dimensions, tenderness, colour, and 
estimated age of the lesion" (p. 26). 
Inscribed in these instructions were the 
1970s' evidentiary requirements for 
corroborative evidence of force in rape 
cases. 
The body map reflected legal 
definitions of rape as forced vaginal 
penetration. In the first SAEK in 1981, 
the body map featured a simple line 
drawing of a female (ab led) body, 
which was relatively young and thin and 
devoid of any racialized features ("General 
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Body Map, 1981 
Examination," ca. 1981). The body in the map was the type that, according to the 
Criminal Code, could be raped. The body map depicted a narrow image of rape and rape 
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survivors/victims that was in stark contrast to the diverse images that some activists were 
making visible in the anti-rape movement. 
Below the body diagram in the body map was a close up drawing of the perineum, 
which featured most prominently, the vaginal opening. By highlighting the vaginal area 
over the anal area, and excluding the oral and penile, the body map constrained 
physicians' drawings and descriptions of rape to the injuries caused by forced vaginal 
intercourse. Rape could only be seen in the body map as marks on or around the vagina 
or as less specified marks on the rest of the body. Other physical injuries, forms of rape 
(such as oral or anal), and the emotional and psychological marks that rape had left on the 
survivor/victim were obscured or unseen in the body map. In constraining visual 
depictions of rape, the body map enacted and reflected narrow constructions of rape and 
its survivors/victims. 
SAEK in practice: Enacting meanings of rape, bodies, and 
survivors/victims. 
When the SAEK was put to work in medicolegal practice, it enacted particular 
meanings of rape, sexually violated bodies, and survivors/victims. On the basis of these 
meanings, the SAEK's forensic script was extended to survivors/victims to define a set of 
expected evidence preserving actions for survivors/victims post-rape. 
The SAEK enacted the survivor's/victim's body as, in the words of some 
contemporary medical actors, "a walking crime scene" (Price, Gifford, Summers, 2010, 
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p. 549). 14 With the SAEK's forensic script, her body became implicated in medicolegal 
practice and she became the subject of it when physicians and nurses combed her body 
for physical traces of rape. Rape, in the SAEK exam room, became defined as an act that 
was empirically observable on the body through visible physical injury, motile sperm, 
and foreign hairs. This was, according to some rape crisis centre workers, a glaring 
contrast to the understanding that many anti-rape activists had of rape as an act that rarely 
left visible marks (RCC4; RCC13). 
The SAEK's script stipulated the technologies that physicians and nurses would 
use to see traces of rape. White and Du Mont (2008) describe how sexual assault is 
"visualized" (p. 1) in the contemporary SAEK exam through technical "optical 
technologies" (p. 1 ). Expanding their definition of technology to include not only 
technical technologies, but also "simple tools" (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999, p. 3), it 
could be said that the SAEK of the 1980s included a range of optical technologies for 
seeing rape: the microscope for viewing motile sperm, and the comb for gathering hair, 
the body map for illustrating violence, and the swabs, bags, toothpicks, and syringes for 
collecting blood, skin, hair, and semen. Physicians' use of these technologies enacted 
meanings of rape as an act that could be seen. 
The SAEK's technologies worked to "freeze" (King, 1994, p. 90) rape so that it 
could be later observed and witnessed in the courtroom. As one forensic scientist said, 
describing the contemporary SAEK, "the kit is great because it captures the evidence at 
14 Understanding the sexually violated body as a crime scene in forensic examination is a common dictum 
reiterated in nursing and psychology literature (Price, et al., 2010; Johnson, Peterson, Sommers, Baskin, 
2012; Campbell, Patterson, & Bybee, 2009). Feminist scholars have explored how this understanding 
disempowers women who experience rape (Doe, 2012), rearticulates notions of the domestic (Mu Ila, 2008), 
and fragments the body and reduces conceptions of rape to bodily violence (Bumiller, 2008). 
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the time the complainant comes forward and it is then locked down in time" (FSl). With 
the SAEK, visual signs of rape were "locked down" so that they could later be 
"virtual[ly] witnessed" (Shapin & Schaffer, 1985 p. 60) by lawyers, judges, and juries. In 
this way, the SAEK's testimony as the technoscientific witness allowed other actors in 
the courtroom to virtually witness sexual assault. Shapin and Schaffer describe virtual 
witnessing as a "literary technology" (p. 60) that early scientists used to "produc[ e] in the 
reader's mind an image of the experimental scene in a way that obviates the necessity for 
either direct witness or replication" (p. 60). The SAEK's testimony worked in a similar 
way: it produced images of rape in lawyer's, judge's, and jurists' minds that removed the 
necessity for directly witnessing sexual assault. 
In the contemporary courtroom, Bumiller (2008) suggests that, "sexual violence is 
made verifiable through the voyeuristic reimagining of the violation of women's bodies" 
(p. 32). Reports from the late 1970s and 1980s suggest a similar trend. If rape was 
virtually witnessed in the courtroom with physical injuries and foreign bodily traces, it 
was more likely to be believed (Clark & Lewis, 1977; Kinnon, 1978). 
In addition to meanings of rape as empirically observable, the SAEK and 
medicolegal practices around it also enacted rape as a medical problem requiring medical 
intervention (Doe, 2003; Mulla, 2008; Doe, 2012). The survivor/victim in a SAEK exam 
was commonly named in training videos and medical literature as "the patient" ("Taking 
Care," 1990; Fahrney, 1974; Hargot, 1985a) who was being given medical treatment. 
This language likened the survivor/victim to other emergency ward patients, rape to a 
medical condition that could be treated, and the SAEK to other medical procedures. 
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As the survivor's/victim's body became enacted as a crime scene, she was 
positioned in practice as a risky medicolegal outsider who had the potential to 
unknowingly destroy valuable physical evidence at the scene of the crime. The SAEK's 
forensic script encouraged her to see her own body as a crime scene by stipulating a set 
of actions for her to take to preserve and protect bodily evidence until it could be 
collected with the SAEK. Many of the texts, information booklets and pamphlets for 
survivors/victims on the SAEK outlined strict instructions on preserving bodily evidence. 
The Provincial Secretariat of Justice (l 978b) handbook for survivors/victims included 
instructions in capitalized letters that read, "DO NOT BA THE, SHOWER, OR 
DOUCHE. These actions can destroy evidence" (Provincial Secretariat for Justice, 
1978b, p. 1 ). 
The SAEK's forensic script configured an ideal implicated user of the SAEK. 15 
This ideal implicated user was the survivor/victim who knew and followed the SAEK' s 
forensic script and thus worked cooperatively with the SAEK. To fit this definition, a 
survivor/victim needed to have the capacity and desire to read the dense English SAEK 
instructions and the ability and wish to follow them immediately following their rape. For 
many women, these instructions were likely difficult to remember and to follow in the 
face of trauma and the long emergency room delays. Many rape crisis centres attempted 
to make these instructions more accessible to women, and in doing so, I argue that they 
became involved in stabilizing the SAEK, despite the fact that many were deeply critical 
of its use. 
15 1 expand this idea further in chapter 6. 
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Conflicted relations: Rape crisis centre workers and the SAEK. 
Although many anti-rape activists had advocated for the SAEK's development in 
the 1970s and some had participated in its early design, many anti-rape activists had what 
appeared to have a conflicted relationship with the SAEK. One rape crisis centre worker 
described this by saying, "we were never big believers in the evidence kit" (RCC4). 
According to her, many of the anti-rape activists thought that the SAEK gathered useless 
evidence that could easily be explained in court as traces of consensual sexual activity. 
Another activist recalled, "there was a lot of tension around what the kit did beyond 
prove that there may have been some kind of activity that might be labeled as sexual 
activity ... there was a great deal of conversation [and] fretting" (RCC14). 
While some claimed that the SAEK "lent some amount of credibility" to women's 
rape reports and "gave some women comfort" (RCC 12), others argued that the SAEK 
symbolized "the medical system becoming ... a gate keeper to the legal system" (RCC14), 
and falsely represented rape "as either a medical issue or a legal issue, as opposed to a 
social issue" (RCC 14 ). Some argued that the kit was a tool that perpetuated the disbelief 
of women's testimonies ofrape in the legal system, and as such "the kit couldn't be 
understood outside of the context of patriarchy" (RCC14). However, for many rape crisis 
centre workers, these tensions about what the SAEK did and what it symbolized were 
weighed against the knowledge that for some survivors/victims, although often very few, 
the SAEK provided the necessary evidentiary proof that their rape had occurred for a 
perpetrator to be convicted of rape (RCC 12; RCC 14 ). The SAEK was, according to 
some, "a necessary evil" (RCC14). 
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Despite the uncertainties about the SAEK amongst rape crisis centre workers, 
many rape crisis centres and the texts they produced participated in stabilizing the SAEK 
and its forensic script. Rape crisis centres' brochures often included instructions for 
preserving bodily evidence ("Sudbury Rape Crisis Centre," ca. 1980; "Sexual Assault 
Centre London," 1981; "Sexual Assault 
Crisis Centre Windsor," ca. 1984), and 
some volunteer training manuals described 
how volunteers should convey information 
about evidence preservation to 
survivors/victims ("Training Manual," 
1977; Toronto Rape Crisis Centre, 1979). 
Many of these texts reiterated government 
and medical descriptions of how to 
preserve evidence and the importance of 
doing so for police reports. The doubts that 
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SAEK's value were erased in most of these Sudbury Rape Crisis Centre Pamphlet ca. 1984 
texts. By erasing their own uncertainty within their texts, many rape crisis centres 
participated in advertising the SAEK and its forensic script to survivors/victims. 
Rape crisis centres and their texts became involved in making the SAEK work in 
medicolegal practice when they disseminated medicolegal expectations for the implicated 
user of the SAEK. While the SAEK's forensic script for survivors'/victims' actions post-
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rape gained stability, the script for medicolegal actors' actions did not, as legal reforms 
and medico legal controversy threw parts of the SAEK' s script into question. 
Destabilizing the SAEK with Law and SAEK Users 
Redefining Tools: Rape law reform. 
In 1982, after more than six years of anti-rape and feminist lawyers and activists 
lobbying for legal reform, sections of the Criminal Code of Canada relating to rape were 
redrafted (Sheehy, 1999; Tang, 1998). When the reforms came into effect in early 1983, 
they eliminated the Criminal Code's narrow definition of rape as forced vaginal 
penetration and created a new section for sexual assault under the larger heading of 
physical assault (s. 246). Mirroring the structure for physical assault offences, sexual 
assault was defined as a three-tiered offence with graded levels of violence and penalty, 
which included: i) sexual assault, with a maximum penalty of 10 years (s. 246.1 ), ii) 
sexual assault with the use or threat of bodily harm (s. 246. 2), with a maximum penalty 
of 14 years, and iii) aggravated sexual assault, with the maximum penalty of life 
imprisonment (Bill C-127, 1982). With this reform, sexual assault was given a more 
expansive definition that included other forms of non-vaginal rape and sexual assault, as 
well as sexual assault against men. The reform also eliminated the immunity that 
husbands had under the previous Criminal Code to rape their wives. 
In addition to the substantive changes in sexual assault law, there were several 
procedural reforms regarding the evidentiary requirements for sexual assault. Most 
important to the SAEK, the 1976 Criminal Code reforms on corroborative evidence were 
reinforced with a clearer mandate in 1982, a mandate that eliminated the need of 
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corroborative evidence for sexual assault conviction through the words: "no 
corroboration is required for a conviction and the judge shall not instruct the jury that it is 
unsafe to find the accused guilty in the absence of corroboration" (Bill C-127, 1982, s. 
246.4). 
When these reforms were being drafted in Bill C-127 ( 1982), many hoped that the 
new reform would eliminate the sexist biases previously embedded in rape law and 
increase the reporting and conviction rates for sexual offences (Parnis & Du Mont, 1999). 
Michelle Landsberg (2011) expressed this hopefulness when she described the 
anticipated reform in her column in 1981; "the new terminology happily washes away 
accumulated layers of sexism currently built right into the laws: that only a woman can 
be raped, only by men, and only when the penis penetrates the vagina" (p. 125). Despite 
the confidence with which many feminists and anti-rape activists welcomed the expected 
reform, Landsberg's (2011) columns suggest that some had hesitations and doubts about 
the reforms capacity to radically shift the legal handling of sexual violence and mourned 
the loss of the term rape, which had animated the anti-rape movement for the previous 
decade. 
Bill C-127 (1982) had significance for the SAEK. By reshaping parts of the law 
that had been inscribed in the SAEK's design, the reforms had the potential to call the 
SAEK' s design and meaning into question. The SAEK' s purpose of capturing visual 
signs of forced vaginal penetration became unnecessarily narrow under the expanded 
definition of sexual assault. Also, the reform opened the possibility of challenging the 
SAEK's purpose of collecting identifying evidence of an offender, which some anti-rape 
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activists argued, stemmed from the belief that survivors/victims were raped by people 
they did not know (RCC4). By eliminating husbands' immunity to rape, many activists 
and medicolegal actors expected that more sexual assaults involving known offenders 
would come forward; as one crown attorney reportedly said in 1981, "a change like that 
could open the floodgates" (Landsberg, 2011, p. 127). In most cases involving known 
offenders, identifying information was not required as the case more commonly revolved 
around consent, not identity (DL6). By redrafting the legal basis upon which the SAEK 
was built, Bill C-127 had the potential to destabilize the forensic script of the SAEK. 
In late 1982, just after Bill C-127 (1982) had been introduced in parliament, 
medical and legal actors were designing and distributing a new SAEK to Ontario 
hospitals (Comish, 1982, R. Comish to Emergency Room Physicians, Nurses, Police, 
Crown Attorneys, December 10, 1982). The redesigned SAEK reflected relatively 
minimal changes, which included two new forms (a French consent form and a new 
medical history form) and removed one forensic procedure of scraping a 
survivor's/victim's fingernails. The only evidence that the SAEK's forensic script had 
been redesigned to reflect the pending legal reforms was its inclusion of instructions for 
gathering forensic evidence from male survivors/victims of sexual assault. 
The SAEK's body map, which had previously featured a distinctly female body, 
was redrawn to feature a seemingly unsexed body with a small jaw, similarly sized hips 
and shoulders, muscular legs, and a short hair cut. Below the close up diagram of the 
vaginal area, a diagram of the penile region was added. In these changes, the SAEK' s 
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forensic script shifted slightly to accommodate the SAEK' s new purpose of collecting 
forensic evidence of sexual assault from women, men, girls and boys. 16 
These relatively small changes to the SAEK did not reflect the elimination of the 
corroborative evidence requirement (Pamis & Du Mont, 1999). The SAEK still 
maintained its purpose of collecting evidence of bodily harm that could be used to 
substantiate or refute a survivor's/victim's experience of sexual assault. The SAEK 
retained its emphasis on collecting evidence that identified the perpetrator, despite what 
was expected to be a significant increase in cases involving known perpetrators. While 
the SAEK's forensic script was only slightly altered by the 1983 legal reforms, parts of 
the script were hotly contested in the medicolegal system in the years before and after. 
Designated SAEK users. 
In the 1980s, the SAEK's forensic script stipulated physicians as the SAEK's 
primary users (Ontario Hospital Association, 1983a). This instruction gave physicians a 
new expert claim over the new tool and the sexually violated bodies it worked on. As 
White and Du Mont (2008) have noted, with the SAEK, "physicians were integrated into 
a new form of expertise" (p. 2) on rape, violated bodies, and forensic evidence. 
To use the words of Science and Technology Studies scholar, Sheila Jasanoff 
(1998), physicians in the 1980s had "authorized lines of sight" (p. 713) over sexually 
violated bodies. Their scope of practice, unlike nurses and many other medical personnel, 
gave them the authority to collect medical samples from body orifices (MacDonald, 
16 Despite these changes, I continue to use the female pronoun when I refer to survivors/victims, as women 
have been and continue to be the most likely survivors/victims of rape and sexual violence in Canada 
(Kong, Johnson, Beattie, Cardillo, 2002). 
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Wyman, & Addison, 1995, p. 1 ). The vaginal aspirate and speculum examination in the 
SAEK exam required a medical actor who had the authority and expertise to see inside 
women's bodies.1 7 
In the 1980s, nurses were most often physicians' assistants in the SAEK exam, 
who could collect some forensic evidence, but only at the physician's discretion 
(Provincial Secretariat for Justice, 1978). 18 Nurses were often responsible for explaining 
the SAEK procedures to the survivor/victim and completing some of the documentation 
("Taking Care," 1990) and with physician permission, they collected the 
survivor's/victim's clothes and some hair, mouth, and fingernail samples ("Procedures 
Form,." ca. 1981). Although physician-nurse teams were often used for SAEK exams (Du 
Mont & Pamis, 2003), the procedure forms and training videos clearly stipulated the 
physician's authority over the SAEK and the procedures in the exam. 
Not all physicians welcomed their new responsibility for the SAEK. While many 
medicolegal and government actors hoped that the SAEK would increase physicians' 
willingness to conduct forensic exams by simplifying the process (Ontario Hospital 
Association, 1983a), it did not prove to do so in practice ("A Report of the OHA," 1983). 
Some physicians felt uneasy about their new dual role as medical care providers and 
SAEK forensic evidence collectors (Martin et al., 1985). One doctor described this by 
saying, "I think anytime we are asked to move outside of a primarily medical role, there 
17 Martin et al. ( 1985) describe two additional reasons why physicians were chosen to conduct the SAEK 
exam: the assumption that survivors/victims would be more likely disclose rape to a physician and the 
assumption that physicians were more likely to be seen as credible witnesses in rape cases. 
18 Despite not having the same degree of authority as physicians, from the historical reports, it appears as 
though nurses received more training on the SAEK than physicians: in the Ontario Hospital Association 
survey in 1983, only 65% of Ontario hospitals had trained physicians on the SAEK, where 78% had trained 
nurses ("A Report of the OHA," 1983). 
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is a certain discomfort" (D 1 ). According to many of the historical records, this clash 
between medicine and law played out in physicians' responses and resistance to the 
SAEK and its forensic script that designated them as the tool's primary users. The 
controversies that the physicians had the effect of destabilizing the SAEK in medicolegal 
practice. 
Thirty-five percent of hospitals surveyed by the Ontario Hospital Association in 
1983 reported problems with the SAEK ("A Report of the OHA," 1983). Most notably, 
physicians reported frustration about the significant amount of time that the SAEK 
imposed on forensic exams. One nurse remembered the frustration the SAEK caused 
amongst many medical staff. "Everyone would do this big yawn if a sexual assault case 
came in ... they would say 'oh god, who's ready to be in one room for five hours?'" 
(SANE2). 
In medical journals, some physicians expressed concerns about the usability and 
design of the new tool and debates waged about its practicality. In response to one article 
that praised the SAEK (Hargot, 1985a), Herbert and Whynot (1985) wrote, 
It has been our experience that the Ontario kit, like most others ... makes a simple 
examination unnecessarily complicated, time consuming, and expensive ... one can 
take all appropriate evidence with a few swabs, test tubes, and slides - all 
available in any office or emergency department (p. 1453). 
Hargot ( 1985b ), an avid supporter of the SAEK, responded in a later article, "my fear in 
having a less defined protocol is that we would be taking a step backwards ... the use of 
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the kit is meant to simplify the procedure, not to complicate it" (p. 1453). While Hargot 
saw the SAEK's benefits, many other physicians did not. 
Physician dissatisfaction with 
the SAEK started early. In 1981, in 
response to increasing physician 
resistance to the SAEK, the Ontario 
Medical Association ( 0 MA) 
announced that physicians would 
exam ($125 for male 
survivors/victims) (Montgomery, 
Toronto Star, April 9, 1981 
1981 ). The Ministry of the Attorney Reprinted with Permission - Torstar Syndication Services 
General refused to pay the fee. The OMA responded by stating that if the Ministry would 
not pay for SAEK exams, physicians would charge the "authorities requesting the 
service" (p. 1 ), which likely referred to individual police detachments. By 1983, however, 
the OMA and the Ministry had apparently reached a settlement that would grant 
physicians $185 for each SAEK exam, which would be paid by Ontario Health Insurance 
Plan (Ontario Hospital Association, 1983a). Despite secured payment, many physicians 
as well as other emergency room staff continued to resist accepting responsibility for 
administering the SAEK. Physicians and nurses often prioritized other medical 
emergencies over survivors/victims and as a result, long delays awaited many 
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survivors/victims in Ontario hospital emergency wards (Women's College Hospital, 
1983). 
One survivor's/victim's wait in a Toronto emergency ward made front-page 
headlines in 1982. After waiting many hours in the emergency ward at Humber Memorial 
Hospital in Toronto, medical staff refused to treat the survivor/victim and she was 
reportedly forced to travel to Women's College Hospital for the SAEK exam (Stead, 
1982). When the survivor/victim reported her story to the media, controversies sparked 
over who was to blame (D 1 ). In the media reports, some criticized the physician involved 
and others, police officers and rape crisis centres, reported the systemic problem of 
delays in emergency wards (Stead, 1982). 
According to some memos from the Ontario Hospital Association (1983b ), these 
media reports put the emergency room delays "under close public scrutiny" (p. 1 ). In an 
effort to regain public confidence in medical responses to sexual assault, the Minister of 
Health stated in the media that he would be "writing to every hospital in the province to 
ensure that never again will a rape victim be turned away untreated" (Stead, 1982, p. 1 ). 
Likely, he sent out the following letter, 
Recent disturbing events surrounding the care and treatment of rape victims in the 
emergency department of some hospitals is causing some concern. I would like to 
stress that the first priority is to ensure that appropriate medical treatment is 
provided and that the necessary forensic process is carried out with the utmost 
urgency and sympathy. The rape evidence kits have been designed to provide a 
standardized means of collecting forensic information and evidence. Although I 
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appreciate that it takes time to complete the requirements within the kit, this 
aspect should not be allowed to delay or alter the provision of adequate care and 
attention given to the patient .. .It is the duty of everyone involved to treat these 
unfortunate victims with utmost sensitivity [emphasis added] (Ontario Ministry of 
Health, 1982, p. 1 ). 
In the media, the Ministry claimed that the government had done its part in supporting 
survivors/victims by educating physicians on the SAEK and financing rape crisis centres 
(Stead, 1982). Despite the government's efforts, however, public relations battles 
between government parties ensued in the media and Ontario Liberal and NDP leaders 
reportedly challenged the Conservative government's for being disinterested in 
survivors/victims and their needs (Stead, 1982). 
As a result of the mounting public pressure, government agencies proposed to 
move the SAEK out of emergency wards in Toronto and into a regional sexual assault 
treatment centre ("Meeting Notes," 1983). The centre would be staffed by specially 
trained physicians and nurses and would be responsible for treating all survivors/victims 
in the Toronto area (Women's College Hospital Public Relations, 1982). These proposals 
sparked a re stabilizing of the SAEK with a new expert space for the SAEK exam. 
Stabilizing with New Expert Spaces 
Sexual Assault Care and Treatment Centres (SACTC) were built as new 
medico legal spaces for the SAEK. For many medical, legal, and government actors, these 
centres held promise of diminishing the controversies around the SAEK by providing a 
new institutional home for the SAEK where it could be reclaimed by willing medical 
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actors. In addition to the survivor's/victim's experience at Humber Memorial Hospital, 
many other things fuelled the development of the first SACTC in Toronto. 
Imagining a SACTC. 
The idea for a hospital-based SACTC was in existence long before it was realized 
in Toronto. Hospital-based SACTCs had been running in the United States since 1972 
(Burgess & Holmstrom, 1973). In Ontario, a regional rape treatment centre was opened in 
Hamilton in 1979 (Hargot, 1982). When the steps were undertaken to design and build a 
SACTC in Toronto, these centres were used as a model ("Rape Treatment Centre," 
1982). 19 
Many supporters of the proposed Toronto SACTC described the centre as the only 
solution to physicians' reluctance to the SAEK and to emergency room delays ("Meeting 
Notes," 1983; Women's College Hospital, 1983). One proposal stated, 
Although revisions to the Sexual Assault Kit have made it easier to use and 
procedures have been somewhat standardized, there is still a feeling that police 
cases of this nature are not truly a part of emergency medicine. Feelings cannot be 
legislated and problems will continue to occur unless centres providing necessary 
care are doing so (Women's College Hospital, 1983, p. 4). 
19 This history is somewhat unclear. In many public relations documents, Women's College Hospital 
(WCH) claims to be the first sexual assault care and treatment centre in Canada (Sunnybrooke and 
Women's College Health Sciences Centre, n.d.; Ontario Network of Sexual Assault/Domestic Violence 
Treatment Centres, n.d.). However, the WCH proposal for the centre (WCH Public Relations, 1982) as well 
as some internal memos on the development of the centre ("Rape Treatment Centre," 1982), clearly suggest 
that WCH's plan was to "utilize/modify the step-by-step plan already in existence at McMaster" (p. 1). 
While it is not clear if Hamilton had a physical centre in 1979, which the WCH had in 1984, one Hamilton 
physician did describe the Hamilton sexual assault treatment program as a centre, which suggests that it 
might have been a dedicated physical space for sexual assault treatment (Hargot, 1982). 
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According to this argument, "problems" around the SAEK would only be diminished and 
"feelings" resisting the SAEK subdued if a new expert space was developed that housed 
voluntary trained physicians willing to take responsibility for the SAEK. 
The Ontario government framed the proposed SACTC as having even broader 
appeal (Ontario Ministry of Health, ca. 1984). SACTCs seemingly meshed well with the 
government's push in the 1980s to lower costs of health care, increase efficiency, and 
centralize health services (Murray, Jick, & Bradshaw, 1984). Keith Norton, the Ontario 
Minister of Health, expressed this clearly in a news release announcing SACTCs in 
Ontario: 
In an era of limited fiscal resources, new money must be generated by trade-offs 
and economies within the health care system itself ... it is imperative to use every 
health care dollar as effectively as possible ... in the hospital sector, tough times 
means co-operative times (Ontario Ministry of Health, ca. 1984). 
In many reports, centralizing health care services for sexual assault and eliminating the 
delays the SAEK caused in emergency wards with a SACTC was cast as a necessary step 
for reducing the health care costs of sexual assault treatment (Women's College Hospital, 
1983). 
In addition to government arguments for SACTCs, one municipal report, written 
in 1983, gave the idea of SACTCs in Toronto some of its greatest publicity. Following a 
series of rape-murders in Toronto in 1982, a task force was initiated to investigate the 
criminal justice system's response to public violence ("Task Force on Public Violence," 
1983). The Task Force, headed by a member of the Board of Police Commissioners for 
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Toronto (Baker, 1983), included six working groups with over 80 volunteers ("Task 
Force on Public Violence," 1983), some of whom were anti-rape activists from the 
Toronto Rape Crisis Centre (Watt, S., 1982, S. Watt to Members, December 13, 1982). 
The Task Force recommended many changes, ranging from specialized police rape 
investigation squads to public education campaigns on the criminal justice system ("Task 
Force on Public Violence," 1983). Most notable was their recommendation to develop 
five regional sexual assault centres in Toronto. The Task Force's report was covered 
extensively in the media (Baker, 1983; Lipovenko, 1984). 
The Task Force report marked another moment when anti-rape activists and rape 
crisis centre workers became involved in the action around the SAEK. Ironically, it 
would be the sexual assault centres that some medical actors would use to displace rape 
crisis centre workers from medicolegal practice involving the SAEK. 
Women's College Hospital's SACC. 
Women's College Hospital was the first hospital in Toronto to propose to house a 
regional SACTC (WCH Public Relations, 1982). The hospital argued that its established 
expertise in women's health and history of "demonstrated social awareness" (Women's 
College Hospital, 1983, p. 4) made it an ideal home for the SACTC. Despite some initial 
concerns about funding (Haslehurst, 1983, J. Haslehurst to D. Psutka, September 6, 1983) 
and designating adequate staff and space for the centre ("Executive Committee Minutes," 
1983), the hospital began its preparations to open the SACTC by April 1984 (Anderson, 
1984). 
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Naming expert spaces. 
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Memo, 1983 
In the year before the centre 
opened, there was some 
controversy about what the 
centre should be called. An 
early report in 1982 used the 
name, "Rape Treatment 
Centre" (Women's College 
Hospital Public Relations, 
1982, p. 1 ). However, less 
than a year later, in an 
internal memo, an 
unidentified author scribbled 
over the name with notes 
about the drawbacks of using 
the word centre. She or he 
questioned, "should we call it a clinic to avoid confusion with rape crisis centre[s]?" 
("Draft," 1983). Possibly, this question was sparked by hesitations that the Ministry was 
expressing about treatment centres duplicating the services in rape crisis/sexual assault 
centres (Watt, 1984, S. Watt to J. Pepino, May 4, 1984). 
Despite their apparent concern with being confused with rape crisis/sexual assault 
centres, hospital administrators eventually chose the name, "Sexual Assault Care Centre 
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(SACC)" (Sunnybrooke and Women's College Health Sciences Centre, n.d.). Feminist 
scholar Marjorie Cohen (1993) notes that governments have often "co-opted" (p. 21) 
organizational names from the women's movement and have as a result, created much 
confusion about organizational structures. Along similar lines, it could be said that the 
SACC chose a name that co-opted organizational titles from the anti-rape movement and 
in so doing created confusion amongst 
victims/survivors seeking support and 
police investigators about where the 
SAEK exam was done. 20 
On April 12, 1984, the Women's 
College SACC opened its doors 
(Lipovenko, 1984). The centre was located 
in the hospital near the emergency ward 
and had its own examination room for 
SAEK exams and a seating area for 
medical consultations (Women's 
College Hospital, 1983). It was staffed 
The Miss Margaret Robins Archives of Women's 
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Announcement of Women's College SACC, 
by several nurses and 14 physicians who had agreed to be associated with the centre 
(Anderson, 1984). In some articles announcing the centre, medicolegal actors reported 
the benefits of institutionalized sexual assault care over rape crisis advocacy. In one 
20 In many of my interviews, the respondents and I had to take extra steps to clarify which type of centre we 
were talking about: SACTCs or rape crisis/sexual assault centres (which many of them are now called). As 
I discuss more in chapter 6, this confusion has supported the efforts to redefine sexual assault care and 
advocacy. 
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article, a social worker stated, "sexual assault victims prefer to be treated in a hospital 
rather that a rape centre because they find a certain comfort in institutions" (Anderson, 
1984 ). These claims, in retrospect, foreshadowed what would be a more organized effort 
to displace rape crisis centre workers in the SAEK exam. 
A (dis)comforting expert space. 
Not long after the SACC opened at Women's College, other SACTCs began 
opening across the province. By 1987, there were 15 SACTCs in Ontario (Brodie, 1987) 
and by 2000, there were 27 (Saltmarche & Cherrie, 2000). In 1993, a provincial network 
of SACTCs had formed. In 1998, many centres' mandates expanded to include 
survivors/victims of domestic violence (KPMG Consulting, 1999) and this change was 
reflected in the network's name.21 By providing a new expert space for the SAEK, the 
SACTCs silenced some of the controversies about SAEK's in emergency wards, and in 
so doing, gave the SAEK some renewed stability in medicolegal practice. Many 
medicolegal actors heralded the Ontario SACTCs as a significant advancement in the 
medicolegal response to sexual assault (Lipovenko, 1984; Baker, 1983); however, as I 
will argue, their introduction had more nuanced effects. 
According to many rape crisis centre workers, for many survivors/victims the 
SACTCs provided a welcomed alternative to emergency wards (RCC4; RCC13; SANEl; 
SANE2). Many nurses I interviewed reiterated this by saying that the trained staff at the 
SACTCs and the separate location from the emergency ward created "a more caring and 
supportive environment" (SANEl) for survivors/victims. However, there were many 
21 For simplicity, I use the name Sexual Assault Care and Treatment Centre (SACTC) for the remaining 
chapters. 
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survivors/victims who did not directly benefit from the SACTCs, such as those 
survivors/victims who did not wish to go to the hospital after experiencing a sexual 
assault or those whose access to the SACTC was limited or prevented by language, lack 
of information, geography, limited transportation or for other reasons. 
In the initial years of the Women's College SACC, the centre's mandate was, 
according its coordinator Dianne Nannarone, 
Two fold ... to present an approach to comprehensive management which is 
responsive to the emotional, physical, and medical/legal needs of victims of 
sexual assault, and to present a 'networking' model for nurses and physicians and 
other health care professionals integrating medical and emotional treatment with 
the criminal justice system as part of the therapeutic process [emphasis added] 
(Unknown, 1986, p. 1). 
By fostering a "networking model" (p. 1) for medical professionals, the SACCs became 
the physical location where expertise on sexual assault was developed and supported. By 
seeking to "manage" (p. 1) sexual assault as an "emotional, physical, and medical/legal" 
(p. 1) problem, practices in the SACC enacted meanings of sexual assault as an individual 
trauma and sexual assault treatment as a medical/legal intervention. Sexual assault 
treatment became tied to the SAEK as the tool became a central part of medico legal 
practice. 
The physical layout of the Women's College SACC reflected the meanings of 
sexual assault, survivors/victims, and sexual assault treatment that were inscribed in the 
SAEK and mirrored in the SACC's mandate. One video that was filmed at the SACC 
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captures the small space that was reserved for consultation, which seemingly could only 
comfortably accommodate one physician, one nurse, and the survivor/victim.22 The 
restrictive capacity of the room reinforced meanings of sexual assault treatment as an 
individualized exchange between medical personnel and survivors/victims. The room's 
central feature, the large examining table, and the other medical and forensic tools 
surrounding it, defined sexual assault treatment as a medical/forensic intervention, which 
included the SAEK exam. Sexual assault, within this physical arrangement, became an 
individual, medical problem, or as Doe (2003) says, "a personal tragedy rather than a 
social evil and a crime" (p. 307). In 2000, the SACC opened an interview suite for police 
interviewing survivors/victims (Public Affairs, 2000). This structural addition solidified 
the connection between sexual assault treatment and the law that the SAEK forged. 
The SACC's physical location reinforced medicolegal definitions of the ideal 
implicated user of the SAEK. To access the SACC services and therefore the SAEK, a 
survivor/victim had to have transportation to the centre, health care coverage, the ability 
to speak English, 23 the willingness to go to a hospital, a degree of comfort in 
institutionalized spaces that were predominantly white and English speaking, and the 
physical mobility to lie on the examining table that did not accommodate mobility 
impairments.24 These restrictions on SACC access defined the narrow bounds of the 
SAEK's ideal implicated user.25 
22 I draw the contents of this description of the SACC from the SAEK training video, Taking Care (1990), 
which was filmed at the Women's College Hospital SACC. 
23 Sexual assault treatment centres in Ontario introduced French services in 1994 (Ontario Women's 
Directorate, 1994). I found no evidence of other language services being offered before this date. 
24 In the 1980s, lack of accommodation for individuals with physical impairments was not unique the 
SACTCs and characterized many institutional and public spaces (Ringaert, 2003). In the SACTCs, 
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Boundary work: Expert spaces displacing rape crisis centre workers. 
The SACTC's physical space allowed medical actors to control rape crisis centre 
workers involvement in the SAEK exam. Many medicolegal actors used the SACTCs to 
do what Jasanoff (1998) has called "expert-community boundary work" (p. 733), where 
they drew and policed new lines between the SAEK experts and rape crisis centre 
volunteers and staff. Whereas a decade earlier, rape crisis centre workers were commonly 
situated as experts on the margins of medical practice, now, with the development of the 
SAEK, medicolegal expertise, and expert spaces, they were becoming increasingly 
displaced in the SAEK's work. Medicolegal actors' boundary work attempted to situate 
rape crisis centre workers as non-users of the SAEK who were on the margins of the 
SAEK's work and who had limited influence over its use. These efforts sparked much 
controversy. 
Within the first month of the WCH SACC opening, the Toronto Rape Crisis 
Centre and the hospital were in negotiations over whether volunteers had the right to 
accompany survivors/victims into the SAEK exam (Lipovenko, 1984). As two activists 
remembered, "we had to insist that we remain[ed] in the process" (RCC13) because "our 
role was not seen as a critical one" (RCC14). Hospital administrators expressed concerns 
about the lack of hospital based "controls" ("Women's College Hospital Memo," 1982b, 
p. 2) over rape crisis volunteers. The hospital proposed, 
accessible examining tables that accommodated mobility impairments caused by disability and severe 
injury were introduced in 1998 (Barnhouse, D., 1998, D. Barnhouse to P. Campbell, March 2, 1998). 
25 I discuss this further in chapter 6. 
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... that those volunteers selected to service this Centre be carefully screened, as it 
would be most damaging to individual victims as well as Women's College 
Hospital, if volunteers were to use to the program to press personal beliefs 
regarding reporting and prosecution ofrapists (Women's College Hospital, 1983, 
p. 11). 
Reports suggest that the hospital would only permit advocates from rape crisis centres in 
the SAEK exam if they promoted the SACC and the SAEK to survivors/victims. The 
hospital wrote in the SACC proposal, "it is hoped that staff of the rape crisis centre would 
recommend/convince victims, who had not yet obtained care, to seek out the assistance of 
Women's College Hospital's Sexual Assault Treatment Centre" [emphasis added] (p. 12). 
Hospital administrators were situating rape crisis centre workers as non-users of the 
SAEK who could only be marginally involved in the SAEK's work if they promoted and 
supported it. 
According to some anti-rape activists, the tensions between the hospital and rape 
crisis centre made anti-rape advocacy difficult in the SACC, particularly for those 
without professional training of some kind (RCC 14 ). One activist explained, 
Some of our volunteers were not highly professionalized individuals who could 
show a card and talk the appropriate professional language. We were women 
helping other women .... the tension was based on the rape crisis centre's political 
analysis of rape intersecting with the hospital hierarchy and insistence on 
credentials (RCC14). 
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The Toronto Rape Crisis Centre collective stated that, "rape crisis workers were often 
perceived as unprofessional, improperly trained, and threatening" (TRCC, n.d. ). In this 
context of expert boundary drawing, many activists claimed that the expectation on rape 
crisis centres to "liaise" (Sinclair, 1980, D. Sinclair to S. Sahli, June 26, 1980, p. 1) with 
hospitals in the government funding requirements was difficult if not impossible to fulfill 
(TRCC, n.d.). 
"The Ultimate Co-Optation" 
Many anti-rape activists questioned the rise of expert knowledge and practice 
around sexual assault and saw the SACTCs as an effort to undermine and co-opt sexual 
assault services and advocacy in the anti-rape movement (RCC4; RCC7; Doe, 2003; Doe, 
2012). When the Women's College SACC opened, Deb Parent, from the Toronto Rape 
Crisis Centre, was quoted in the media as saying "I don't want to see mini rape crisis 
centres set up at hospitals" (as cited in Lipovenko, 1974). A similar sentiment was 
expressed when a third generation anti-rape activist that I interviewed recalled her 
grandmother's descriptions of the SACTC's opening in her Northern Ontario community. 
She said, "I remember what my grandmother said when the SACTC came in ... 'this is the 
death now for women's groups. This is the ultimate co-optation'" [emphasis added] 
(RCC7). 
The growth of SACTCs in Ontario in the late 1980s and 1990s was accompanied 
by an expanded mandate for many centres, which included advocacy, public education, 
and research on sexual assault ("Annual Report," 1988). Some SACTCs adopted self-
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descriptions that resonated some of the same language rape crisis centres' had used to 
define themselves (e.g. Winner, 1977; "Why Invest," 1979). One in particular read, 
Our role is to help women regain control, power and choice in their lives. We also 
play an advocacy role by influencing policy and requesting funding for new 
programs to meet the need of our clients. We are committed to practical and 
theoretical research designed to ... facilitate the understanding and prevention of 
sexual assault ("Interviews," 1999). 
By building a physical space for the SAEK exam, the medical actors in the SACTCs 
claimed a new medicolegal expertise over not only the SAEK, but sexual assault as well. 
The expertise in the SACTCs fit well within the climate of increasing government 
pressures to professionalize sexual assault advocacy and services. This claim to expertise 
was further solidified with the development of a new expert for the SAEK exam. 
Stabilizing with New Expert Users 
As the numbers of SACTCs grew across the province, centre coordinators 
increasingly struggled to find willing physicians to staff the centres (SANE2). These 
difficulties inspired initiatives to devise alternatives to the physician-nurse model for the 
SAEK exam (Du Mont & Pamis, 2003). Centre coordinators identified nurses as cheaper 
and more accessible source of labours for the SAEK exam (D 1 ). Out of this, a new expert 
user of the SAEK arose in the medico legal network: the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner 
(SANE). This new actor expanded the SAEK' s network and as a result, some of the 
controversies around the SAEK's use diminished and the SAEK became further 
stabilized in medicolegal practice. 
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Sexual assault nursing first appeared in the United States, almost twenty years 
before it was developed in Canada (Ledray & Simmelink, 1997). In the early 1970s, 
some medical clinicians were arguing for a new occupational group of nurses responsible 
for the forensic exam (Williams & Williams, 1973; Donadio & White, 1973 ). These 
clinicians suggested that nurses were uniquely poised to become the primary 
professionals for sexual assault treatment because of their extensive experience 
supporting survivors/victims through the forensic exam and because most nurses were 
women. Not long after, in 1976, the first Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) 
program was developed in the United States (Ledray & Simmelink, 1997). SANE 
programs in the US grew steadily in the years that followed, with their numbers 
dramatically increasing with the 1994 Violence Against Women Act (Fitzpatrick, Ta, 
Lenchus, Arheart, Rosen, Bimback, 2012). Although SANE programs in Canada 
developed more slowly, when they began to appear, they relied heavily on the model that 
had been established in the United States (SANE5). 
In 1992 in Ontario, nurses at a Ministry of Health conference expressed an 
interest in establishing a SANE program in Ontario (Macdonald, Wyman, & Addison, 
1995). By this time, the Regulated Health Professions Act had expanded Ontario nurses' 
scope of practice to include the authority to insert instruments and/or hands "beyond the 
opening of body orifices" (Macdonald, Wyman, & Addison, 1995, p. l-A).26 This change 
gave nurses the authority to see inside a woman's body using a speculum or other 
26 This change coincided with many other expansions in nurses' scope of practice (Worster, Sarco, 
Thrasher, Fernandes, & Chemeris, 2005). 
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medical tools, or in other words, an "authorized line of sight" (Jasanoff, 1998, p. 713) 
over sexually violated bodies. 
In the few years that followed, several Ontario nurses obtained SANE training in 
the US, and in 1995, a SANE program was introduced to the SACC at Women' College 
Hospital (Macdonald, Wyman, & Addison, 1995). In this program, nurses could conduct 
SAEK exams without physicians if the survivor/victim did not meet any of the criteria for 
physician referral, which included things such as, vaginal bleeding, pregnancy, and 
histories of psychosis and suicide attempts, among other things (Macdonald, Wyman, & 
Addison, 1995). According to Du Mont & Parnis (2003), the objective of SANE program 
at WCH, as with the programs in the US and the others that later developed in Ontario, 
was to "increase efficiency, consistency, and quality of health care and evidence 
collection by using a single well-trained professional" (p. 173). 
Ontario SANEs built their professional status by claiming expert knowledge over 
the SAEK, and through that, sexual assault and medical forensic science. In 1995, a 
SANE training program was introduced to Ontario, which included 40 training hours on 
the SAEK and other forensic and medical tools such as speculums and pregnancy and 
tests, and on general themes of forensic science relating to sexual assault and the 
techniques and skills for "maintaining professionalism and objectivity in medical 
documentation and courtroom presentation" (Du Mont & Pamis, 2003, p. 175). Through 
these training programs, SANEs solidified an expertise over the SAEK, other tools of 
forensic evidence collection, and sexual assault that other emergency room nurses and 
physicians did not have. SANEs supported their claims to expertise with a wealth of 
162 
empirical research, largely conducted by SANEs, on the benefits of SANE programs on 
forensic evidence collection (Ledray & Simmelink, 1997; Sievers, Murphy, & Miller, 
2003), efficiency and quality of sexual assault treatment (Stermac & Stirpe, 2002), 
quality of sexual assault care (Dandion-Abbott, 1999), and prosecution rates in sexual 
assault cases (Aiken & Speck, 1995; Cornell, 1998; Little, 2001; Hutson, 2002). In 2007, 
Canadian SANEs formalized their professional status with a Forensic Nurses Society of 
Canada (Forensic Nurses' Society of Canada, 2012). Through these moves to 
professionalize and credentialize SANEs, the SAEK became the domain of a new expert. 
According to some reports, many physicians resisted the development of SANE 
programs in their hospitals (SANE2). As one sexual assault nurse recalled, "they did not 
want to let go" of the expert status that the SAEK exam had afforded them (SANE2). 
Maier (2012) found that some physicians "did not understand SANEs' role and resisted 
SANEs' presence in 'their territory"' (p. 1326). Other physicians, however, reportedly 
worked cooperatively with SANEs and welcomed the reprieve that reduced responsibility 
for the SAEK had offered them (Martin et al. 1985). 
By taking responsibility for the SAEK exam, SANEs were, and continue to be, 
called on to testify in sexual assault cases, sometimes as lay witnesses, where they testify 
on their practices in the SAEK exam, and sometimes as expert witnesses, where they 
express opinions on whether a survivor's/victim's injuries could have resulted from 
consensual sexual activity (DL3; DL5). In Canadian law, expert evidence is only 
considered admissible if it is given by a "properly qualified expert" (R. v. Mohan, 
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1994).27 In some sexual assault cases, defence lawyers have successfully argued that 
SANEs are not qualified experts as they have relatively limited training, compared to 
physicians (R.v. Radcliff, 2009), and they have a lack of experience examining non-
sexually assaulted anatomy (R.v. Thomas, 2006). One defence lawyer outlined his 
approach for challenging SANEs expertise; 
I say things like, you've got no particular training in that area, you haven't been to 
medical school, you are not a physician, you are not an expert, you haven't 
conducted any studies, you are doing a sexual assault kit on people who are all 
coming in essentially indicating that there has been forced sexual activity in some 
way, so what kind of comparator is that? (DL2). 
Despite these attacks on SANE's expertise, several nurses reported that SANEs are 
commonly deemed properly qualified experts and have given expert testimony (SANE2; 
SANES; SANEl). 
SANEs' introduction to the medicolegal network redefined the SAEK's forensic 
script as SANEs became the SAEK's designated users.28 This shift was accomplished in 
practice. As SANEs did more SAEK exams across the province, testified in more sexual 
assault cases, and SACTCs came to be known as the institutional homes for SANEs, the 
SAEK' s forensic script shifted to accommodate the new expert. 
27 R. v. Mohan sets out four criteria for expert evidence, of which this is one. The other three criteria are: 
the evidence must be "relevant"; "necessary to assist the trier of fact"; and "there must be no exclusionary 
rule otherwise prohibiting the receipt of the evidence." 
28 Not all hospitals in Ontario have SANE programs and as such, there are hospitals where physicians or 
nurses without SANE designations use the SAEK. I describe this further in chapter 6. 
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Much of the clinical research on SANEs has claimed that they are more likely to 
adhere to SAEK protocols than emergency physicians (Ledray & Simmelink, 1997; 
Dandion-Abbott, 1999; Sievers, Murphy, & Millers, 2003; Campbell, Patterson, & 
Lichty, 2005; Campbell, Patterson, & Bybee, 2009) and more likely to collect the 
stipulated amounts and different types of evidence the SAEK requires and store and label 
the evidence according to the SAEK' s requirements (Ledray & Simmelink, 1997; 
Dandion-Abbott, 1999; Sievers, Murphy, & Millers, 2003). SANEs' adherence to the 
SAEK's script has been linked in the literature to increased rates of sexual assault 
prosecution (Ledray & Simmelink, 1997; Campbell, Patterson, & Bybee, 2009). SANEs' 
work of ensuring that the SAEK's script was closely followed was thus part of and 
contributed to the bustle of medico legal activity attempting to stabilize the SAEK in the 
medicolegal network. 
Concluding Thoughts 
Through the medicolegal efforts to stabilize the SAEK, medicolegal actors 
claimed a new interest and expertise in sexual assault with new experts and expert spaces 
for the SAEK exam. With this shift, anti-rape activists from rape crisis centres became 
largely displaced in the SAEK exam. While the SACTCs and SANEs appeared to 
successfully stabilize the SAEK in the medicolegal network, and silence most of the 
controversies surrounding it, the SAEK would destabilize again through new scientific 
controversies, technological developments, and legal uncertainties. In the following 
chapter, I explore the introduction of DNA analysis to forensic evidence collection in 
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sexual assault cases, a development that would radically shift the SAEK's meaning and 
material form once again. 
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Chapter 5 
Assembling the Genetic Technoscientific Witness of Sexual Assault 
When forensic DNA typing1 was introduced to sexual assault investigation in 
Canada in 1989, it redefined the technologies that forensic scientists were using to 
analyze the Sexual Assault Evidence Kit (SAEK). In so doing, DNA typing redefined the 
SAEK and the evidence it produced. In this chapter, I examine the rise of forensic DNA 
typing in Canada and explore the technoscientific and legal controversies around DNA 
that destabilized the SAEK. I show how with DNA technology, the SAEK's material 
form was redesigned and its meaning in medicolegal practice was reassembled and 
stabilized as the new genetic technoscientific witness of sexual assault. 2 Through the 
history of controversy around DNA typing, I show how medicolegal trust in the SAEK as 
the new genetic technoscientific witness of sexual assault was accomplished in practice. 3 
Sheila Jasanoff (2006) argues that in forensic practice, "physical traces remain 
silent ... unless they are made to speak with the aid of specialized laboratory techniques" 
(p. 330). Following this argument, I suggest that physical traces collected with the SAEK 
remain largely silent until they are analyzed by forensic scientists and interpreted by 
1 DNA is an abbreviation for deoxyribonucleic acid, a type of molecule that is found in cell nuclei and 
mitochondria that forensic scientists now understand to reflect an individual's unique genetic make-up. 
Forensic DNA typing, DNA profiling or DNA analysis, are abbreviations that all refer to a family of 
techniques for analyzing genetic material in trace evidence. In sexual assault cases, DNA typing 
technologies are used to identify perpetrators of crime from trace evidence gathered at a crime scene and/or 
with the SAEK. 
2 Other scholars and forensic scientists have described DNA as a genetic witness of crime (Federico, 1991; 
National DNA Databank, 2003). Here, I build on this metaphor, to show how the advent of DNA typing led 
to the SAEK being redefined in medico legal practice as the genetic technoscientific witness of sexual 
assault. 
3 Forensic DNA typing is not limited to sexual assault investigation. It was and continues to be used in a 
variety of criminal investigations where there are traces of bodily tissues or fluids, such as murder, 
manslaughter, assault, and robbery. In this chapter, I focus on the history of DNA typing as it relates to 
sexual assault investigation. 
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medical and legal actors. Only by making the SAEK speak can the SAEK act as the 
technoscientific witness of sexual assault. In this chapter, I focus on the techniques for 
making the SAEK spe.ak about the identity of sexual assault perpetrators.4 I argue that 
DNA typing contributed to destabilizing the SAEK by calling into question the 
techniques that medicolegal actors used in the 1980s to make the SAEK speak and 
redefining and stabilizing new techniques for making the SAEK speak in sexual assault 
cases. 
As I stated in chapter 1, some Science and Technology scholars have proposed 
that stabilized technologies are those "in which the conflict and heterogeneity inherent in 
technology building is overcome ... and the social relations which lie behind the 
technology are made either invisible or unquestionable" (Halfon, 1998, p. 802). Adopting 
a similar perspective, Akrich ( 1992) argues that once stabilized, technologies act in 
networks as "instruments of knowledge" (p. 221 ). These perspectives frame stabilization 
as an outcome of controversies that have been resolved and made invisible. I argue that 
the SAEK's entangled histories demand an alternative framing. 
As I will show in this chapter, despite the efforts to stabilize the SAEK in 
medicolegal practice in the 1980s, and its continued use throughout the 1990s, there were 
vibrant controversies around its meaning and material form. In the 1990s, medicolegal 
actors were using the SAEK as an "instrument of knowledge" (Akrich, 1992, p. 221) in 
sexual assault cases, but were also debating and redefining the technologies for analyzing 
4 As I illustrated in the previous chapter, there are other components of the SAEK, such as the body map 
and sexual and medical history form, which are also made to speak through medical and legal 
interpretation. I discuss this further in chapter 6. 
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the SAEK's contents. Here, I adopt Singleton's (1998) understanding of stabilization, 
which proposes that instability can exist within stability to show how controversies over 
the technologies for analyzing the SAEK coexisted with the SAEK's continued use in 
medicolegal practice. 
This chapter illustrates a crucial shift in the SAEK's terrain. ID: chapter 3, I 
illustrated how action around the SAEK and sexual assault in the 1970s was on the street, 
in community rape crisis centres, and consultations between anti-rape activists and 
government, medical, and legal actors. In chapter 4, I showed how action around the 
SAEK shifted to hospital emergency wards and Sexual Assault Care and Treatment 
Centres (SACTCs ). In this chapter, the action shifts location again. Here, I show how the 
activity around the SAEK and sexual assault moved to scientific laboratories, legal 
courtrooms, and government boardrooms. 5 With this shift, I argue that the flurry of action 
around the SAEK moved even further from its origins in the anti-rape movement. 
This chapter illustrates how DNA analysis shifted the focus of many discussions 
around the SAEK from protocols, services, and treatment to bodily substances and 
identity. I show how material things - blood, semen, DNA profiles, laboratory tools, etc. 
- formed new practices and relations between actors in the SAEK' s network. In doing so, 
I explicitly illustrate how non-human actors were central to reassembling the SAEK in 
meaning and in material form. 
5 Here, I am not suggesting that action in other locations ceased. Instead, I proposing that there were 
different historical locations where there were flurries of activity around the SAEK and sexual assault. The 
result was that over the course of this history, different actors became central to the SAEK's assembly and 
reassembly. 
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I show how DNA analysis brought scientists, lawyers, and government actors into 
the centre of action around the SAEK and pushed rape crisis centre workers further to the 
margins. Following the medico legal efforts to displace rape crisis centre workers in the 
SAEK exam in the 1980s, few rape crisis centre workers were involved in the 
controversies around DNA technology and the SAEK in the 1990s. During this time, as I 
show in this chapter, there were many anti-rape activists involved in legal reforms for 
sexual assault law and some who voiced contentions around the rise of DNA evidence. 
However, with the development of medicolegal expertise, experts, and expert spaces for 
sexual assault and the rise of DNA, rape crisis centre workers were increasingly left out 
of the medico legal controversies and consultations around the SAEK. As a result, many 
of the traceable controversies6 around DNA and the SAEK feature medico legal actors 
who used the SAEK as the technoscientific witness, such as forensic scientists, lawyers, 
physicians, and nurses. The content of this chapter reflects this shift. 
I begin this chapter by briefly sketching some of the context into which forensic 
DNA typing in sexual assault cases entered in the late 1980s. I then describe the 
dev_elopment of DNA typing and some of the legal and technoscientific controversies that 
surrounded its introduction in medicolegal practice. I track how, through these 
controversies, forensic scientists, government agencies, and the media used violence 
against women to propel a rapid acceptance of forensic DNA typing by framing it as a 
technology that would enhance public safety and protect the public from violent crime. I 
6 There are few historical records on rape crisis centre workers' explicit involvement in controversies 
around DNA evidence in sexual assault cases. This does not mean that advocates were not involved, but 
instead reflects the fact that they left few accessible traces in public archives and libraries. 
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then turn to sketch how DNA typing led medicolegal actors to redesign the SAEK's 
material form and reassemble its meaning into the genetic technoscientific witness in 
medicolegal practice. I show how in practice, the revised SAEK enacted new meanings 
of survivors' /victims' and their bodies. I conclude by examining how DNA and the 
SAEK has seemingly been stabilized in medicolegal practice and question whether the 
controversies around DNA typing have in fact come to a close. 
Setting the Stage 
Forensic DNA typing emerged within a particular historical context that enabled 
its rapid acceptance as an objective set of techniques for analyzing SAEKs. In what 
follows, I briefly sketch the political, legal, and forensic scientific contexts within which 
DNA typing emerged. 
Rebick (2005) describes the 1990s as a decade that featured pervasive and 
powerful conservative politics, media declarations that the feminist movement was over, 
and severe federal and provincial funding cuts for women's organizations. Many of the 
rape crisis centre workers that I interviewed echoed this description by saying that during 
the 1990s, funding pressures on rape crisis centres became more acute, collectives 
diminished, and pressures to professionalize intensified (RCC4; RCC13; RCC14). In this 
context, lawyers and forensic scientists were developing new medicolegal practices for 
sexual assault cases and anti-rape activists were actively organizing to transform sexual 
assault law. 
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Survivors' /victims' credibility on trial. 
The 1990s was a 
tumultuous decade 
for sexual assault 
law. While many 
feminist lawyers, 
scholars, and activists 
were organizing to 
Toronto Star, January 30, 1988 implement legal 
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reforms, defence 
lawyers were devising and solidifying new defence strategies for challenging 
survivors' /victims' credibility in court. This context opened the doors to DNA analysis 
being used in sexual assault cases as an apparently objective technology for analyzing the 
SAEK. 
According to some feminist scholars, despite the protections survivors/victims gained 
with the 1983 rape law reform, sexual assault courtrooms in the 1990s were "a minefield 
for female sexual assault victims" (Lee, 2000, p. 8), where their credibility was put on 
trial with new means and a new fervor. In contrast to these assertions, some defence 
lawyers argued that the accused were disadvantaged by the 1983 sexual assault law 
reforms, which according to some, provided "a blue print for convicting people of sexual 
assault" (Schmitz, 1988, p. 43). Some lawyers argued that in this climate, new aggressive 
defence strategies were needed to challenge the survivor's/victim's credibility. One such 
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defence strategy was proposed by Michael Edelson at an Ottawa criminal bar meeting in 
1988, where he asserted that the defence should "whack the complainant hard at the 
preliminary ... if you destroy the complainant in a prosecution, you cut off the head of the 
Crown's case, and the case is dead" (p. 44). "Destroying" the complainant, according to 
Edelson, involved collecting discrediting evidence in survivor's/victim's psychiatric, 
hospital, and criminal records, establishing a survivor's/victim's drug use, and hiring a 
private investigator to "beat the bushes and interview some of the principle Crown 
witnesses" (p. 45). According to one of Michele Landsberg's (2011) columns, rape crisis 
staff and volunteers reported that Edelson' s tactics were widely followed in the 1990s, 
particularly after two additional legal reforms that were designed to minimize defence 
interrogation into survivors' /victims' sexual histories and personal records. 
In 1991, the Supreme Court ruled that the existing restrictions on the admissibility 
of sexual history in sexual assault cases violated the constitutional rights of an accused 
under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (R. v. Seaboyer, R. v. Gayme, 1991). 
According to Johnson and Dawson (2011 ), many feminist advocates, scholars, and 
lawyers contested the ruling and argued that it would discourage women from reporting 
sexual assault. In response to this pressure, the Minister of Justice, Kim Campbell, 
organized a consultation that included 60 women's groups, which contributed to drafting 
new legislation for the use of sexual history in sexual assault cases (Stuart & Delisle, 
2004). Landsberg recalled, 
It was an unprecedented, almost incomprehensible event: Conservative prime 
minister Brian Mulroney was in power, and here was his minister of justice, Kim 
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Campbell, summoning grassroots and front-line women's groups ... ! was among 
the startled invitees. Never before had a justice minister asked the advice of 
women in reforming the rape laws (p. 128).7 
Bill C-49 arose from these consultations and when it was passed in 1992, it added section 
276 to the Criminal Code, which defined stricter rules around the admissibility of a 
survivor's/victim's sexual history. While this reform clarified the laws around the 
admissibility of sexual history, it did not preclude the use of sexual history and gave 
judges the authority to rule that evidence of sexual history was relevant in sexual assault 
cases. A Department of Justice study in 1997 found that in most sexual assault cases, 
judges continued to admit evidence of sexual history, often on the basis of vague defence 
arguments about relevance (Meredith, Mohr, & Carins Way, 1997). 
In response to the new legislation limiting the use of sexual history, some defence 
lawyers turned to survivors' /victims' personal records as a means of challenging their 
credibility and discrediting their testimony (Johnson & Dawson, 2011). In 199 5, the 
Supreme Court ruled that personal records could be used if defence counsel proved that 
the records were relevant to the case (R. v. O'Conner, 1995). In 1997, Bill C-46 was 
passed, adding Section 278 to the Criminal Code, which established a firmer set of 
requirements for judges determining the relevance of personal records and included a 
recognition of the survivor's/victim's right to privacy. The reform was challenged shortly 
after as a Charter violation; however, the Supreme Court ruled in R. v. Mills (1999) that 
7 This is perhaps somewhat overstated. As I described in chapter 3, in 1976, anti-rape activists drafted 
recommendations for rape law reform for the Law Reform Commission (Vance, 1978). The extent to which 
the government solicited activists' recommendations in 1976 is unclear from the historical records. 
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it did not infringe on the Charter rights of the accused. Although some activists initially 
considered the Supreme Court ruling to be a victory, it did not stop many defence lawyers 
from continuing to argue that personal records were in fact relevant (Johnson & Dawson, 
2011). 
Despite some of the advancements in legal protections for survivors/victims 
gained in the 1990s, 8 many feminist scholars and activists argued that survivors' /victims' 
credibility in the courts was continually undermined and challenged. In 1999, Penni 
Mitchell reflected back on the decade of legal reform and wrote "no means no, but the 
war against sexism in the courts is far from over" (Mitchell, 1999). Within this context, 
forensic DNA typing emerged as a new technology that promised to provide objective, 
credible evidence of sexual assault. As survivors' /victims' credibility was being 
challenged in the courts, the credibility of the new genetic technoscientific witness of 
sexual assault was being assembled. This assembly involved not only developing new 
laboratory techniques and technologies for analyzing the SAEK, but also displacing old 
ones. 
Making the SAEK speak in the 1980s. 
In the late 1970s and 1980s, the Sexual Assault Evidence Kit (SAEK) samples of 
hair, blood, and semen were "made to speak" (Jasanoff, 2006, p. 330) with analysis that 
forensic scientists and police used to exclude possible suspects of sexual assault. These 
techniques did not identify individual perpetrators, but could exclude them if the scientist 
8 Another significant legal development in the 1990s was what has come to be known as the "no means no 
legislation," where the Supreme Court ruled that implied consent is not a valid defence for sexual assault 
(R. v. Ewanchuk, 1999). 
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could show that the suspect's physical characteristics did not match those they saw in the 
sample (Stone & Stone, 1978). As I show in this chapter, DNA analysis displaced these 
techniques, and in so doing, destabilized the SAEK of the 1980s. 
In the 1980s, forensic scientists visually compared hairs in the SAEK and hairs 
collected from a suspect to demonstrate a match, which could be used in court to indicate 
a suspect's guilt ("Scientific Evidence," 1980).9 According to one forensic science 
manager, matches were, however, very rare, as hair similarity was difficult to determine 
with any certainty (FSM). To put this in Latour's terms (2005), hairs resisted being 
analyzed and categorized in this way. As a result, forensic scientists more commonly 
used other techniques to analyze the SAEK (FSM). 
Forensic scientists used blood typing to analyze blood and bodily fluid in the 
SAEK (Eckert, 1978). The Landsteiner-Berstien classification system was most 
commonly used, which involved identifying one of four blood types (A, B, AB, and 0) in 
a sample. In this system, forensic scientists would associated each blood type with 
estimated frequencies of their occurrence in North American populations: Type A 
characterizes 41 % of the population, Type B, 10%, Type AB, 4%, and Type 0, 45% 
("Scientific Evidence," 1980). To specificity the analysis, some scientists used protein 
and blood grouping systems, in which they used particular combinations of blood types to 
formulate smaller population frequencies (Krishnan, 1978). Forensic scientists could use 
the blood type or grouping that they identified in a SAEK sample to exclude all suspects 
with that blood type (Krishnan, 1978). Like hair, however, blood was not easily 
9 Chemical analysis was also used, however, most forensic scientists considered it to be complex and 
unfruitful because chemical compositions of hairs varied across the body (Krishnan, 1978). 
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categorized and according to Gill, Jeffreys, & Werrett (1985), these techniques "left a 
large degree of uncertainty" (p. 578), which often played out in the courtroom. 
One crown prosecutor asserted that, in the 1980s, forensic hair and blood analysis 
was rarely useful in sexual assault cases (CA5). He explained that "it was almost 
impossible to get a conviction ... because you didn't have the scientific evidence linking 
the accused to the victim" (CA5). With the available forensic techniques, the analyzed 
SAEK could only reveal a possible link between an accused and a survivor/victim 
("Scientific Evidence," 1980). The crown prosecutor described blood grouping by saying, 
"it was very very very weak evidence ... that evidence was so weak because of the vast 
number of people who are in blood groups. It was almost um, the evidence was 
negligible" (CA5). According to this prosecutor, the SAEK of the 1980s had little value 
in the sexual assault courtroom beyond illustrating injuries. The perceived limitations of 
the SAEK and forensic hair and blood analysis helped set the stage for the rise of DNA 
analysis. 10 
When forensic DNA analysis emerged in the late 1980s, forensic scientists vowed 
that it would displace and surpass the older techniques of forensic hair and blood analysis 
(Gill, Jeffreys, & Werrett, 1985). They promised that it would outshine previous forensic 
methods and provide objective identifying evidence in sexual assault cases. In these 
reports, DNA typing held the potential to redefine the techniques and technologies for 
analyzing the SAEK, and therefore to destabilize the SAEK of the 1980s. 
IO Others have argued that DNA analysis was also sparked by growing discontent with other forensic 
methods, such as forensic fingerprinting. For a detailed history of the controversies surrounding forensic 
fingerprinting, see Cole (2001 ). 
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Displacing Old Techniques: The Discovery of DNA Typing 
In the early 1980s, Alec Jeffreys, a geneticist at the University of Leicester, 
England, and his colleagues were devising a new forensic technique of extracting 
identifying codes from bodily fluids, which they claimed, could identify individuals. In 
1985, Jeffreys and his colleagues announced their discovery of what they called "DNA 
fingerprinting" (Jeffreys, Wilson, & Thein, 1985; Gill, Jeffreys, & Werrett, 1985). 11 
They claimed that DNA fingerprinting would be a powerful new method that would 
replace earlier forensic methods and in so doing, "revolutionize forensic biology" (Gill, 
Jeffreys, & Werrett, 1985, p. 577). 
The method that Jeffreys and his colleagues proposed was multi-staged and 
involved extracting DNA strands from a sample, cutting them into fragments, and 
illuminating DNA fragment variations, or Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphisms 
(RFLP) (Curran, 1997). RFLPs were, according to Jeffreys and his co-researchers, 
specific to individuals on the basis of their varying length and amounts of repetitive 
nucleotide sequences (Gill, Jeffreys, & Werrett, 1985, p. 577). Through this method, 
these researchers produced a "DNA fingerprint" (p. 577), which illustrated variations in 
DNA fragments with an image that appeared almost like a supermarket bar code 
(Gerlach, 2004). Jeffreys proposed that an unknown "DNA fingerprint" from a suspect 
11 This term was later rejected by forensic scientists and geneticists because it was thought to obscure a 
crucial difference between forensic fingerprinting and DNA profiling: a DNA profile's uniqueness is 
determined through statistical probabilities of a DNA profile's rarity within a population, whereas a 
fingerprint's uniqueness is assumed (Cole, 2001). While fingerprints were thought to be a unique mark of 
individuality, DNA profiles are seen as rare genetic sequences (Cole, 2001). The terms "DNA profiling," 
"DNA typing" and "DNA analysis" were adopted as alternatives to Jeffreys' original "DNA 
fingerprinting." In accordance with this turn, I use these three terms interchangeably. 
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could be compared to a known "DNA fingerprint" from a victim or a crime scene to 
determine if there was a match (Jeffreys, Wilson, & Thein, 1985). 
Not long after Jeffreys and his colleagues had publically described their new 
technique, DNA typing became a central feature in a 1986 sexual assault murder 
investigation in Leicester, England (Gerlach, 2004). Two young women, Lynda Mann 
and Dawn Ashworth, had been sexually assaulted and murdered by an unknown 
perpetrator or perpetrators ("Jail term cut," 2009). The police sought thousands of blood 
samples from men in surrounding communities for DNA testing (Wambaugh, 1989). 
Colin Pitchfork was eventually identified as the perpetrator and he became the first 
person to be convicted of a crime based on forensic DNA evidence ("Jail term cut," 
2009). 
How genetic fingerprinting can aid forensic science 
Toronto Star, August 16, 1987 
Reprinted with Permission - Torstar Syndication Services 
Destabilizing the SAEK with a revolutionary technology. 
Jeffreys and his co-researchers had foreshadowed Colin Pitchfork's conviction 
several years earlier when they claimed that DNA typing would revolutionize violent 
crime investigation, most "particularly with regard to the identification of rape suspects" 
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(Gill, Jeffreys, & Werrett, 1985, p. 577). In one article, Gill, Jeffreys, and Werrett 
asserted that DNA typing would overcome common forensic challenges in sexual assault 
cases and would, for the first time in forensic biology, "enabl[e] positive identification of 
the male donor/suspect" (p. 577) of a sexual assault. 12 With these claims, the SAEK of 
the 1980s that had been "made to speak" (Jasanoff, 2006, p. 330) with hair and blood 
analysis, lost value in the eyes of many forensic scientists and police investigators. 
Only a few years after Gill, Jeffreys, and Werrett's (1985) article was published, 
Canadian and American forensic scientists began echoing the claims of DNA's potential 
for transforming sexual assault investigation and the SAEK. In 1987, John Wilker, the 
president of an American private lab, asserted DNA's potential by saying, "in rape cases 
in which sperm can be recovered, there is just no way that could be analyzed until now" 
(Hilts, 1987, C 16). In the same year, Douglas Lucas, the director of the Ontario Centre of 
Forensic Science, claimed that DNA fingerprinting's "greatest application would be in 
sexual assault cases" (Strauss, 1987, D4). 
DNA's anticipated usability in sexual assault investigations was situated in a rush 
of media coverage in the late 1980s about DNA's potential to revolutionize forensic 
science. Canadian and American media were quick to cast DNA typing as a radically 
new, infallible technique for identifying perpetrators of crime (Lynch et al., 2008). 
Canadian newspaper headlines described DNA as the "hot new crime buster" 
(MacCharles, 1988, Al) that "points at the guilty" (Strauss, 1987, D4) and "makes 
criminal identification certain" (Hilts, 1987, C 16). DNA analysis was proclaimed to be 
12 The scientists rested the technique's revolutionary potential in rape cases on a narrow understanding of 
rape as an act of penile-vaginal penetration perpetrated by an unknown offender. 
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the "biggest advance in the science of crime detection in a century" (Lohr, 1987, G8). In 
some reports, DNA analysis was likened to a divine intervention for crime detection. One 
detective in Calgary was reported as saying "it's like God opened up the clouds and said 
to offenders, 'Stand by, I've got a new process for the police to use"' ("DNA Prints," 
1987, H8). These reports cast older forensic techniques for analyzing SAEK contents as 
outdated and largely incapable of producing useful evidence. DNA was thus gaining 
credence by destabilizing the SAEK of the 1980s and the techniques for making it speak. 
By 1988, the Centre of Forensic Science was, according to one media report, 
receiving dozens of DNA typing requests from police and procurators across the country 
(MacCharles, 1988, Al). The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Forensic Laboratory was 
given a $3 million dollar budget to begin the preparations for a DNA typing laboratory, 
and the Ontario Centre of Forensic Science, an allocated $100,000 for DNA typing 
research (MacCharles, 1988, Al). In the face of this funding and the growing anticipation 
of the technology's arrival in Canada, some forensic scientists and lawyers expressed 
hesitancy about how the courts would receive the new technology. The director of the 
CFS was reported in the media as saying that despite the growing excitement about DNA 
typing, "forensic scientists were laying low ... nobody wants to rush before a judge and 
jury until the method is known to be foolproof' (MacCharles, 1988, Al). Some lawyers 
reportedly questioned the feasibility and ethics of obtaining DNA samples from unwilling 
suspects (Dunlop, 1987, Cl). 
Despite any hesitations there may have been, in the fall of 1989, the RCMP 
laboratory in Ottawa began accepting DNA samples (Counsell, 2007), and in July 1990, 
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the Centre of Forensic Science followed suit (Campbell, 1996). In the five years that 
followed, DNA typing was used in over 1,000 criminal trials in Canada (R. v. S.F., 
1997). With the increasing use of DNA typing in medicolegal practice, the SAEK was on 
the verge of being redefined as a tool for collecting DNA evidence. While the sheer 
numbers of cases using DNA typing conveyed a general acceptance of the technology in 
medicolegal practice, the first few years of forensic DNA typing were filled with many 
legal and technoscientific controversies and changing scientific practices. As I show, 
these tensions and shifts in practice were part of the process of stabilizing the new SAEK 
and its meaning as the genetic technoscientific witness of sexual assault in medicolegal 
practice. 
Destabilizing through Shifting Practice and Controversy 
DNA typing technologies began to change not long after they were introduced to 
forensic work. In the late 1980s and 1990s, some forensic scientists argued that RFLP 
DNA analysis was difficult to use in sexual assault cases, because it required a significant 
amount of time and large non-decayed samples of blood or semen (Reynolds & Blake, 
1991). 13 According to a media report in 1987, some molecular biologists were arguing 
that with RFLP DNA testing, sexual assault kits from the 1980s were inadequate (Bass, 
1987, Al). One argued that kits from the 1980s were designed for older techniques that 
required only small amounts of semen to confirm that sperm was present. Iri contrast, he 
stated, the large amounts of sperm that RFLP DNA testing required was often not being 
collected with the existing kits. Others blamed the difficulties in collecting adequate 
13 A complete RFLP DNA analysis required approximately 10-12 weeks and approximately IOml of sperm 
or a bloodstai11 the size of a quarter (Campbell, 1996). 
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amounts of DNA for RFLP DNA analysis not on sexual assault kits, but on the fact that 
adequate samples were rarely available in sexual assault kit exams (Reynolds & Blake, 
1991 ). In response to these perceived limitations, scientific practices began to shift in the 
mid-l 980s with the development Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) and Short Tandem 
Repeat (STR) analysis, two new techniques for DNA typing. 
PCR is a technique currently used to increase amounts of DNA in a sample 
through a series of heating and cooling cycles that duplicate the DNA. With this 
technique, millions of copies of a DNA molecule can be produced within a few hours, 
which reduces the size of sample required for DNA profiling from that of a quarter to 
0.3-0.5 nanograms (a billionth of a gram) (Lynch et al., 2008). When PCR was first 
introduced to Canada in the early 1990s, media reported scientists saying that it was a 
"huge leap for the science" (Kozicki, 2007, p. 42) that would expand the capacity of 
forensic DNA typing and significantly reduce the time it required. 14 The introduction of 
PCR was accompanied by the development of Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis, 
which involved analyzing shorter lengths of DNA. When STR and PCR techniques were 
used together, scientists could analyze small-degraded samples collected with the SAEK 
to develop DNA profiles (Curran, 1997). 
According to one forensic scientist, these changes in scientific practice enhanced 
the usability of the SAEK (FSl). With the combined STR and PCR technique, it became 
more likely that scientists could devise a DNA profile from the SAEK contents and make 
it speak in medicolegal practice. While these developments seemingly stabilized the new 
14 For a detailed anthropological study of PCR's development, see Paul Rabinow's (1996) Making PCR. 
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SAEK, other legal and technoscientific controversies were arising that would destabilize 
the SAEK and the new techniques for analyzing it. 
Controversy in the courts: The "DNA wars." 
In the 1990s, legal and technoscientific controversies were erupting over the 
reliability of DNA evidence. What would come to be called the "DNA wars" (Thompson, 
1993, p. 22) characterized much of the early to mid-1990s in the United States. The 
American DNA wars centered on the reliability of DNA collection and analysis and the 
accuracy of DNA profile interpretation (Lynch, 1998). While some prosecutors and 
forensic scientists avidly advocated for admitting DNA evidence in criminal trials, others 
argued that the flood of excitement around DNA had led courts to prematurely rush to 
introduce DNA evidence before the scientific community had deemed it to be reliable 
(Lander, 1989; Hoeffel, 1990). Hoeffel, a legal scholar, argued in 1990 that DNA had 
been "steamrolled ... through the courts" (p. 466) and that restraint must be exercised "on 
the acceptance of unproven novel scientific techniques that turn courtrooms into 
laboratories and defendants into guinea pigs" (p. 467). The debates were aired in US 
courtrooms and in published articles in science and legal journals (Lynch et al., 2008). 
In Canada, the so-called DNA wars were far less animated. According to Gerlach 
(2004 ), Canadian courts were less concerned with the technical reliability of DNA 
analysis than their American counterparts and focused instead on interpreting DNA 
profiles with probabilities of identification. By challenging DNA, these controversies 
simultaneously challenged the SAEK' s capacity to act as a genetic technoscientific 
witness that accurately identified perpetrators of sexual assault. 
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Forensic scientists interpreted DNA profiles with statistical estimates that another 
individual, other than the suspect, matched the DNA profile in the SAEK or at the crime 
scene. The estimates were based on databases of DNA that were intended to represent the 
genetic variability within a population but were at the time, loosely compiled from blood 
banks, police volunteers, and other nonrandom samples and divided into roughly defined 
racial subgroups (Lynch et al., 2008). Some population geneticists challenged the validity 
of statistical estimates based on the early databases and raised "the subpopulation 
problem" (Cohen, 1990, p. 358), which highlighted the possibility that DNA profile 
frequencies might differ between sub-populations and laboratory DNA databases. 
In Canada, questions around the subpopulation problem first appeared in a sexual 
assault murder case in.British Columbia in 1991 (R. v. Baptiste, 1991). The defense 
argued that the DNA evidence derived from the vaginal swab and a bloodstain on the 
accused's pants had been based on insufficient sub-population data on the small 
Aboriginal community in British Columbia where the suspect was from. Defence lawyers 
asserted that as a result, there was "no scientific basis" to the scientist's interpretation of 
the DNA evidence, which was that the possibility the DNA came from someone other 
than the suspect was extremely remote. In this case, DNA's capacity to reveal identities 
of sexual assault perpetrators was in question. Despite the controversy in court, the trial 
judge, and the subsequent Court of Appeal, ruled that the DNA evidence was in fact 
admissible. The subpopulation problem was featured in several subsequent Canadian 
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cases, most involving Aboriginal defendants, until the late 1990s, 15 when the debates had 
largely subsided with developments in technologies and population data (Frederiksen, 
2011). 
By the mid 1990s, many forensic scientists were proclaiming that, "the DNA 
fingerprinting wars [were] over" (Lander & Budowle, 1994, p. 735). According to Lynch 
et al. (2008), the controversies had largely subsided with the release of the National 
Research Council report on forensic DNA evidence in 1996, numerous consultations and 
working groups on DNA evidence that occurred in the early 1990s and the series of 
standards and protocols that had been developed as a result. In 1994, two opposing 
participants in the DNA controversies, Eric Lander, a key critic of forensic DNA typing 
and Bruce Budowle, a proponent of DNA typing, asserted together that there was "no 
remaining problem that should prevent the full use of DNA evidence in any court" 
(Lander & Budowle, 1994, p. 735). They called for a wide-spread acceptance of DNA 
evidence, "the public needs to understand that the DNA fingerprinting controversy has 
been resolved. There is no scientific reason to doubt the accuracy of forensic DNA typing 
results ... Now, it is time to move on" (Lander & Budowle, 1994, p. 738). 
Lander and Budowle's assertions reverberated in Canadian and American 
courtrooms. In 1997, one Ontario Supreme Court judge clearly depicted DNA's new 
uncontroversial status in a statement he made during a sexual assault trial. He declared, 
There is no real controversy in scientific and legal communities that DNA 
analysis is currently the most advanced tool for human identification since the 
15 By this point, a threshold of admissibility for novel scientific evidence had been established through R. 
v. Mohan (1994), which was used to determine the admissibility of DNA in subsequent cases. 
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advent of fingerprinting. As such, there is no necessity in this case for a lengthy 
explanation into the underlying scientific principles of DNA analysis. The science 
is capable of eliminating coincidence (R. v. S.F., 1997). 
The SAEK of the 1980s and the techniques for making it speak had been relegated into 
the past. Now, with declarations that the DNA wars were over, the new technique for 
analyzing the SAEK was being defined in medicolegal practice as reliable, objective, and 
"the most advanced tool for human identification" (R.v. S.F., 1997). With this, the SAEK 
was being stabilized as a tool that could objectively identify perpetrators of sexual 
assault. This change in the SAEK's value was made public through one particular serial 
sexual assault investigation in Ontario. 
Situating DNA and the SAEK as the objective protectors. 
In 1996, Justice Archie Campbell released a report that documented the multiple 
failings of Ontario police and forensic scientists who had worked on the highly 
publicized sexual assault murder investigation of Paul Bernardo. This report, I argue, 
contributed to the efforts to destabilize the SAEK of the 1980s and stabilize the new 
SAEK with DNA analysis as an objective tool for identifying perpetrators of violent 
crime and protecting women from sexual perpetrators. 
According to Campbell (1996), between the years 1987 and 1992, Paul Bernardo 
sexually assaulted and raped at least 18 women and murdered three others in Ontario. For 
much of this time, police knew Bernardo only as "the Scarborough rapist" (Ibbotson & 
Irish, 1988, A6; Mascoll & O'Neill, 1990, Al). Campbell's inquiry revealed that 
Bernardo remained unidentified for years because of delayed forensic analysis and a 
187 
series of disjointed, uncoordinated, and often disinterested police investigations. 
Campbell's report documented many dimensions of failed medicolegal practice, 
however, what is most significant here, is his analysis of what occurred at the Centre of 
Forensic Science. 
Campbell ( 1996) described how police submitted multiple SAEKs from women 
Bernardo had raped in 1987 and 1988 for blood grouping analysis. He documented how, 
after a few failed attempts, the forensic results led police to reduce the suspect pool to 
20% of the male population and later, to 13% of the male population. Campbell was clear 
to note that "conventional" (p. 43) blood-grouping tests were inadequate for identifying 
assailants with any precision. He reported that the CFS had ignored the police request to 
analyze Bernardo's DNA when it was resubmitted with 92 other samples from possible 
suspects. He noted that it was not until 1992, two years after the first SAEKs were 
submitted, when the police resubmitted the samples for DNA testing that the analysis was 
actually completed and Bernardo was identified and arrested. According to Campbell, 
during the time Bernardo's DNA was sitting at CFS unanalyzed, Bernardo raped four 
woman and tortured and murdered two others. 
Campbell (1996) stressed that if Bernardo's DNA samples had been analyzed 
from the SAEKs that were first submitted in 1990, the rapes and murders between 1990 
and 1992 would not have occurred. DNA analysis of SAEK contents, in this report, was 
framed as an objective technology that, if used in a timely way, could prevent violence 
against women, unlike the "conventional" (p. 43) techniques for analyzing SAEKs. 
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Delays in DNA analysis were described as a risk to public safety and he pressed for more 
funding for DNA analysis. He wrote, 
The Bernardo case demonstrates that delays in DNA testing can imperil personal 
safety and cost lives. Any reluctance to continue to spend the public funds 
necessary to maintain a reasonable turnaround time for DNA tests must give way 
to a consideration of the financial and human cost of failing to do so (p. 9). 
Campbell's simple formula for ensuring public safety with SAEKs and DNA analysis 
was reiterated by the media, where DNA typing was described as the tool that could have 
protected some of the women Bernardo raped and murdered ("Bernardo DNA," 1996, 
A4; Kirk, 1995, Al). One of Bernardo's own lawyers was quoted as saying, "if they took 
samples ... and done the proper tests, I think none of this would have happened" (Kirk, 
1995, Al). 
In response to the rush of media on Campbell's (1996) report, some feminist 
writers challenged Campbell's message by arguing that his simplistic conclusions arose 
from his blindness to the sexism embedded in police handling of violence against women 
(Dionne, 1997; Landsberg, 2011). Dionne (1997) argued that "he would have us believe 
that technology is the policing cure" (p. 3) for failed investigative techniques and 
violence against women. 
Despite these critiques, the Campbell report helped to situate the SAEK with 
DNA analysis as necessary, objective technologies for protecting women and preventing 
violence. This contributed to laying the ground for two significant developments in law 
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around DNA typing, both of which redefined how DNA analysis was used in sexual 
assault investigations. 
Redefining DNA Typing Practices in Law 
Obtaining DNA. 





is intrusive, says 
convicted man 
BY TRACY HUFFMAN 
S'ti'FFRt:PORTF:N 
The man convicted of aggra· 
vated assault last week after 
dragging a police officer 
through a downtown intersec-
tion in a stolen wn does not 
want to provide a ONA sample 
for a federal data bank. 
"My client is objecting to the 
act. He feels it's intrusive,'' 
Charles Gardiner's lawyer, 
Bari)' Fox. said outside a court-
room yesterday. 
Gardiner was scheduled to 
be sentenced yesterday on a se-
ries of charges stemming from 
the incident last Aug. 14. But 
Fox said he was not informed 
that prosecutor Calvin Bany 
would make the request for a 
DNA sample. 
Madam Justice Patricia Ger· 
man delayed the sentencing 
until today to allow Fox to re· 
view new legislation about the 
DNA data bank and study sirni· 
larcases. 
The legislation came into ef· 
feet June 30. The Superior 
Court or Justice on University 
Ave. has had only thrne cases 
where DNA has been taken. 
Gardiner, 34, pleaded not 
guilty to one count each of at· 
tempted murder, aggravated 
assault, assault with a weapon. 
falling to remain at the scene of 
an accident, possession of sto-
len property and operating n 
motor vehk:le while disqWlli· 
tied. He was found guilty on all 
but the attempted murder 
charge. 
While in a stolen van, Gardi· 
ncr dragged Constable Nick 
Tsoutsoulns through the Power 
St. and Richmond St. E. inter· 
section. After several warnings 
to stop the vehicle, Gardiner 
was shot. 
Tsoutsoulas was later 
cleared by the province's spe· 
cial investigations unit of any 
criminal wrongdoing. 
Fox said the process could be 
considered an assault. He de-
nied his client doesn't want to 
provide DNA because it could 
link him to otherc:rimes. 
Barry explained outside the 
courthouse that only a small 
sample of blood is necessary. 
"It's basically a prick of the fin-
ger,'' he said. 
People charged and convict· 
ed of a serious offence after 
June 30 will be automatically 
required to provide a sample. 
Barry explained. But cases in· 
valving a person charged be-
fore June 30 and convicted af-
ter that date, the decision is left 
tothejudge, he said. 
It is important to have Gardi· 
ners DNA in the bank in case 
Gardiner commits another of· 
fence or has 1.'0mmitted others 
in the past, Barry said. Barry 
said he will ask the judge to 
sentence Gardiner to a mini-
mum of IO years. Fox would 
notsaywhathewill request. 
Toronto Star, July 21, 2000 
Reprinted with Permission - Torstar 
Syndication Services 
In sexual assault cases, DNA profiles derived from 
SAEK contents were compared to DNA profiles 
derived from samples collected from suspects. In the 
early 1990s, police could only legally acquire 
suspects' DNA with their consent or from buildings, 
receptacles, and/or places (R. v. Prevost, 2011). 
According to some forensic scientists, these legal 
restrictions greatly limited the SAEK's capacities to 
identify perpetrators of sexual assault (FS 1, FS2). 16 
Shortly after DNA analysis made its entrance into 
Canadian courtrooms, legal questions began to arise 
about the constitutionality of police seizing DNA 
samples from suspects without their consent. 17 
16 If the police did not have a DNA sample from a suspect, forensic scientists had nothing to compare to 
the DNA in the SAEK. The result, in these cases, was that the suspect was not identified. 
17 To my knowledge, these debates did not discuss the constitutionality of collecting DNA samples from 
survivors/victims, as it was assumed that survivors/victims had consented to the SAEK exam. Interestingly, 
however, many of these courtroom debates featured discussions about the threats that DNA sampling 
presents to an individual's bodily integrity, regardless of whether they have consented to it (R.v. Alexis, 
1994; R.v. S.F., 1997; R.v. Stillman, 1997). I explore some of these debates in the context of the SAEK 
exam in chapter 6. 
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Courts debated whether seizing biological samples violated suspects' rights under 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Gerlach, 2004). 18 In 1994, the Supreme 
Court ruled that police did not have the right to seize biological samples without valid 
and informed consent (R.v. Borden, 1994). However, this precedent quickly changed 
with the passing of Bill C-104 in 1995, which permitted police to seize biological 
samples for forensic testing with a warrant. The bill outlined a range of designated 
offences for which warrants could be obtained, which included sexual assault among 
many others (Solicitor General, 1996). Government officials cited Bill C-104 as the first 
phase of the Government of Canada's strategy to expand the use of DNA analysis 
(Curran, 1997). 
The Solicitor General (1996) publicized Bill C-104 as one that would enhance the 
power of DNA to improve public safety and diminish violent crime. The Bill was, 
however, not without its critics. In the courtroom, there were several unsuccessful 
challenges to the new bill as a violation of the Charter. In one such challenge, which 
reached the Ontario Supreme Court, the judge asserted the Bill's importance to public 
safety by saying, 
The important government justifications of fostering effective crime control, 
protecting the innocent, enforcing society's criminal laws, and substantially 
improving the search for truth in the criminal trial process warrant the court 
authorized intrusion upon bodily integrity ... the DNA warrant legislation is a 
18 . Most notably, these challenges focused on the Charter rights to be "secure from unreasonable search and 
seizure" (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982, s. 8) and have "security of the person" (s. 7). 
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rational and proportionate response designed to meet these objectives [emphasis 
added] (R.v. S.F., 1997, 143). 
With this development, police could legally seize DNA samples from suspects to 
compare them to those obtained with the SAEK. This change in law set the stage for the 
second phase of the government's DNA Strategy, the development of the National DNA 
Data bank. 
Banking DNA. 
Not long after Bill C-104 had passed, the Solicitor General of Canada (1996) 
initiated a nation-wide consultation on the prospect of a National DNA Databank that 
would house DNA profiles of convicted 
offenders. The proposed databank 
received substantial support from the 
Canadian Association of Chiefs of 
Police and various other victims' rights 
organizations, who had been lobbying 
for a National DNA Databank for 
several years (National DNA Databank, 
2006). Many women's groups, and some 
rape crisis centre workers among them, 
voiced strong contestations about the 
proposed databank, arguing that it was a 
Genetic bank to ·help 
police catch criminals 
·1 Law allows collection 
I of DNA from repeat, 
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waste of valuable public resources (Kubanek & Miller, n.d.). Despite this resistance, Bill 
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C-3, the DNA Identification Act (1998), was drafted and in December 1998, the bill 
authorizing the construction of the new databank was passed in the House of Commons. 
Preparations to build the databank began shortly after Bill C-3 's passing and 
within 18 months, with a $10.9 million dollar start up budget, the National DNA 
Databank opened on June 30, 2000 (National DNA Databank, 2003). The databank was 
to be situated in Ottawa, run by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and consist of two 
indices: a convicted offender index, which would store DNA profiles from convicted 
offenders obtained with warrants, and a crime scene index, which would store unknown 
DNA profiles collected from crime scenes and SAEKs (National DNA Databank, 2006). 
Police investigators would use the databank to identify unknown perpetrators and/or 
serial perpetrators by searching for matches between banked DNA profiles and known or 
unknown DNA profiles collected during police investigations. Within two years of being 
in operation, the databank had amassed 10, 261 DNA profiles (National DNA Databank, 
2003), a number that has since swelled to 350,159, as of March 2013 (Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police, 2013). 19 
The DNA Databank was heralded as a development that would ensure public 
safety. Like the way scientists and government actors first described DNA, the media 
described the databank as the "revolutionary tool" (van Wageningen, 2000, Al) that 
would ensure the timely apprehension of violent offenders and protect the public from 
repeat offenses. 
19 As of March 2013, the databank included 266, 355 convicted offender profiles and 83, 804 crime scene 
DNA profiles (Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2013). These statistics are continually increasing, as the 
databank receives an estimated 600 to 700 samples per week. 
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In a government press release introducing the databank, the Solicitor General stated, "this 
will give us a powerful investigative tool that will protect Canadians from violent 
criminals. It will help ensure that those guilty of serious crimes, such as repeat sex 
offenders and violent criminals, are identified and apprehended more quickly" (as cited in 
Curran, 1997, p. 24 ). In the first annual report for the databank, RCMP Commissioner 
Zaccardelli asserted the databank's value by saying, "for Canadians, it means safe homes 
and safe communities" (National DNA Databank, 2002, p. 2). By describing the databank 
as a tool that would ensure safety, these claims reinforced notions that DNA and the 
SAEKs that collected it had the power to protect the public from violent crime. 
Not all people in Canada welcomed the introduction of the DNA databank. Some 
criminal lawyers expressed concerns that the bank "put too much personal information in 
the hands of the state" (van Wageningen, 2000, Al). The Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada (1995) voiced concerns about the breadth of the offenses captured in the 
databank. It was, however, women's groups who voiced the strongest opposition. 
According to Kubanek and Miller (n.d.), the 670 member groups of the National 
Action Committee on the Status of Women and the 60 women's groups that responded to 
the Solicitor General of Canada (1996) consultation document opposed the development 
of a National DNA Databank. Kubanek and Miller argued that banking offenders DNA 
did not serve women's interests and that the databank was being "falsely romanticized as 
a 'quick fix' for the systemic problems that women face in dealing with the criminal 
justice system" (p. 3). They also argued that the databank would reflect the 
disproportionately high conviction rates for men of colour, Aboriginal men, and poor 
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men and would therefore reinforce existing inequalities. They attacked the databank's 
hefty budget and questioned how it was that women's survivor and advocacy 
organizations were so poorly funded when there were available funds for enhancing the 
strength of forensic DNA analysis. 
Feminist critiques of the databank were, according to Gerlach's (2004), met with 
little interest from government agencies. In one speech, the Solicitor General briefly 
noted the women's groups concerns but quickly dismissed them by reinforcing DNA as a 
necessary tool for public safety; 
There are those who believe that resources earmarked for a DNA data bank would 
be better spent on family violence programs or women's shelters. In response, I 
would agree that spending in those areas is important ... but at the same time, there 
is no doubt in my mind that a national DNA databank will add to the safety of all 
Canadians (as cited in Gerlach, 2004, p. 88). 
This response was one of the few in which government actors publically responded to 
feminist critiques. 
The development of the National DNA Databank, along with the legal provisions 
for DNA warrants, redefined how DNA typing was used in sexual assault investigations. 
With these changes, DNA samples obtained from the SAEK could be compared to those 
seized from a suspect or banked in the databank. These changes, according to some 
medicolegal actors, strengthened the SAEK's capacities to objectively and accurately 
identify sexual assault perpetrators (FS 1; P 1; CA5). However, not all agreed. 
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Continued Controversy 
Almost as quickly as it was developed, forensic scientists were touting forensic 
DNA analysis as a technology that would revolutionize the investigation of violent crime 
and in so doing, protect the "innocent" (National DNA Databank, 2010, p. 3) victims of 
violence. In the late 1980s and 1990s, most of the cases that brought forensic DNA 
analysis into the public eye, such as the Paul Bernardo investigation, concerned sexual 
violence against women. As I have shown, many media articles, public inquiry reports, 
and government documents reiterated how DNA evidence had been and could be used to 
identify sexual off enders and protect women and girls from further victimization. In these 
accounts, women's and girl's experiences of sexual violence were used to advertise the 
power of forensic DNA analysis and propel its rapid acceptance in medicolegal practice. 
This strategy, however, did not go unchallenged. 
Helen Holmes, an academic feminist, posed the question in 1994: "who benefits 
from the development and use of DNA typing?" (p. 232). She argued that police and 
crown attorneys were given a newfound credibility when they used the latest technology 
to fight crime and apparently protect the public from violence. Forensic laboratories, she 
contended, gained legitimacy, secured employment, and funding. Women, in Holmes' 
analysis, did not benefit from the rise of DNA typing. This was an argument that several 
other Canadian feminists reiterated (Kubanek & Miller, n.d.; Lee, 2000). 
Kubanek & Miller (n.d.) outlined a fervent critique of the rise of DNA analysis in 
the Canadian legal system. They argued that despite the fact that DNA was being 
promoted in women's interests, forensic DNA technology rarely proved itself useful in 
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cases of sexual assault and rape. Most sexual violence cases, they asserted, involve 
perpetrators whom a survivor/victim knows, such as a father, brother, uncle, friend, 
boyfriend, or husband. In these cases, they stated, the legal question is one of consent, not 
identity, and therefore a technology for identifying the perpetrator of the attack is 
superfluous. They accused the media of sensationalizing rare occurrences of stranger 
rapes on women and girls who could most easily be portrayed as innocent and 
defenseless and the federal government, for "pander[ing] to the myth of the dangerous 
stranger" (p. 2). 
Kubanek and Miller (n.d.) also raised a concern that ifDNA evidence was used in 
sexual assault cases, it would devalue and displace other forms of evidence, including 
women's testimony. They wrote, 
Increasing the weight given to scientific evidence subtly alters the notion of 
reasonable doubt ... DNA evidence provides such a high level of statistical 
reliability that other types of evidence pale in comparison ... .in cases where DNA 
evidence is not available .... the usual evidence accumulated against the accused 
may look weak. In the eyes of the judge and jurors, the verbal testimony of 
witnesses, especially that of the victim, cannot carry the statistical reliability of 
scientific evidence, a bias which can only work against women in the majority of 
cases (p. 2). 
With this argument, Kubanek and Miller described how the SAEK with DNA analysis 
could act as technoscientific witness in the courtroom, which would silence the women's 
testimonies of sexual assault. 
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Holmes (1994), Lee (2000), and Kubanek & Miller (n.d.), challenged the claim 
that DNA typing could protect women and girls from sexual violence. Holmes argued 
that the rise of DNA evidence would be unlikely to deter men from raping women and 
would be more likely to inspire new strategies amongst rapists to obscure or eliminate 
traces of rape, such as wearing a condom during a rape or participating in a gang rape. 
She expressed concern that forensic DNA evidence could lead government agencies to 
falsely believe that the problem of sexual assault had been solved. Kubanek & Miller 
(n.d.) asserted these sentiments more strongly when they wrote, "these interventions 
cannot be defended in the interests of women subjected to male violence ... we will not 
have these actions taken in our name" (p. 4). Despite the many feminist critiques of DNA 
evidence, efforts were underway to redesign the SAEK's material form to suit the needs 
of forensic DNA typing. 
Reassembling the SAEK 
At the end of the 1990s, when the SAEK with DNA evidence had gained 
stability in medicolegal practice as a tool for identifying perpetrators of sexual assault, 
forensic scientists began efforts to redesign the SAEK's material form to suit the needs of 
DNA typing. Up until that point, the SAEK's material form had remained relatively 
constant, despite the many controversies and changing practices around it. In what 
follows, I describe how the SAEK was reassembled to serve its new purpose as a DNA 
evidence collector. I show how these changes in the SAEK led to new enacted meanings 
of sexually violated bodies in medicolegal practice. 
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Redesigning the SAEK's material form. 
With the rise of medico legal expertise in sexual assault, expert criticisms began to 
emerge about the intrusiveness of the SAEK (Griffiths, 1999). In an audit on sexual 
assault investigation in Toronto, Jeffrey Griffiths described the growing recognition 
amongst medicolegal actors in the late 1990s that for many women, the SAEK exam was 
"long, humiliating, and almost as traumatic as the sexual assault itself' (p. 96). In 
response, the Ministry. of the Solicitor General organized a SAEK Working Group, which 
was charged with the task of reviewing the SAEK and its impact on survivors/victims of 
sexual assault. 20 
Alongside the SAEK Working Group, in 2001, the Centre of Forensic Science 
was conducting its own review of the SAEK "in light of current DNA technology."21 
Drawing on the findings from the CFS review and the SAEK Working Group, a new 
SAEK was designed. The CFS claimed that the new SAEK would be a "less intrusive 
procedure for [the] victim," would ensure "faster analysis within the lab [and] facilitate 
storage," and have an "optimal design for DNA analysis," which would create "more 
DNA-ready samples."22 In 2001, the CFS held educationals on the new SAEK in five 
communities across Ontario where police, sexual assault nurses, physicians, and rape 
20 Despite submitting multiple A TIP requests and conducting many archival searches, I have found very 
few records on this working group, who it included, how they functioned, for how long, to what end. The 
records that I have found include only short summaries of what was decided and do not include the list of 
attendees. However, around this time, the provincial coordinator of the sexual assault treatment centres 
became the primary contact for CFS forensic scientists who were redesigning the SAEK (FS 1 ). This 
marked a divergence from the beginnings of the SAEK, when rape crisis centre workers were a central part 
of SAEK design meetings (chapter 3). From the change in practice, it could be assumed that SANEs took a 
central role in the SAEK Working Group, perhaps more than rape crisis centre workers. 
21 CFS, "Sexual Assaults and Forensic Evidence: SAEK Consultation," (May 29, 2001), obtained through 
FOi request to the Centre of Forensic Science, no. CSCS-A-2012-01825. 
22 Ibid. 
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crisis centre staff met to learn about the new SAEK. Following this, the new SAEK was 
released in hospital SACTCs. 
The redesigned SAEK was not radically different from its previous iteration. 
However, the changes that were made are worth noting, as they offer insight into some of 
the past practices with the SAEK. Often it is in times of technological change that 
previous technological practice becomes most visible. 
The new SAEK added and eliminated several evidence collection steps and 
included several new technologies for storing biological evidence. To allow forensic 
scientists to distinguish between a perpetrator's DNA and a survivor's/victim's, the new 
SAEK included a DNA sample from the survivor/victim, which was obtained with a 
buccal swab on the survivor's/victim's cheeks, tongue, and gums.23 In response to the 
decreasing use of hair and blood typing analyses, CFS removed several steps from the 
SAEK.24 Plucking pubic hairs, which had a decade earlier caused heated controversy 
amongst scientists, physicians and anti-rape activists, was completely removed from the 
SAEK exam. A forensic scientist reflected on this decision and said, "it was used so 
infrequently that the pain and the trauma [was] not worth it for those rare cases where 
you m[ight] find something" (FSl). The CFS also removed the vaginal aspirate for 
similar reasons. One sexual assault nurse explained that forensic scientists had found that 
swabs were just as effective for collecting seminal fluid in a woman's vaginal cavity as 
was a vaginal aspirate. She described the process by saying that it was "messy. Didn't 
23 CFS, "Hospital Instructions," (2012), obtained through FOi request to the Centre of Forensic Science, 
no. CSCS-A-2012-03930. 
24 CFS, "Sexual Assaults and Forensic Evidence: SAEK Consultation," (May 29, 2001), obtained through 
FOI request to the Centre of Forensic Science, no. CSCS-A-2012-01825. 
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really give us a whole lot of evidence. Therefore they decided it wasn't worth it, with 
nurses, and I know, patients rejoicing [laughs]" (SANES). 
Most significantly, the new SAEK was designed to be stored at room temperature 
(FSl). Previously, all SAEKs had been frozen; however, according to one forensic 
scientist, transportating frozen SAEKs from hospitals to police evidence units to the CFS 
often resulted in samples being spoiled, leaked, decayed, or damaged (FS 1 ). The "RT 
swab box"25 was introduced to the SAEK, which allowed moist swabs to breathe and dry. 
Some SAEK evidence that did not dry easily was still frozen, such as sanitary napkins, 
condoms, and wet diapers. The shift to a self-drying SAEK made it possible for hospitals 
to store SAEKs while a survivor/victim decided if she wanted to report to the police. A 
new policy was introduced to the SACTCs that stated that if a survivor/victim wanted to 
postpone the decision to report her assault, a SAEK could be held for 6 months (FSl). 
This development was identified by many SANEs I interviewed as a significant 
advancement for survivors/victims (SANE2, SANES). 
According to many medico legal actors interviewed in this study, the reassembled 
SAEK gained a new credibility from DNA analysis techniques that made it speak. One 
officer remarked, "the introduction of DNA has been the biggest advancement in terms of 
catching a perpetrator ... the value of the kit has changed because ofDNA ... [it] becomes 
more valuable because it contains DNA" (FIU2). With this new value in medicolegal 




The reassembled SAEK in practice. 
Forensic DNA typing solidified a new purpose for the SAEK: it became the tool 
for identifying perpetrators of sexual assault. Many sexual assault police investigators I 
interviewed equated DNA testing with the SAEK, as if in the past decade, the two have 
become synonymous. The SAEK before DNA analysis had been understood as a tool that 
could, at best, eliminate suspects, whereas the SAEK after DNA analysis became a tool 
for the identification of suspects. With DNA testing, legal evidence of identity became 
the central concern of the SAEK exam, despite the contrary crime statistics that suggested 
that over half of sexual assaults involved perpetrators that a survivor/victim knew (Kong, 
Johnson, Beattie, & Cardillo, 2003).26 The SAEK's new focus on identity did not reflect 
known trends in sexual assault, but rather reflected and reinforced an understanding of 
sexual assault as an act perpetrated by strangers. Forensic DNA typing gave the SAEK its 
new purpose of identifying "the dangerous stranger" (Kubanek & Miller, n.d., p. 2), and 
in so doing, shifted the meaning of the technology itself. 
The genetic technoscientific witness. 
Forensic DNA evidence was and is often dubbed as the "silent but credible 
witness" (National DNA Databank, 2003, p. 26) or the "genetic witness" (Frederico, 
1991, p. 204). As two Canadian forensic scientists wrote, DNA evidence "speaks for 
itself. It doesn't lie, it has no bias, it doesn't forget and it doesn't change" (Hepworth & 
McLeod, 2005, p. 1 ). DNA analysis made the SAEK speak as the new genetic 
26 Higher estimates have since been cited. In the most recent Canadian victimization survey, 78.8% of 
sexual assaults involve a perpetrator that is a friend, neighbor, acquaintance, or relative (Statistics Canada, 
2009). 
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technoscientific witness of sexual assault. Many assumed that this new witness would 
give corroborative evidence of sexual assault that was unbiased, credible, and inherently 
trustworthy. The reassembled SAEK with DNA, many medicolegal actors supposed, 
could not tell a lie. One forensic scientist told me, "it is what it is ... the evidence will 
either corroborate it or not ... you just find what you find." (FS3). Many police officers 
expressed the significance of the new genetic witness and asserted that sexual assault 
investigations were made abundantly easier when "there is solid DNA saying that it was 
done" (Pl). 
New meanings of survivors/victims bodies. 
Forensic DNA analysis heightened the value of evidence obtained in the SAEK 
exam and gave it a new status as evidence that could help "protect" (National DNA 
Databank, 2010, p. 2) the public. With this shift in the meaning of SAEK evidence, new 
meanings of survivor's/victim's bodies were enacted in the SAEK exam. Sexually 
violated bodies became the sites where identity codes of perpetrators of sexual assault 
could be found. After DNA analysis was introduced, the SAEK's forensic script 
encouraged survivors/victims to not only conceptualize her own body as a crime scene, 
which the previous iteration of the SAEK had done, but also as a crime scene that held 
the evidence to "protect" (p. 2) the public from sexually violent men. 
Arguably, this change intensified the pressure on survivors/victims to follow the 
evidence preservation practices in the SAEK's forensic script. Many nurses and police 
noted the risk of survivors/victims destroying DNA evidence by washing or wiping their 
bodies after a sexual assault and described their practices for reinforcing the SAEK' s 
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script. One nurse stated, "a lot of girls hate this; however we tell them don't wipe before 
and don't wipe after. Because the more they wipe, the more evidence is wiped away" 
(SANE3). A police investigator expressed a similar thought when he said, "the average 
victim who is the true victim27 will normally shower ... it's not good for 
me ... unfortunately that will wash off most DNA" (FIUl). Many of the websites for 
SACTCs now contain instructions for survivors/victims on how to ensure that DNA 
evidence is preserved (e.g. Joseph Brant Hospital, 2013). While DNA typing 
strengthened the SAEK's forensic script, it also opened the script up to further revision. 
Continued redesign. 
Despite all of the medicolegal efforts to stabilize the SAEK's meaning and 
material form, the SAEK' s redesign in 2001 was not its last. It is a technology that is in 
constant flux. Every two to three years, CFS and the Coordinator for the Ontario Network 
of Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence Treatment Centres meet to discuss SAEK 
revisions (FSl).28 According to one forensic scientist involved in these meetings, the 
SACTC Coordinator raises nurses' ongoing concerns about the SAEK and how it is 
impacting survivors/victims and forensic scientists raise issues with the SAEK' s design 
in relation to developing understandings of forensic science and the increased 
sensitivities of forensic technologies. This process ofrevising the SAEK's material form 
27 Police investigators' disbelief of women's experiences of sexual violence is pervasive and well 
documented (Doe, 2003, 2012; Crew, 2012). Ten out of the twelve sexual assault police investigators that I 
spoke with discussed false accusations of sexual assault as a relatively common occurrence. I discuss this 
more in chapter 6. 
28 I submitted a Freedom oflnformation request to obtain the minutes from these meetings. However, I was 
told that the minutes do not exist. 
204 
often results in tensions between evolving scientific understandings and medicolegal 
practice. Some of these tensions arise from translating shifting science into new practice. 
Scientific understandings about foreign DNA and its life inside or on a sexually 
violated body influence how the SAEK is used. With the introduction of DNA analysis, 
the time limit after an assault within which the majority of samples in the SAEK could be 
taken was extended from 24 hours to 48.29 This timeline was increased several years later 
to 72 hours to reflect the increasing sensitivities of DNA technologies and shifting 
scientific understandings of how long foreign DNA can survive in a woman's vaginal 
cavity (FS 1 ). 
By the time I was collecting data for this study in 2012, the scientific claim that 
foreign DNA can live up to 72 hours in a woman's vaginal cavity had been fully 
entrenched in medico legal practice. Many of the SACTC websites cited 72 hours as the 
maximum time within which they could offer a SAEK exam (e.g. Joseph Brant Hospital, 
2013; Credit Valley Hospital & Trillium Health Centre, 2012). 30 Many police 
investigators, sexual assault nurses, and rape crisis and sexual assault volunteers and 
staff, similarly asserted that after 72 hours "all evidence is usually lost" (RCC6). One 
police officer said that after 72 hours, "DNA is washed away, semen, vaginal fluid, it's 
dried up. DNA would not be transferable at that point in time" (Pl 1). Another stated, "the 
kit can only be done within 72 hours, and if we don't get the evidence then, we are not 
going to get it later" (P 1 ). These sentiments were/are commonly reiterated to 
29 CFS, "Sexual Assaults and Forensic Evidence: SAEK Consultation," (May 29, 2001), obtained through 
FOi request to the Centre of Forensic Science, no. CSCS-A-2012-01825. 
30 This timeline reflects the restriction on biological sampling and not the collection of clothes and 
documentation of injuries. 
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survivors/victims, who were/are told that a SAEK exam is only possible if they reported 
to a hospital within 72 hours of their assault (RCC3 ). 
The way in which the SAEK was/is used suggests that scientists have reached a 
consensus about the 72-hour time limit on SAEK sampling. However, in the forensic 
literature, there are varying reports on the life of foreign DNA in the vaginal cavity, 
which range from three days (Gingras et al., 2009) to seven (Hawkins & Domoney, 
2012). To better reflect the scientific literature, in 2012, the timeline for taking vaginal 
swabs with the SAEK was extended to 7 days (168 hours).31 
The change in protocol, and the scientific understanding that it reflected, unevenly 
filtered into medico legal practice. Despite the change being instituted in January 2012, 
many medicolegal actors expressed confusion over the new timelines. While many 
continued to reiterate the 72-hour rule, others said "I forget what the latest memo said, 
whether it was 72 hours or 96" (OPP A2), and "I really don't even know what the changes 
exactly are, cuz we have essentially a sheet, a poster that outlines all the changes, but 
basically ... now we have more time to collect this evidence, cuz I guess it is all just 
getting better" (SANE6). One CFS forensic scientist described the difficulties of 
translating new scientific claims into practice. He said, "I've heard ... nurses being 
confused about 'when can we use the kit? I thought you are not supposed to use it after 
72 hours.' We've spent a lot of time over the years to try to clarify these misconceptions, 
that being one of them" (FS 1 ). As scientific understandings of DNA continue to change, 
31 CFS, "New Acceptance Criteria for SAEK," (January 24, 2012), obtained through FOi request to the 
Centre of Forensic Science, no. CSCS-A-2012-01826. 
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these tensions between scientific understanding and medicolegal practice in the SAEK 
exam will undoubtedly continue. 
Appearances of Stability 
Since the technoscientific and legal controversies around the SAEK and DNA 
typing in 1990s, the reassembled SAEK with forensic DNA analysis has gained the 
reputation of being an objective, reliable technology that gives irrefutable evidence of 
sexual assault. The reassembled SAEK has become seemingly stabilized in medicolegal 
practice, a result that has been largely fuelled by the appearance of closed controversies 
and apparent consensus around DNA. 
Outside of medicolegal practice, DNA has, according to some scholars, become a 
"cultural icon, a symbol, almost like a magical force" (Nelkin & Lindee, 2004, p. 2), and 
forensic DNA evidence, "a signifier of truth" ( Jasanoff, 1998, p. 718) and a "veritable 
truth machine" (Lynch et al., 2008, p. 1 ). New forensic science television shows, such as 
C.S.I. and Law and Order Special Victims Unit have reinforced the apparent credibility 
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or a DNA swab?" 
Sound lart'etched? I thought 
so too, but Ricardo Federico a 
ONA dofence lawyer in Toran· 
to says we can ~ spot 
DNA ride programs in the not· 
so-distant future, given what 
police In Vancouver and Sud· 
bwyBnldOing. 
Suspects In the murder of 
Renee Sweeney are being 
asked by Sudbwy police to 
consent to a ONA test. Swee-
ney was murdered while nt her 
job at an adult video store In 
January, 1993. More than 500 
ONA samples have been col· 
lectedtodete. 
"When a suspect comes In 
we ask them to consent to 11 
ONA teSt. We've had to obtain 
Sharlene Azam 
a number of warrants where 
people have refused to con-
sent," says Sudbwy Region Po-
lice Steff Sergeant Bob Keetch. 
Though there is little new 
llbout using DNA to link a per· 
son toe .:rime, Federico ls wor-
ried. While samples obtained 
under warrant must be de-
stroyed ofter a suspect is 
dea~. samples given freely 
may not be. Keetch says the de-
cision to retain or destroy the 
DNA given by consent has not 
yet been handed down by the 
Crown. It !hose samples are re-
tained where will they end up? 
Starting In July we will have 
Canada's first DNA data bank 
in Ottawa in which the DNA of 
convicted individuals will be 
kept. A computer will matdi 
the DNA sampl" from me data 
bank to that at a crime scene 
and voUll the offender will be 
identified. 
Seems like a roolproof. 
speedy way of convicting re-
peat offenden;, right? 
Well, not exactly. 
Most Canadian DNA tests 
are done in U.S. labs and those 
facilities are not 1111 created 
equally. Forensic DNA scientist 
Dr. Edward Blnke. of the O.J. 
Simpson Dream Team de-
fence, says the accuracy of the 
results depends on the skill of 
the scientist. This is shoe~ 
given that we treat DNA C\1· 
dence as absolutely irrefutable. 
When the perception of a sci-
ence rises to a le,,el of being 
foolproof. we are at risk be-
cause science is a tool wielded 
by humans who a~ Wholly fa!· 
llble. 
ln an age when police are be-
ing accused of planting evi· 
denc:e, where saence is pro-
moted as an objective 
determinant, when there are 
still all·white jw1es, are we ig• 
noring the rolo and possible bi-
as of the stukeholden; orpartlc· 
ipants in the process? 
If Guy Paul Morin had given 
up his ONA the day the police 
questioned him, and there was 
no definitive result. would that 
source of exoneration have 
been available to him 10 :years 
later? 
You can't open a paper today 
without reading about another 
groundbreaking leap In ONA 
recbnology, but tho growth of 
scientific advancements is ex· 
ponential while the rights of 
citizens have stood still. 
More and more we aro mov· 
Ing toward the belief that sod· 
ery has to be protected. but we 
hnve to violate the rights of in· 
dividuals to do that. In tho '60s 
and '70s, tho mantm wos: pro-
tect me from government and 
its use of power. Today, it's 
protect me from my neigh-
bours. 
DNA technology has theebll· 
ity to Infringe on the rights of 
cltlzens In a way we have not 
previously seen. 
Federico believes we are 
perc:hed on the tip of a disturb-
ing iceberg. "I don't !mow how 
far the state Intends to go. They 
might decide to take ONA sam-
ples al birth. or II something 
happens at a high school, they 
may decide to ask stUdents to 
consent to a DNA search." 
It's !ntetestlng to note that 
students must provide their fin. 
gerprint before writing the law 
sdlool admlsslons test. Drug 
testing is already a ~uire­
meat at a tew corporations 
Connda, so what you do outside 
the office Is relevant lnslde the 
office. 
In our :zeal to be lnw·llbldlng 
and citizens nbove sll.$pfclon. 
will we soon have to provide 
Toronto Star, February 1, 2000 
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DNA samples before we can 
join professional asso(intions 
or hold certain Jobs? 
Our obsession with the need 
to protect ourselvu from crime 
suggests we are willing 10 give 
up our fn!edoms to ensl!nl our 
security. Does that mean we 
won't eventually be able to de-
fend our rights, or even care 
about them? 
1s:u1~~::~ 
ment In forensic Investigation 
in the last 100 years, will we 
live In a society where we tear 
lhe science police? 
The younger generation's 
big fear will not only be Big 
Brother's use of video cameras 
or Internet survelllance to keep 
citi1ens in line. Instead they'll 
look forward to bureauc:mt5 
with everyone's ONA samples. 
letting them know who did 
what, whe~, when lllUI to 
whom. 
And, of course, it will all he 
true. It's infallible. 
L 
and objectivity of DNA typing in the public imagination (Nelkin & Lindee, 2004). In 
these representations, the controversies over DNA typing appear to have been closed and 
faded into the past. 
Medicolegal actors commonly describe forensic DNA evidence as infallible and 
powerful, as a "priceless" (CA4) "silver bullet" (CA5), a "smoking gun" (National DNA 
Databank, 2010, p. 8) that is "absolutely indispensible" (CA5), and "the best crime 
fighting tool we've had" (OPP Al). One police investigator I interviewed described DNA 
evidence by saying, "it makes your evidence a certainty ... you can't fight the DNA" (Pl). 
Another investigator said, "look over your shoulder, we're coming. That's what DNA 
tells you. It's God's fingerprint" (Slade, 2011, Bl). Many investigators I interviewed 
suggested that DNA evidence has become a new standard in sexual assault investigations. 
One explained, "without that evidence, our hands are tied. It goes from 100% we can ID 
the person to your word versus his" (Pl). Another proclaimed that, "society has become 
DNA driven, where it's almost made it a bit more difficult for our cases in court if there 
is no DNA" (P3).32 Most medicolegal actors now expect that the SAEK will collect DNA 
evidence. 
Questions about the science behind DNA typing have all but disappeared in 
Canadian courtrooms. One defence lawyer described the prospect of challenging the 
science of DNA typing as "a tough row to hoe" (DL2) and another admitted he has 
"never tried to fight it" (DL3). One forensic scientist recalled the criminal trials of the 
1990s and remembered how often he responded to the criticism that "DNA [was] junk 
32 I discuss the influence of SAEK evidence on prosecution rates in chapter 6. 
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science" (FS 1 ). In recent years, he said, he rarely is challenged on the scientific methods 
of DNA typing. Referring to the possibility of a defence challenging the science, he 
suggested that, 
They can try. They are not going to get very far, there is just so much precedent 
that I can just [snap snap snap] you know, 'are you telling me, and this court that 
the whole forensic community is misguided? The FBI, the European countries, 
Australia, that we are all using DNA technology, and it is wrong?' It is a hard 
argument (FSl). 
In the course of a mere two decades, DNA evidence has gone from a contested terrain to 
a sealed set of practices that many actors claim to be completely immune to criticism. 
As DNA evidence has secured an uncontested place in medicolegal practice, 
proponents of DNA typing have strengthened their claims about the technology's power 
to protect. In 2005, the National DNA Databank wrote, "the power of DNA to help solve 
crime is undeniable, and continued support of the National DNA Databank will help to 
ensure that this power is harnessed and used effectively to support the safety of 
Canadians" (National DNA Databank, 2006, p. 7). 33 Some Canadian forensic scientists 
extended claims about DNA protecting public safety by projecting that if the National 
DNA Databank and DNA typing were used to their full capacity, more than 1,800 sexual 
assaults could be prevented per year in Canada (Hepworth & McLeod, 2005). While it is 
unclear how these numbers were calculated, they serve to reinforce the doctrine that 
33 The National DNA Databank professes to have assisted with more than 11,000 investigations, 1,500 of 
which are sexual assault (Standing Committee on Public Safety & National Security, 2009). 
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DNA and the SAEK can protect the public, and mainly women and girls, from sexual 
assault. 
Instability within. 
Although the controversies around DNA typing have seemingly been closed, and 
with that the controversies around the SAEK, the increased medicolegal emphasis on 
DNA evidence has led to new instabilities and controversies in the medicolegal system. 
Many of these new instabilities revolve around diminished resources and contrasting 
pressures to expand DNA typing techniques that make the SAEK speak. These 
controversies reveal how instability can exist within seemingly stabilized technologies 
and networks. 
Delays in the forensic lab. 
Since the introduction of forensic DNA analysis, Canadian forensic labs 
experienced a significant increase in the number of requests for forensic analysis (Auditor 
General of Ontario, 2007; Auditor General of Canada, 2007). Between 2000 and 2006, 
the Centre of Forensic Science had a 224% increase in requests for biological forensic 
testing, which includes DNA typing (Auditor General of Ontario, 2007). The large 
workload increases have led to substantial backlogs in forensic testing. In 2007, CFS' s 
average turnaround time, which is measured by the time required to conduct the analysis 
and issue a final report, was 73 days (Auditor General of Ontario, 2009). 34 Around the 
same time, the standard at the RCMP forensic labs was 30 days, however, this was 
34 It is important to note that this number does not reflect the total range of turnaround times. In 2011, only 
26% of the sexual assault cases analyzed at the CFS were completed within the 60-day target date (Centre 
of Forensic Science, 2011 ). The length of delay for the other 7 4 % of cases was not reported. 
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reportedly rarely met, and was more commonly extended to 108-120 days (Hepworth & 
McLeod, 2005).35 Current delays in forensic testing, similar to those in the 1990s, have 
been framed by government officials as public safety risks: "delays or errors in forensic 
analysis ... affect public safety by allowing criminals to remain free to reoffend" (Standing 
Committee on Public Accounts, 2008a, p. 3). 
In addition to the pressures from increased requests for DNA typing, two 
legislative changes have heightened the workload of Canadian forensic laboratories. Bill 
C-13 and Bill C-18 were introduced in 2008 and added 1 72 designated Criminal Code 
offenses for which a DNA warrant could be sought. Many politicians framed Bills C-13 
and C-18 as advancements for public safety. Senator Marilyn Counsell claimed, "there is 
no doubt that Bill C-18 moves law, justice, and the safety of all Canadians forward" 
(Counsell, 2007, p. 6). However, in practice, this change sparked many new tensions. 
For forensic labs that were already overburdened with increasing numbers of 
requests for DNA typing, these bills threatened to increase the existing backlogs. In 2009, 
the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security cited the increasing 
weight that Bills C-13 and C-18 were placing on forensic labs as a significant problem 
and declared that CFS and its counterpart in Quebec36 were in "emergency mode" (p. 18). 
As a way of resisting the new workload, CFS began refusing work that arose from the 
legislative changes and sent it to the federal RCMP lab, which was experiencing similar 
pressures (Standing Committee on Public Accounts, 2008a). In 2009, the CFS publically 
35 These numbers pale in comparison to those in the United Kingdom, where there is a two to ten day 
turnaround time for DNA typing at the national lab that operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week and 
employs 2,500 staff (Auditor General of Ontario, 2007). 
36 Quebec and Ontario are the only provinces in Canada with their own provincial forensic lab. All other 
provinces use the RCMP Forensic Laboratory Services. 
211 
stated that an additional $11 million dollars over three years would be required to meet 
their increasingly large workload demands (National DNA Databank Advisory 
Committee, 2010). I found no evidence that this boost in funding was ever granted.37 In 
the absence of increased government funding, forensic labs have responded to increasing 
workloads in two ways: 1) automation, 2) reliance on privatization. 
As a way of increasing the speed and decreasing the cost of forensic DNA 
analysis, many forensic laboratories have introduced automation/robotics (Hudlow & 
Buonsristiani, 2012). In 2007, the CFS reported that with automation, their staffing costs 
in the biology unit decreased by 42% (Auditor General of Ontario, 2007)38 and by 2009, 
their turnaround time had been reduced to 66 days (Auditor General of Ontario, 2009). 
While these numbers were celebrated by the CFS, they obscured the complexities behind 
automation. Automation does not work for all steps of the DNA analysis process 
(Standing Committee on Public Accounts, 2008b ). Hepworth and McLeod (2005) suggest 
that automation can have the undesired effect of creating "bottlenecks" (p. 4) at the non-
automated stages of the process. Automation, in some Canadian labs, has also produced 
undesirable results. 
The RCMP forensic lab introduced automation to DNA typing in 2005. Shortly 
after doing so, laboratory officials announced that automation had "increased casework 
capacity two or three fold while improving the timeliness of reporting results" (Auditor 
General of Canada, 2007, p. 14). However, internally, forensic scientists were repeatedly 
37 Given the provincial government's pressures on CFS to explore "cost saving opportunities" (Standing 
Committee on Public Accounts, 2008a) and the more recent cuts and layoffs in the CFS's electronics unit 
(Bonokoski, 2012), it is unlikely the CFS budget will do anything but decrease. 
38 The number of jobs that were sacrificed to achieve this number was not reported. 
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raising concerns that the automated systems were producing haphazard results. 
Management ignored the scientists' concerns for a full year, claiming that the automated 
system was in fact reliable (Auditor General of Canada, 2007). Only after the Auditor 
General made the circumstances public, did the RCMP off er to retest all evidence that 
had been analyzed with the automated process ("RCMP offers," 2007). 39 In this case, 
automation increased the RCMP's workload and in doing so, did not contribute to 
eliminating backlogs and delays. 
A second development that has arisen from the increased pressures on publicly 
funded forensic labs is the rise of private DNA labs in Canada (FS2). While private DNA 
labs have been running in the United States since the 1980s (Halfon, 1998), in Canada 
private labs have been a more recent development (FS2). Private DNA labs commodify 
short turnaround times and more sensitive technologies. One private lab in Canada claims 
to provide a five-day turnaround time for forensic DNA typing (FS2). The marketing 
director at this lab stressed the benefits of a fast turnaround time by saying, "we say it is 
high time that Canadian tax payers are given the option to have a DNA profile done very 
quickly" (FS2). The same private DNA lab also advertises expensive DNA typing 
technologies that they claim to be more sensitive than those the public labs use. 
While private DNA labs may increase the speed of analysis for some cases, they 
are unlikely to address the widespread problem of forensic backlogs and delays in 
Canada. If police detachments are forced to pay for individual SAEKs to be analyzed, it 
could be imagined that this would increase police reluctance to pursue investigations in 
39 I found no report on whether scientists found different results with this retesting than they had obtained 
with the automated systems. 
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sexual assault. 40 Through this change in practice, a new axis of inequality could be 
formed within the legal system. 
Expanding DNA typing in Canada. 
Despite the mounting pressures on forensic labs and the evidence of backlogs and 
delays, some Canadian groups are lobbying for increased DNA testing. The focus has 
been most predominantly on expanding the DNA Databank. The argument has been 
made in two ways. 
Approximately 36,000 convicted offender profiles are uploaded to the DNA 
Databank each year under the current legislation requiring a court order (Standing 
Committee on Public Safety and National Security, 2009). In the 2009 Statutory Review 
of the DNA Identification Act, the committee in charge problematized the administrative 
time required for the crown to secure court orders for DNA sampling and highlighted the 
regional differences in the number of court orders that are made (Standing Committee on 
Public Safety and National Security, 2009). In response, the committee recommended 
that DNA samples be taken immediately, without a court order, upon conviction. The 
committee estimated that the change in legislation would increase the number of profiles 
uploaded to the DNA Databank to 113,000 per year, which, according to them, would 
justify a significant increase in the funding for the National DNA Databank. The 
Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police have gone even further to argue that police 
should have the right to obtain DNA samples upon arrest of an accused for any of the 
primary designated offences, such as sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, and 
40 The number of reported sexual assaults that Ontario police consider to be founded and therefore worthy 
of investigation is already very low (Crew, 2012). I address this issue more in chapter 6. 
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murder (Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, 2011 ). Several lawyers I interviewed 
suggested that eliminating court orders for DNA sampling would be highly unlikely 
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. However, as the history of DNA 
typing and banking in Canada has shown, it is imaginable that claims of collective safety 
could be used again to surpass Charter rights. 
A second push to expand the DNA Databank has come from pressures to develop 
two additional indices in the bank: a Missing Persons Index that would collect DNA 
samples from family members of missing persons that could be compared to unidentified 
human remains, and a Victims of Crime Index that would bank DNA profiles of victims 
of designated offenses (Bernier, 2010). Both indices would open the door to a new 
practice in Canada of banking DNA profiles of individuals who have not been convicted 
of a crime and have been obtained with consent. 
The Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police and victims advocacy groups have 
been actively lobbying for a Missing Persons Index (Canadian Association of Chiefs of 
Police, 2012; Miller, 2012). However, the Canadian government has been reportedly 
resistant to invest the funds necessary for the new index (Miller, 2012). The Victims of 
Crime Index, although included as a possibility, has been less commonly cited and its 
imagined use, significantly less defined.41 If this index was implemented, the SAEK 
might become directly implicated in DNA banking, as it would supply 
survivor's/victim's DNA samples to the databank. Both the Victims of Crime and the 
Missing Persons index would require a survivor/victim or her family members to give 
41 It is very unclear what purpose this would serve in medicolegal practice. I found no clear explanation of 
how this index would be used and what value it would have. 
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informed consent to have their DNA banked. However, as I will argue in the following 
chapter, there are unanswered questions about what informed consent is in the face of 
trauma, expert technoscientific practice, and a growing reliance on the genetic witness to 
protect the public from violence. 
Brewing controversies: Banking scientific findings. 
Banking scientific findings is a complicated task, particularly in the context of a 
rapidly changing scientific practice. New technologies for forensic DNA typing are in 
constant development (National DNA Databank Advisory Committee, 2010). However, 
the technologies that the National DNA Databank uses to develop banked DNA profiles 
have stayed relatively constant since the databank' s inception in 2000 (FS2). A new 
tension between shifting technologies and banked scientific findings may be in the near 
future. 
The DNA profiles in the National DNA Databank are nuclear DNA profiles 
derived from PCR/STR technology and can only be compared with DNA profiles that are 
created with PCR/STR technology. Profiles that are derived from new technologies, such 
as mitochondrial DNA analysis, are not comparable with those in the databank (FS2).42 
As new DNA typing technologies become more prevalent and displace older 
technologies, the capacity of the databank to fulfill its promise to identify matches 
between banked DNA profiles and newly derived DNA profiles will be in question. One 
crown attorney described this prospect by saying, "the technology is changing .. .it's past 
the DNA data bank. And that's a big problem. I don't know if the public appreciates how 
42 See Quinlan (2008) and Quinlan, Fogel, & Quinlan (2010) for further discussion. 
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big of a problem that is" (CA3). The development of new DNA typing technologies may 
be the basis of a new wave of controversies around DNA typing and banking in Canada. 
Concluding Thoughts 
The rapid growth and acceptance of DNA typing in Canada inspired the 
reassembly of the SAEK' s meaning and material form. As I have shown, DNA has 
drastically shifted, and is continuing to shift, the techniques that forensic scientists use to 
make the SAEK speak. Through legal and technoscientific controversies, a new meaning 
of the SAEK as the genetic technoscientific witness of sexual assault that protects the 
public from sexual violence emerged and gained stability in medicolegal practice. 
Despite the SAEK's stability in contemporary medicolegal practice, controversies 
around forensic DNA typing have not closed or faded into the past. Rather, they are 
active and imminent. As I will explore in the next chapter, in the face of the 
contemporary SAEK's stability, there are many other brewing and ongoing instabilities 
within the SAEK. 
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Chapter 6 
(De)Stabilizing the Contemporary SAEK: Contested Terrains of Practice, 
Expertise, and Private Suffering 
In 2010, at least three sexually assaulted women were turned away from a Sexual 
Assault Treatment Centre in Ottawa because there were no qualified nurses available to 
administer the SAEK (Seymour, 2011, Cl). Emergency room staff told the women to 
come back later or travel to a SACTC an hour outside of Ottawa. One woman, who had 
no funds to travel, and no wish to delay the SAEK exam, chose not to return to the 
Ottawa Hospital (RCC9). Months later, when her assailant was brought to trial, the 
judge dismissed the charges, concluding that it was "disturbing" that no SAEK exam had 
been done and that without it, her evidence was too unreliable to find the accused guilty 
(Seymour, 2011, Cl). 
*** 
At a sexual assault conference in 2009, Jane Doe, a well-known anti-rape activist, 
stated to a room of scholars, activists, and survivors/victims that the SAEK has become 
the new standard for sexual assault cases, despite the fact that it perpetuates dated rape 
myths, is seldom used in court, and rarely works in women 's interest. One woman near 
the back of the room identified herself as one of the activists who had participated in the 
political struggles to develop the SAEK in the late 1970s. After recounting some of this 
history, she said to Jane Doe, "they turned it against us. "1 
The events at the Ottawa hospital and at the sexual assault conference in 2009 
reveal some existing conflicts around the contemporary Sexual Assault Evidence Kit 
(SAEK) and the medicolegal practices it works within. Both events reveal the ongoing 
and brewing controversies around how the SAEK acts in the medicolegal network. In this 
chapter, I use both events as an entry point into the SAEK and consider the question they 
collectively pose: how does the SAEK act in the contemporary medicolegal network, for 
what purposes, and to whose benefit? 
1 These events occurred at the conference titled "Sex Assault Law, Practice, and Activism in a Post-Jane 
Doe Era," held in Ottawa, Ontario in March, 2009. 
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Every day, approximately five to ten SAEKs are submitted to the CFS for analysis 
(FSl).2 In raw materials alone, each SAEK costs $67, and in 2012, the Centre of Forensic 
Science (CFS) paid $120,000 for a yearly supply of SAEKs for Ontario.3 These numbers 
suggest that the SAEK has become deeply integrated into contemporary medicolegal 
practice. Given the SAEK's apparent stability, I argue that it is crucial for feminist 
scholars to examine how the contemporary SAEK works and for whom. 
As I have shown in preceding chapters, the SAEK' s history in Ontario has 
featured significant changes in the medicolegal network, or the "webs of relations" (Law, 
2007, p. 1) in which the SAEK works. New actors have been envisioned and incorporated 
into the SAEK's practice (i.e. SANEs), new tools for organizing actors and practices have 
been devised (i.e. legal reforms and protocols), and new physical spaces have been built 
(i.e. SACTCs ). Through a diffracted imagining of the SAEK, I have shown how the 
SAEK has shifted in meaning and material form through scientific, medical, 
technoscientific controversies, legal reform, and technological change. I have argued that 
through this shifting terrain, the SAEK has gained stability in medicolegal practice as the 
objective technoscientific witness of sexual assault. 
2 To my knowledge, there is no publically available provincial data on the number of survivors/victims 
who access sexual assault treatment centres and request SAEK exams. However, other provincial data on 
sexual assault offers some insight. In 2011, 7,821 sexual assaults were reported to police in Ontario, which 
represents a small decrease from 2002, when 8,362 sexual assaults were reported to police (Mcinturff, 
2013). Police reports represent a small fraction of sexual assaults in Ontario. Over the last decade, self 
reported sexual assaults in Statistics Canada victimization surveys increased by 100,000, from 179,000 in 
1999 to 265,000 in 2009 (Perreault, Brennan, & Brennan, 2011). Likely, the number of survivors/victims 
who report to sexual assault treatment centres is between estimates from police reports and Statistics 
Canada. 
3 CFS, "Untitled," (2013), obtained through FOi request to the Centre of Forensic Science, no. CSCS-A-
2013-01382 and 1411. 
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Haraway (2000) reminds us that diffraction involves seeing the history of how an 
object came to be as well as what it simultaneously is. This chapter builds on the previous 
chapters, where I traced how the SAEK has come to be, to perform the other part of 
diffraction, where I will examine what the SAEK simultaneously is. I do so by 
investigating how the SAEK acts and is enacted as the technoscientific witness of sexual 
assault in contemporary medicolegal practice. 
I begin with the questions: who benefits from the SAEK's stability as the 
technoscientific witness?, what purposes does its stability serve?, and what are the costs 
of its stability to whom? I argue that by tracing medicolegal practices that involve the 
SAEK, it is possible to see who benefits from the SAEK's stability and who does not. As 
I explained in chapter 2, Star ( 1991) proposes a critical shift in Actor-Network Theory 
(ANT) when she argues, "it is both more analytically interesting, and politically just to 
begin with the question, cui bono? than to begin with a celebration of the fact of 
human/non human mingling" [emphasis added] (p. 43). Here I explicitly take up Star's 
reimagined ANT to ask of the contemporary SAEK: cui bono?4 
Embedded in the question who benefits from the SAEK is a more theoretical one: 
for whom is the SAEK stable? Star (1991) contends that, "no networks are stabilized or 
standardized for everyone" (p. 44). She argues that public stability of technologies and 
networks is often accompanied by "the private suffering of those who are not standard -
who must use the standard network, but who are also non-members of the community of 
4 By beginning with the question who benefits from the SAEK, I follow in Jane Doe's (2012) path, who in 
a recent article, began her investigation of the SAEK with the same question. Doe's work explores this 
question through survivors'/victims' and advocates' perspectives of the SAEK. This chapter takes a 
different approach. Here, I explore who benefits by investigating medicolegal practice: who does what, 
when, where, how, and why? 
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practice" [emphasis added] (p. 43). For these non-members, Star argues, stabilized 
networks are not sources of order and stability, as they are for members. Instead, 
stabilized networks are more often "a source of chaos and trouble" (p. 42). In this 
chapter, I reveal some of the chaos, trouble, and private suffering embedded in the 
SAEK's stability by exploring the practices that maintain them. I suggest that this private 
suffering is central to how the SAEK acts and has stability as the technoscientific witness 
of sexual assault in the medicolegal network. 
This chapter reveals how the SAEK has stability for medicolegal actors who 
access "truths" of women's reports of sexual assault and for some survivors/victims who 
fit the narrow definition of the ideal implicated user of the SAEK. Here, I show how the 
SAEK does not have stability for survivors/victims who do not fit into the definition of 
the ideal implicated user of the SAEK. Through this, the chapter illustrates how the 
definition of ideal implicated user is enacted in practice, and how this enactment gives 
the SAEK and its network stability for many medicolegal actors and very few 
survivors/victims. Alongside all of this, I sketch some of the brewing controversies and 
uncertainties about the contemporary SAEK to reveal some instabilities that may shake 
the SAEK's stability in the future. 
As I have argued throughout this dissertation, stability is not a finalized outcome 
of controversy. Rather, it is a moment, easily disrupted, when consensus and order is 
seemingly reached. Here, I offer more nuance to the term by illustrating how consensus 
and order is not universal amongst all actors in the SAEK's network, but is instead, 
unequally distributed between and among medicolegal actors and survivors/victims. 
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I begin this chapter by sketching some of the clusters of practices that make up 
the terrain of practice and expertise within which the SAEK currently acts. I illustrate 
several clusters of practices and argue that they directly or indirectly support and shape 
the flow of medico legal action through which the SAEK moves. I focus on police 
practices of determining "truths"5 about women's reports of sexual assault and the 
shifting terrains for rape crisis centres (RC Cs) and Sexual Assault Care and Treatment 
Centres (SACTCs ), in which rape crisis centre workers have been pushed to the margins 
of SAEK's practices and medicolegal actors have claimed expertise over the SAEK 
exam, and increasingly, sexual assault, and sexual assault care and advocacy. 
I then trace how the SAEK acts and is enacted as an objective technoscientific 
witness of sexual assault in contemporary medicolegal practice. I examine four points of 
action in the medicolegal network: 1) accessing the SAEK, 2) staging the SAEK, 3) 
obtaining (un)informed consent to the SAEK, and 4) reading the SAEK, to illustrate who 
the SAEK stable for and who it is not, what purposes its stability serves, and at what 
costs and to whose benefit. 
Contested Terrains of Practice and Expertise 
Contemporary media reports often claim that medicolegal practices around sexual 
assault have vastly improved in sensitivity and efficiency since the 1970s and early 1980s 
(Lonsway & Archambault, 2012). Many of the medicolegal actors I interviewed 
reiterated media assertions of progress by stating that since the 1980s, reforms in medical 
5 I use quotations here to emphasize that the "truths" police and other legal actors claim about sexual 
assault are a product of their values, beliefs, and practices, and often not of a woman's experience of sexual 
assault. 
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and legal practice in Ontario have resulted in a "landscape that has dramatically changed" 
(CA5) and a process that "typically goes quite flawlessly" (PA3). These participants 
claimed that survivors' /victims' experiences in the medicolegal system have drastically 
improved as a result of sexual assault legal reforms; contemporary medicolegal experts 
for sexual assault, such as SANEs and police sexual assault investigation squads; new 
protocols, such as mandated police training in sexual assault and hospital protocols for 
evidence collection; and new services and spaces for survivors/victims, such as victim 
services and the SACTCs. While the medicolegal network has undoubtedly shifted, it is 
perhaps too premature to claim progress. Through the terrains of practice and expertise 
that surround the SAEK, I suggest a more nuanced estimation of the contemporary 
medicolegal network, which highlights that stability of the SAEK's network benefits few 
survivors/victims. 
Police practices and manufacturing distrust. 
Many feminist scholars have argued that sexual assault policing is guided by a 
general disbelief of women who report sexual assault (Estrich, 1986; Doe, Dale, & Bain, 
2009; Crew, 2012; Alderden & Ullman, 2012). Russell (2011) argues that despite the 
initiatives to improve Canadian sexual assault policing, "many troubling aspects of police 
response remain unchanged since the 1970s" (p. 28). One aspect of police practice that 
has remained relatively constant since the 1970s is police (and other legal actors) 
disbelieving women reporting sexual assault. The SAEK is enacted as the 
technoscientific witness through a set of police practices that maintain a systemic 
disbelief of women and their reports of sexual assault. In a later section, I investigate how 
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the SAEK is integrated into police practice as an objective tool for determining "truth." 
Here, I briefly sketch some of the police practices that support and shape the SAEK' s use 
as an objective and credible tool. 
Police are trained to disbelieve women reporting sexual assault. Police training 
manuals, as Crew (2012) notes, commonly equate sexual assault with false reports by 
asserting that sexual assault investigation is plagued with frequent false reporting. The 
"Baeza False Report Index" (p. 177) in Baeza and Turvey's (2002) training manual lists 
sixteen "red flags" (p. 177) of false reports of sexual assault, which include a range of 
indicators such as, a survivor/victim requesting to speak to a female officer, missing her 
curfew on the night of the assault, moving to a new home during the investigation, having 
a psychiatric history, having a past experience of reporting a sexual assault, and/or 
displaying "TV behavior" (p. 177).6 These "red flags" (p. 177) rest on and perpetuate a 
narrow definition of the "real rape victim" (Estrich, 1986, p. 1088) 7 who is untouched by 
men, unlabeled by psychiatrists, and seemingly unaffected by her own rape. Training 
texts, such as Baeza and Turvey' s, act on and within police practice by shaping and 
coordinating how sexual assault investigation is done. 
One of the most revealing works on Ontario policing practices is Blair Crew's 
(2012) study of unfounded rates for sexual assault, i.e. the number of sexual assault 
reports where police conclude that no violation of the law took place or was attempted. 
6 
"TV behaviour," according to Baeza, encompasses anything that could be defined as "mimicking the way 
that stereotypical victims act on television ... (hysterical, demanding female officer, catatonic, etc.)" (p. 
177). 
7 Susan Estrich (1986) describes "real rape victims" (p. 1088) as the victim whose identity and rape fit the 
sexist and racist stereotypes that define which rapes police choose to believe. 
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Crew (2012) found that in some regions of Ontario, the unfounded rate for sexual assault 
can be as high as 32.45%, compared to the rate for other crimes, which at it highest, 
ranges from 2.39-3 .43%. I asked police officers to estimate how often they conclude that 
sexual assault reports are unfounded and I received varying reports from "the odd one" 
(P7) to over 50% (FIUl). 
Police practices for determining the "truth" of sexual assault reports are relatively 
invisible to those that do not directly observe them (Alderden & Ullman, 2012). I filed a 
Freedom of Information request to access the teaching materials for the police training on 
"deceitfulness and truthfulness"8 and I was denied access on several grounds, one being 
that: "the ministry may refuse to disclose a record if the disclosure could reasonably be 
expected to facilitate the commission of an unlawful act or hamper the control of crime."9 
Police practices for determining "truth" are heavily guarded on the presumption that 
visible practices would facilitate false reports of sexual assault. I asked police how they 
determine if a sexual assault report is false, and while some were hesitant to divulge 
investigating skills, others were forthcoming. Some police described how they detect 
false reports through a variety of signs, many of which mirrored Baeza and Turvey' s 
index and others, popular psychology. Some of these techniques included: a 
survivor's/victim's emotional state, her level eye contact, and the number of times she 
touches her face, and changes in her tone, speech, word choices and level of detail when 
she describes the assault. Many police claimed that if a survivor/victim is falsely 
8 One of my participants identified this training session in the course of the interview. 
9 Section 14(1)(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. Letter from Ministry of 
Community Safety and Correctional Services, June 11, 2002, FOi request no. CSCS-A-2012-01832. 
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reporting, she cannot describe her assault backwards, rarely knows if her assailant was 
circumcised, often reports with her boyfriend the next morning, or does not report at all, 
is desperate for attention, and likely has a motive such as, she was late for curfew or she 
needed an excuse for an upcoming exam. 10 
Police also base their judgments of a survivor's/victim's believability on her 
social location (Irving, 2008; Doe, 2012). Many of the rape crisis centre workers I 
interviewed confirmed this when they said that police are far less likely to believe women 
of colour, Aboriginal women, disabled women, women with mental health diagnoses, 
trans women, sex working women and far more likely to label their reports as unfounded. 
Police techniques for determining "truth" configure a narrow definition of who can be 
trusted and in so doing, help to manufacture police distrust of women reporting sexual 
assault. 
Police practices that manufacture disbelief set part of the medico legal terrain in 
which the contemporary SAEK acts. Other aspects of the terrain are characterized by 
shifting claims of expertise in sexual assault care and advocacy and some of the resulting 
tensions within and between RCCs and SACTCs. 
A shifting terrain for RCCs. 
Contemporary anti-rape activism is operating in "a radically altered terrain" 
(Beres, Crow, & Gotell, 2009, p. 144) from its origins in the collectively run rape crisis 
centres of the 1970s. According to many feminist scholars and activists, the pressures to 
professionalize sexual assault advocacy and transform RCC collectives into 
IO These criteria have been paraphrased and assembled from multiple interviews with police investigators. 
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hierarchically run services in the 1980s and 1990s, which I described in chapters 3 and 4, 
have coalesced with more contemporary pressures from severely diminished funding for 
activist organizations and pressures from funders and policy makers to redefine RCCs as 
de-gendered/de-politicized service providers for sexual assault (Beres, Crow, & Gotell, 
2009; Russell, 2011; Doe, 2012). 
While in the 1970s and 1980s, rape crisis centre workers were active in the 
SAEK's design, and consultations and medicolegal training on the SAEK, now, they are 
not involved in redesigning the SAEK or SAEK consultations and are more often 
receiving police and nurse training on the SAEK than giving it (RCCl). I argue that in 
the contemporary medicolegal network, rape crisis centre workers have been situated as 
non-users of the SAEK who have very little influence on how the SAEK acts and is 
enacted in medicolegal practice. They are now on the margins of medicolegal practices 
involving the SAEK. 
In arguing this, I am not suggesting that RC Cs are no longer part of practices 
involving the SAEK. Quite the contrary: many contemporary RCCs continue to offer 
survivors/victims advocacy in SAEK exams (when nurses allow them in the room) 11 and 
during police investigations and court proceedings. However, what I am commenting on 
is the different positioning that RCCs have relative to the SAEK. They are no longer 
involved in the SAEK in the same ways that they were during the SAEK's beginnings. 
11 Some nurses that I interviewed stated that they have an explicit policy not to allow rape crisis centre 
workers, or any other support people, to be in the SAEK exam room. Others described how social workers 
in SACTCs have now taken on the role of advocacy in the SAEK exam. These policies and practices are 
one of ways that rape crisis centre workers have been displaced in practices involving the SAEK. 
227 
Changes in practice and pressures on contemporary RCCs have contributed to 
significant shifts in the anti-rape movement. In response to the pressures to 
professionalize RCCs, many contemporary RCCs have moved away from feminist peer 
counseling to professionalized counseling by social workers and psychologists (RCC 11 ). 
New programs, such as George Brown's Assaulted Women's and Children's 
Counselor/Advocate Program, which was developed by several anti-rape activists in 
Toronto, now offers formalized training for new advocates in rape crisis centres. Most 
RCC's operate under a hierarchical or modified collective model and few collective 
organizations remain (RCCl l). One advocate in a collectively run RCC described the 
decline in collectives by saying, "it is slowly becoming more lonely ... we are trying to 
operate as a circle in a triangle world" (RCC9). Under these pressures, sexual assault 
advocacy is being redefined in some RCCs as an individualized service that is managed 
and conducted by professionals. 
Many RCCs have opened their services beyond women and children to include 
men, a change that, according to some, has largely arisen from demands of government 
funders (RCC13). For some rape crisis centre workers, this shift signals a larger move 
away from gendered analyses of sexual assault both within and outside of the movement 
and a new context for RCCs in which "women only spaces are shrinking" (RCC13). 
Some of the advocates who work at the few remaining RC Cs that are reserved for women 
described some of the informal pressures to open their doors to men; several suggested 
that other service providers routinely accuse them of "discriminating" against male 
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survivors/victims (RCC3; RCC7). These pressures mark a new climate for RCC 
advocacy. 
One rape crisis centre worker suggested that in the face of the pressures to 
transform RCCs, the anti-rape movement has become "much more mainstream ... we've 
lost some of our activism along the way" (RCC13). Concurring with this view, Sunny 
Marriner (2012), an anti-rape activist in Ontario, explains this further, 
In a culture of increasing credentialism and professionalization, we see sexual 
assault centres moving even-further from the radical challenges of feminism, the 
expert knowledge it developed, and its at-once hopeful and skeptical aspiration to 
alter the social terrain for women (p. 412). 
Beres, Crow, and Gotell's (2009) recent national survey of contemporary Canadian RCCs 
revealed that funding constraints on RCCs have significantly reduced their time for 
political activism, but have not significantly reduced feminist politics. Marriner argues 
the opposite: "in what appears to be a bid to win the contest of 'experts' with psy- and 
institutionally based services, many of todays SA Cs have attached credibility to being 
perceived as 'every bit as professional' as government-created apolitical victim-service 
models" (p. 445). According to Marriner, this shift suggests that RCCs have been 
complicit in a larger effort to displace feminist expertise in psy- and institutionally based 
services. RCCs have, she argues, decentered their own feminist expertise with 
professionalized, apolitical, models of practice. 
Many of the rape crisis centre workers that I interviewed explicitly identified 
themselves and their centres as feminist. However, some did not and instead emphasized 
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the professionalized counseling and other services that their centres' offers. Taken 
together, this evidence suggests that many aspects of RCCs are shifting in a shifting 
terrain. 
Shifts within the RCC and anti-rape movement have coincided with medical 
actors using their established expertise on the SAEK to increasingly claim expertise over 
sexual assault and sexual assault advocacy and care. As I will show in the following 
section, SANEs are increasingly taking up advocacy and public education practices that 
RCCs once claimed and in so doing, are transforming terrains of expertise on sexual 
assault. 
SANEs practicing expertise. 
The 35 SACTCs that are dispersed across the province of Ontario vary 
substantially in their histories, models of practice, 12 compositions of staff, and funding 
structures (SANE3). Despite their differences, media, scholars, and many medicolegal 
actors credit contemporary SACTCs with providing more supportive environments for 
survivors/victims, shortening SAEK exam times, improving collaboration with law 
enforcement, and producing higher prosecution rates (Du Mont, White, & McGregor, 
2009; Erickson, Dudley, Mcintosh, Ritch, Shumay, & Simpson, 2002; Stermac & Stirpe, 
2002). 
In chapter 4, I illustrated how the SAEK contributed to solidifying SANEs' 
expertise in sexual assault treatment. For much of the 1980s and 1990s, SANEs' 
expertise was restricted to the SAEK exam and emergency medical care. Now, many 
12 Some centres rely on physicians to order blood work and prescribe medications, while others operate on 
the basis of medical directives that give SANEs/RNs the authority to provide those options (SANE3). 
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contemporary SACTCs have expanded their services to include professionalized 
counseling. This counseling is incorporated into existing professionalized models of care 
and as such, it fits neatly within the frame of professionalized sexual assault services that 
funders and policy makers have pushed in recent years. 
With the SACTCs range of individualized medical and counseling services, the 
centres have been dubbed the "one stop shop" (Burnett, 2007)13 for sexual assault 
survivors/victims. This language situates RCCs and the advocacy that they provide as 
redundant and positions SACTC staff as central actors in the SAEK's network. This is 
evident in the structural shifts in contemporary RCCs and SACTCs, in which some 
Ontario RCCs are being subsumed/replaced by SACTCs. In Sudbury, the Sexual Assault 
Crisis Centre (SACC) recently closed and was replaced with the Health Science North, 
Violence Intervention and Prevention Program, a program that provides SAEK exams 
and counseling ("Sudbury to get," 2011). When the new program was announced, some 
media reports downplayed the different purpose it had than its predecessor and cast the 
program as the "new Sexual Assault Crisis Centre" ("Sudbury to get," 2011). Doe (2012) 
suggests that this is not an isolated example and that there is a larger trend afoot, in which 
many RC Cs are being transformed into SACTCs. In this way, some RCCs are being 
literally erased by SACTCs. In this way, SACTCs, and the government and policy 
agendas driving them, are contributing to pushing rape crisis centre workers to the 
margins of practices involving the SAEK. 
13 Many participants in this study, including some rape crisis centre workers, used this term during their 
interviews. 
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Amidst these shifts, SANEs and SACTCs have claimed expertise in sexual 
assault, sexual assault advocacy, and care. In so doing, they have adopted and 
transformed feminist inspired anti-rape expertise, services, practices, which were once 
the sole purview of RCCs and the anti-rape movement. 
Medicolegalizing sexual assault care. 
Under the medicolegal model for sexual assault care in the SACTC, sexual assault 
nurses are placed in the contradictory position of being an objective advocate: s(he) is 
caught between being a supportive care giver and an objective forensic evidence collector 
(Du Mont & Pamis, 2003). Doe (2012) calls this contradiction, "a competition of 
cultures" (p. 20). Several nurses that I interviewed suggested that they contend with the 
competing pressures by siding with the SAEK's forensic script, which they argue is in the 
survivor's/victim's best interests. One said, "it sounds very callous, but it's for their own 
protection ... you have to tell them right off the bat. .. you don't want to hear all the extra 
details" (SANE3). Another said, "I don't need to know if it's not on the form" (SANEl). 
Sexual assault care in the SACTC is thus shaped, and is at times determined by, the 
SAEK's forensic script and the medicolegal model it is part of. With the SAEK, SACTCs 
have been part of transforming sexual assault care from a non-professionalized, 
community based service that RCCs offered to a medicalized/professionalized service 
largely dictated by the needs of the legal system. 
Although the provincial network of SACTCs describes the centres as inherently 
feminist (Ontario Network Sexual Assault/Domestic Violence Treatment Centres, n.d.), 
the data in this study suggests that many SACTCs have adopted what Beres, Crow, and 
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Gotell (2009) have called, a "gender-neutral victim services model" (p. 144), in which 
sexual assault is seen as an individualized and depoliticized issue. Some SACTCs are 
considering expanding their scope of practice to other areas of victimization, such as 
elder abuse (SANE2), and other domains of medical care, such as bodily fluid exposure 
(Stoner, 2003). These changes in practice might further solidify SACTCs conceptions of 
sexual assault as a de-gendered victims issue and sexual assault care as an individualized 
medical service. 
Public education and tensions in expertise. 
Being expert users of the SAEK, SANEs have secured a place in the 
contemporary medicolegal network as experts of sexual assault. Building on this secured 
placement, many SACTCs have expanded their scope to include community outreach and 
public education. In doing so, SACTCs have adopted the practices and claimed expertise 
that most community based RCCs had claimed as their own in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Much of SACTC' s public education work focuses on advertising SACTC services and 
educating women on the SAEK exam (Colby, 2008). 
According to SACTC network newsletters, however, some SACTCs have adopted 
a broader purview of public education, which includes developing sex awareness 
curriculum for secondary schools (Kaplan, 2004 ), training sessions for lawyers, police, 
and paramedics (Furst, 2005), and education programs for secondary schools on the 
gendering of toys (Toppozini, Maxwell & Mesch, 2003), drugs (Fitzgerald, 2006), 
personal safety, and bullying (Maxwell, 2006). In some nurses' descriptions of SACTC 
public education programs, sexual assault is described as a "personal safety issue" 
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(Maxwell, 2006), which often involves "three stages of healing: victim to survivor to 
'thriver'" (Caufield, 2003). Sexual assault, in these descriptions, is an individualized 
experience that fits into medicalized definitions of trauma. Educational programs from 
this framework are a stark contrast to many anti-rape activists' education programs in the 
past, which asserted that sexual assault was not an individual problem and advocated for 
a collective and political response to addressing trauma. 
In some communities, SACTCs' public education work has sparked tensions with 
rape crisis centre workers. One advocate from Northern Ontario described SACTC's 
public education work on the SAEK in relation to the racism she sees permeating 
SACTCs and the medical system of which they are a part. She said, 
"I couldn't emphasize enough the racialized experience in [name of city] .. .it's 
kind of like we don't have missionaries anymore, we have medical missionaries. 
They are those kinds of people who think that Indigenous people are the fringes of 
a dying society, who should either just jump on board with mainstream culture or 
fuck off [emphasis added] (RCC7). 
In her description, SANEs and other experts from the SACTCs often act as white 
"medical missionaries" (RCC7) who attempt to "educate" Aboriginal women and women 
of colour on "healthy relationships," sexual assault, and the proper uses of the SAEK. 
She reflected on some of the SACTC public education programs and said, "there are huge 
gaps in the level of understanding that most practitioners have around the social 
determinants of health, and the context in which Indigenous people are living" (RCC7). 
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These gaps in understanding, she argued, are evident in the content and language that 
many SANEs use in their public education programs. 
Some of the language that the rape crisis centre worker referred to above arose in 
several SANEs' descriptions of their services and education programs for Aboriginal 
women. Many of the SANEs descriptions situated Aboriginal women as vulnerable and 
passive members of a homogenous non-white culture that accepts sexual assault as an 
unquestioned social norm. One said that in Northern communities, sexual assault "is an 
accepted norm .. .it is a perceived cultural bit that this is a normal right of passage" 
(SANES). Others described how Aboriginal women are often "police shy" (SANE4) and 
need to be encouraged to report and follow the SAEK' s forensic script for proper 
evidence preservation. One nurse, explaining why Aboriginal women rarely report their 
experiences of sexual assault, said "they are a very close culture and don't like to share 
and wash their laundry in public" (SANE 1 ). 
As SANEs are increasing their purview in the SAEK' s network, some rape crisis 
centre workers are growing increasingly concerned that SANE' s work is appropriating 
and transforming anti-rape advocacy and education (RCC7; RCCl). For one advocate in 
particular, SANE's educational work is failing to reflect women of colour and Aboriginal 
women's experiences and is abusing the expertise that SANEs appropriated from rape 
crisis centres. These sentiments suggest that there are growing tensions and perhaps a 
new contested ground between RCCs and SACTCs over expert knowledge on sexual 
assault. This may contribute to new instabilities in the SAEK's network in the years to 
come. 
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Unsteady terrain: Funding cuts and shifts in experts. 
Despite the expert status that SANEs and other professionals in SACTCs have 
secured over sexual assault care and advocacy and the central placement that they have 
secured within the SAEK's network, their positioning within the medical system is 
relatively tenuous. In 2008-2009, the funding structure for Ontario SACTCs shifted from 
secure funding from the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care to global funding 
allocated by individual hospitals. One SANE described global funding as "very much stat 
driven" (SANE2) and as allocated purely on the basis of the volume of patients that a 
hospital program serves. The global funding model prioritizes emergency wards that can 
serve up to 300 patients a day and other similar departments, and not SACTCs, which in 
some cases, serve around 35-45 14 cases a month. According to several nurses, the shift to 
global funding has resulted in significant cuts to nursing, counseling, and management 
staff in many SACTCs (SANE2; SANE4). For example, during 2008-2009, the number 
of full-time equivalent positions at the SACTC at Trillium Health Partners hospital 
dropped from 8.13 to 6.47, as did their medical services budget, from $310,912 to 
$193,887 (a drop in $118,025). 15 For some SACTCs, the cuts have eliminated available 
funds for nursing education and training. One SANE reported that her centre does not 
have the funds to pay nurses for their training time on revised SAEKs (SANES). She 
said, "the nurses aren't paid for their time to do it. .. but yet they have to maintain a high 
14 This number reflects the average number of patients the Ottawa SACTC sees per month (Louisa, 2010, 
Al). 
15 THP, "SADV Budget," (2012), obtained through FOi request to the Trillium Health Partners, no. 13-
008. Some of what was lost through these cuts was regained by 2012-2013, when the number offull-time 
equivalents was raised to 7.3. 
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level of knowledge and competency especially in the forensic sides of things ... that is a 
real challenge" (SANES). While significant resources are being funneled into revising 
SAEKs, the actors using them are not given the resources necessary to learn the 
intricacies of the revised tool. 16 
In addition to funding challenges for SACTCs, according to the SACTC 
newsletters, many centres routinely struggle with retention and recruitment of Registered 
Nurses (RN) (Siedlikowski, 2004; Louisa, 2010, Al). Sexual assault nursing salaries can 
be unpredictable and variable, as much of the hours are on call with marginal 
compensation (SANES). To supplement the salary, many nurses seek more secure 
employment in other positions, which can interfere with call hours (SANE3). Beyond 
salary, nurses commonly identify burnout, compassion fatigue, and vicarious trauma as 
significant challenges and barriers to SANE work (Sievers & Stinson, 2002; Dempsey, 
2009). One nurse I interviewed explained the emotional difficulties of the work by 
describing how sexual assault care, particularly for women, often leads to increased 
feelings of vulnerability to sexual assault. She said, "we see in here all these things that 
we are at risk for" (SANE6). Challenges of sexual assault nursing have coupled with the 
cuts in SACTC funding to result in understaffing of some SACTCs, such as the Ottawa 
SACTC described at the beginning of this chapter. 
In the face of pressures to cut costs and increase numbers of sexual assault nurses, 
some centres have expanded their recruitment to include Registered Practical Nurses 
16 In 2011, the Ontario government released a Sexual Violence Action Plan, which promised $15 million 
over the next four years for service provider training, public education, and prevention (Ontario's Women's 
Directorate, 2011). Although the plan promises increased levels of training for SACTC medical staff and 
counselors, it does not include any allocated funds for this purpose. In fact, none of the $15 million was 
explicitly allocated to SACTCs. 
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(RPN). 17 In 2006, the RPN scope of practice was expanded by the Ontario College of 
Nurses, allowing RPNs to conduct most steps in the SAEK exam (Fitzgerald & Rioch, 
2009). 18 Following this change, the number of RPNs in sexual assault nursing has 
significantly increased: in one northern SACTC, four out of ten nurses are RPNs 
(Fitzgerald & Rioch, 2009). Including RPN s in sexual assault nursing marks a significant 
shift from the early years of the SAEK, when physicians were considered to be the only 
qualified experts that could conduct the SAEK exam. As I described in chapter 4, when 
physicians started to assert that the SAEK exam was an undesirable responsibility, RN s 
replaced them and became expert SAEK users. Now, as RNs are becoming increasingly 
difficult to retain, particularly in northern Ontario, RPN s are being used to fill the void. 
Similar to how RN s solidified and secured their expertise over the SAEK in the 1990s, 
medical actors are now describing RPN s as "professionals" that have the "knowledge, 
skill, and judgment required for the role" (Fitzgerald & Rioch, 2009, p. 4) of the SAEK 
examiner. This illustrates how the SAEK expert user has shifted historically in response 
to increasing pressures to cut health care costs, expanding scopes of practice for medical 
practitioners, and the medical actors' resistance to the SAEK. 
In response to the many uncertainties in SACTCs, several nurses I interviewed 
expressed doubt about how the centres will look in the future (SANE4; SANES). With 
the cuts to funding, the difficulties in recruiting and retaining RN s, and a predicted rise in 
retirements in the near future, these nurses suggested that significant changes in the 
17 In Ontario, most RPNs have a two-year college diploma, whereas most RNs have a four-year 
undergraduate degree. 
18 RPNs' scope varies between centres. However, one centre has RPNs conducting all parts of the SAEK 
exam, including the pelvic exam. Prior to 1995, RNs did not have the authority to do (SANE4). 
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SACTCs may be on the horizon. Through this terrain, it is clear that SANEs' positioning 
in the SAEK's network is not fixed and the network itself is not inherently stable. Rather, 
in its stability is potential for instability, as the network itself is characterized by shifting 
practices and relations between actors. I now tum to discuss the SAEK's stability in more 
detail and describe how it acts and is enacted as the technoscientific witness within the 
network. 
The SAEK: Cui Bono? 
After 34 years of medicolegal efforts to stabilize the SAEK in the medico legal 
network, the contemporary SAEK has gained stability as the objective technoscientific 
witness of sexual assault for sexual assault investigation and prosecution. In a recent 
report, the United States Department of Justice (2013) praised contemporary sexual 
assault kits by asserting that, 
A timely, high-quality medical forensic examination can potentially validate and 
address sexual assault patients' concerns, minimize the trauma they may 
experience, and promote their healing. At the same time, it can increase the 
likelihood that evidence collected will aid in criminal case investigation, resulting 
in perpetrators being held accountable and further sexual violence prevented (p. 
4). 
In a recent Canadian Radio Cooperation broadcast, one policy analyst praised sexual 
assault kits' ability to "affirm the presence of the suspect ... affirm the victim's version of 
events ... and potentially match suspect[s] to other rape cases" (CBC, 2013). In these 
statements, contemporary sexual assault kits are credited with enhanced investigations, 
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increased prosecutions, and improved and less traumatizing experiences for sexual 
assault survivors/victims. 
Many medicolegal actors I spoke with reiterated these sentiments by claiming that 
the SAEK has "advanced a lot of investigations" (FSM), "led to better convictions" 
(SANES), and "has brought the justice system a little further ahead" (SANE2). Others 
claimed that the SAEK is "beneficial for victims" (P 11) because it often "give[ s] 
legitimacy" to her story (SANE3) and in so doing, "assist[ s] complainants in allegations 
of sexual assault" (FS 1 ). A few rape crisis centre workers concurred with the medico legal 
actors and said that the SAEK is a tool that "has been helpful" (RCC 12) and has assisted 
"women [in] build[ing] their cases" (RCC8). Many nurses, police, and forensic scientists 
stated that without the SAEK, sexual assault investigations and trials are reduced to the 
difficult conundrum of"he said, she said" (SANEl). 19 The most emphatic medicolegal 
descriptions of the SAEK proposed that it was necessary for justice: one police officer 
said, "it is so important that she takes the kit, if she doesn't take the kit like, I mean if you 
don't have that in court, we are not going to do her justice" (P6).20 
These views suggest that there is consensus around the SAEK's value in the 
contemporary medicolegal network and that it has an unquestioned stability within the 
medicolegal network. However, some medicolegal descriptions of the SAEK suggested 
that there may be some instability within. Alongside the common depiction of the SAEK 
19 This was a common phrase that many medicolegal actors and rape crisis centre workers, most often in 
the context of describing the apparent impossibility of determining truth in sexual assault cases. 
20 This quote can be read in one of two ways: 1) as a statement of fact, as in "we won't be able to do her 
justice without the SAEK," or 2) as a threat, as in "we won't do her justice without the SAEK." As I 
examine in this section, police practices around the SAEK reveal the potential of both meanings. 
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as a valuable tool, several medicolegal participants stated that in practice, the SAEK is a 
small part of sexual assault investigation and trials and that, in isolation from other 
evidence, the SAEK rarely proves that a sexual assault occurred and rarely facilitates 
conviction. Most of the rape crisis centre workers expressed a similar view and described 
how, in practice, the SAEK rarely works to the survivor's/victim's benefit: "in theory it's 
awesome, but in practice, and legally it doesn't work for the survivor" (RCCl) and the 
SAEK's "intention is great, but it doesn't really serve its intention" (RCC2). These 
contentions suggest that there is not complete consensus over the SAEK's value and that 
the SAEK's stability does not create order for everyone involved in medicolegal practice. 
Rape crisis centre workers' reservations about the value of the SAEK in practice 
are similarly reflected in the scholarly literature on sexual assault and investigation and 
prosecution, where there is conflicting evidence on the impact that SAEKs have on 
sexual assault investigations and outcomes of sexual assault trials (Du Mont & White, 
2007). Some studies have found that evidence from SAEKs increase the likelihood of 
arrest and conviction (Campbell, Patterson, Bybee, Dworkin, 2009), whereas others have 
found that SAEK evidence increases the likelihood of a police charge and arrest, but not 
conviction (Johnson, Peterson, Sommers, Baskin, 2012), and others still have found that 
SAEK evidence has minimal, if any, impact on outcomes of sexual assault investigations 
and trials (Feldberg, 1997; McGregor, Du Mont, & Myhr, 2002).21 
21 Feldberg (1997) and McGregor, Du Mont, and Myhr's (2002) studies are the only two in this list that 
were conducted in Ontario. The others were conducted in the United States. These regional differences may 
be significant when interpreting their results. 
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The conflicting evidence and assertions about the SAEK and its value in the 
contemporary medico legal network reveals existing tensions within the stability of the 
contemporary SAEK. In the following section, I diffract the SAEK to see how it acts and 
is enacted in practice in order to see how its stability benefits some and not others and to 
explore some of the chaos, trouble, and private suffering embedded in the SAEK's 
stability. 
Networks, according to Latour (2005), are best understood as "work-nets" (p. 
132), which take shape through, and as a result of actors' work. As I have shown in this 
dissertation, the medicolegal network has been, and continues to be, shaped and 
constituted by scientific, legal, and medical controversy and practice. The SAEK travels 
through this network, linking practices in the examination room, the police station, the 
forensic laboratory, and the courtroom, and acting with other medico legal actors to 
assemble legal "truths" about sexual assault. In the following section, I zoom in on four 
points of action22 that involve the SAEK within the contemporary medicolegal network: 
1) accessing the SAEK, 2) staging the SAEK, 3) obtaining (un)informed consent to the 
SAEK, and 4) reading the SAEK. In these points of action, I show how the SAEK acts 
and is enacted in particular segments of the contemporary medico legal network to see for 
what and for whose benefits the SAEK's stability as the technoscientific witness serves. 
22 By using the phrase "point of action," I do not mean to imply a singularity or simplicity of practice. 
Rather, I understand these points of action to include an assembly of actors and actions around a particular 
step in the SAEK's travel through the medicolegal network. 
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Accessing, staging, and consent: The SAEK as an empowering choice? 
Many of the medico legal actors I interviewed framed the SAEK in terms of 
choice and empowerment. Several police officers and administrators described the SAEK 
as a tool that all survivors/victims can choose to use for their benefit. Similarly, all of the 
nurses I interviewed described the SAEK and all things associated with the exam as a 
survivors' /victims' choice. Several nurses stressed that in the SACTC, "everything is 
[survivors'/victims'] choice" (SANEl). In the "one-stop shop" (Burnett, 2007) of the 
SACTC, nurses present survivors/victims with what they describe as "a big menu ... we 
just say, here's what we have to offer, take whatever will be of use to you, and leave the 
rest" (SANE7). Many nurses suggested that giving the survivor/victim the choice of the 
SAEK can counteract the lack of autonomy and agency that characterize sexually violent 
attacks: "we want to let them take some of that control back" (SANE I). 
Medicolegal actors frame the SAEK as a tool that survivors/victims can use to 
regain some control, autonomy, and choice. However, by framing SAEK as an 
empowering choice, medicolegal actors obscure practices that limit and impede choice 
around the SAEK. In what follows, I use three points of medicolegal action that involve 
accessing, staging, and consenting to the SAEK in order to complicate and diffract the 
framing of the SAEK as an empowering choice. In doing so, I reveal how the SAEK is 
rarely stable for survivors/victims who do not fit the. narrow definition of the ideal 
implicated user of the SAEK. 
Before doing so, it is important to note that some survivors/victims do experience 
the SAEK exam as empowering. Du Mont, White, McGregor (2009) found that several of 
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the women they interviewed felt that the SAEK exam gave them an empowering course 
of action to take in response to their experience. However, equally importantly, many do 
not experience the SAEK in this way. Du Mont, White, McGregor also interviewed 
women who described the SAEK as a revictimizing violation that was akin to the sexual 
assault itself. The variability in women's experiences of the SAEK is an important 
backdrop to the following discussion of practice. By tracing the medico legal practices 
that complicate choice around the SAEK, I do not mean to deny survivors' /victims' 
capacity to make choices in regard to the SAEK nor erase the range of experiences 
survivors/victims have with the SAEK. My interest is instead in what medicolegal actors 
do to impede empowering choices around the SAEK. 
1) Accessing the SAEK. 
Medico legal framing of the SAEK as an empowering choice obscures the 
difficulties many survivors/victims have accessing the SAEK. With the advent of SANEs 
and SACTCs and their specialized expertise in the SAEK, emergency room doctors and 
nurses have become quick to refuse to conduct SAEK exams, and as a result, access to 
the exam has become more difficult. Medicolegal practices shape, and in some cases 
preclude, access to the SAEK exam, particularly for those survivors/victims who do not 
fit the definition of the ideal implicated user of the SAEK.23 For survivors/victims whose 
geographical location, race, language, disability, residency status, and financial means 
23 In sketching the access restrictions on the SAEK, I am not arguing that the SAEK is necessarily a tool 
that should be accessed. Rather, I draw out these practices to investigate how the SAEK is enacted and 
whom it is enacted for. 
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prevents them from using the SAEK, the SAEK is not a stabilized tool that creates order. 
Instead, it is a tool that can create more trouble and perhaps private suffering. 
A survivor's/victim's geographical location and access to safe transportation can 
severely restrict her capacity to access the SAEK exam. The 35 SACTCs in Ontario that 
provide SAEK exams are all in urban hospitals and are responsible for providing services 
for large geographical areas that often include both urban and rural communities for 
populations ranging from 11,000 to 1,000,000 people (Macdonald & Norris, 2007). One 
nurse humorously recollected her centre's geographical purview a few years ago by 
describing it as "an area bigger than France, with room to spare" (SANES). 
As a result of the SACTCs' established claim to expertise in sexual assault 
treatment, many other hospitals that do not have SACTCs refuse to treat 
survivors/victims and instruct them to travel to the nearest SACTC, which in some cases 
can result in up to three hours of driving. 24 In northern Ontario, survivors/victims have to 
fly to the SA CT Cs in Sioux Lookout, Kenora, or Thunder Bay. In these cases, 
survivors/victims must either finance air travel themselves, apply for air travel funding 
from their employer, or, if they live on a reserve and are eligible, from their band council 
(P A2). Receiving air travel funding often requires a detailed rationale and documentation, 
which can mean that survivors/victims are forced to disclose that they have been 
assaulted (SANE4). Travel arrangements must be made within the SAEK's prescribed 
one-week window, if a survivor/victim wants a SAEK exam. The geographical dispersion 
24 There are some exceptions, particularly in some remote northern Ontario communities, where access to 
urban SACTCs is severely restricted. In some of these communities, SACTC nurses are providing outreach 
training for nurses who conduct the SAEK exam (SANE7). 
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of the SACTCs helps to enact the SAEK as a tool that can only be used by 
survivors/victims who have the means, access, and financial capital to secure safe 
transportation, as well as the time, and/or the desire to travel long distances immediately 
following a sexually violent attack. 
In addition to the challenges that geographical distance poses, accessing the 
SAEK exam also requires that a survivor/victim has access to information about what the 
SAEK is and where it is done, which is often only available online or at public 
educationals. She must also have the English or French (if the centre provides bilingual 
service) language skills to navigate the hospital emergency rooms and the SACTCs or be 
comfortable with the translators they provide, who are in some cases are available only 
by phone (RCC2). She must have an OHIP or Canadian health card, or another health 
insurance equivalent, which, depending on her immigration status, she may not (RCC 11 ). 
She must also have confidence in professionalized medical services to respond to her 
respectfully and equitably, which, if she is a woman of colour or an Aboriginal woman 
who has experienced racism in institutional contexts, she might not. One Indigenous rape 
crisis centre worker described how access to the SAEK can be troubled by racism in the 
medical system, 
It would be white faces in the hospital. And most of women coming through the 
door are Indigenous ... A lot of the hospitals in the North are notorious for poor 
treatment oflndigenous people ... So it's not like you are going to walk through 
the door and see yet another white person in this hospital system and feel 
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immediately safe. That doesn't happen. So many people just get so tired of 
struggling with the mainstream organizations, they just don't bother (RCC7). 
In addition to her faith in how she will be treated, the woman who accesses the SAEK 
must also have some confidence that she will be believed, which many women do not, 
particularly those who have been branded with psychiatric labels from other medical 
experts in the past. Another rape crisis centre worker explained these difficulties around 
access by asking the rhetorical question, "if you have disabilities, or you have mental 
illness, or you are a young woman whose ... [been] medicated or diagnosed ... are you 
going to the same profession to try to be believed?" (RCC3). According to many rape 
crisis centre staff, survivors/victims who do not fit the ideal profile of women using the 
SAEK, choose not to access the SAEK exam (RCC2; RCC 1; RCC6). 
Access restrictions on the SAEK also play out in the context of the exam. The 
SAEK's protocol for taking, and often not returning, survivor's/victim's clothing for the 
purposes of analysis can present barriers for women experiencing poverty. Several rape 
crisis centre workers and some nurses described instances where women were pressured 
to give up their clothing despite the fact that they did not feel they could afford to do so. 
One rape crisis centre volunteer said, "I remember distinctly one woman saying 'do you 
know how much jeans cost? I can't afford that!'" (RCC8). A nurse recalled a debate she 
had had with a police officer about the efficacy of seizing a child survivor's/victim's only 
winter coat, during which the police officer argued that the coat was necessary to "set the 
scene" despite the fact that it was winter and the child's mother had expressed concern 
about how she would afford another coat (SANE7). The SAEK's protocol for seizing 
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clothing enacts the SAEK as a tool that is only accessible to those who can afford, and 
are willing, give up some of their personal possessions. 
The restricted access to the SAEK enacts the contemporary ideal implicated user 
of the SAEK: a survivor/victim who has the financial means, the residency status, the 
language, and the faith in the medical system to support her accessing the SAEK exam. 
Since the medicolegal practices are geared towards supporting her, the ideal implicated 
user of the SAEK may feel the stability of the SAEK and its network. She may even 
benefit from it if she wants her perpetrator to be convicted and the SAEK helps to 
facilitate this. However, for the woman sitting outside of the bounds of the ideal 
implicated user, the SAEK has little stability and is likely to be of little benefit. 
For those survivors/victims who do access the SAEK, the choice of having an 
SAEK exam is often shaped by pressures to follow and consent to the SAEK's forensic 
script. Chandler (20 I 0) suggests that technologies can erode choice and autonomy when 
they are considered to be indispensible to action and are configured as "offers you cannot 
refuse" (p. 15). In what follows, I trace the medicolegal practices that tum the SAEK into 
an offer that survivors/victims cannot easily refuse, by looking at how the SAEK is 
staged25 and how (un)informed consent for the SAEK is obtained. 
2) Staging the SAEK. 
Medical and legal actors (nurses, doctors, police, and victim services) stage the 
SAEK in ways that are often geared towards defining a survivor's/victim's choice to have 
the SAEK exam. This is done most clearly by police investigators, who become involved 
25 I use the word staging to refer to the series of practices that medico legal actors take to present, describe, 
and at times, moralize the SAEK exam to survivors/victims. 
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in staging the SAEK if a survivor/victim reports her assault to the police within the 
SAEK's 72-hour time frame. While many police officers I spoke with insisted that they 
routinely give survivors/victims a choice about whether to have an SAEK exam, some of 
their practices suggest otherwise. 
Police often stage the SAEK with explicit or implicit depictions of the SAEK as a 
necessary tool for achieving "justice" (PlO). By doing so, police assert the SAEK's 
stability as a necessary tool in medicolegal practice. Often police's staging of the SAEK 
is coupled with a deliberate disregard of a survivor's/victim's interest in having a SAEK 
exam. One nurse described an interaction she observed, where a police officer explicitly 
described the SAEK as entirely necessary: 
There was a young woman who was in here who was sexually assaulted and the 
police kept saying 'you've got to do a rape kit, you've just got to do a rape kit!' 
And she said, 'why do I have to? I don't want to. I know him, I know who did this 
to me, why do I have to do a kit?' And the police kept saying, 'well we need the 
evidence!' (SANE2). 
Not all staging practices are as aggressive and explicit. One police officer claimed, "I've 
never had a person outright refuse a kit. I've had them say no, and I'll just sit them in the 
car, and I'll drive them there myself, and I'll say 'well we are here now, let's go in and do 
it"' (Pl).26 He continued by saying, "they are usually pretty up for anything as far as we 
need to get this done" [emphasis added] (P 1 ). Other police officers claimed that they 
always tell survivors/victims that the SAEK is "voluntary" (P2) and that they never 
26 The "drive" this police officer referred to was to an SACTC in a neighbouring city, a half an hour away. 
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"insist on doing something medically to her that she doesn't want" (PAl). However, 
many officers also claimed that they commonly describe the SAEK as a tool that will 
ensure "a more thorough investigation" (Pl 0) and will give police "a better shot at 
finding who did this, so that he won't do this to you or anybody else again" (PAl). 
Another said that he describes the SAEK as a step the survivor/victim can take to "help 
us out," and in return, police can "giv[ e] them some sort of justice" (P 10). 
Survivors/victims who have been coerced into going to a SACTC and have been told that 
the SAEK is a necessary step for ensuring the safety of themselves and others are given 
little room to choose not to have an SAEK exam. 
SANEs often have different staging practices around the SAEK. Many SANEs I 
interviewed stressed that they routinely tell survivors/victims that the SAEK is not 
compulsory and instead, present the SAEK as one of the many options at the SACTCs. 
This finding could be understood through Du Mont and Parnis's (2003) research that 
suggests that SANEs are less likely to perceive the SAEK as important and are less likely 
to encourage survivors/victims to have an SAEK exam. However, several rape crisis 
centre workers provided a different view. Some contended that some SANEs indirectly 
shape and control survivors' /victims' choices by excluding discriminating information in 
their description of the SAEK, such as the limited chances that it will contribute to a 
conviction (RCC7; RCC9; RCCl 1).27 Others suggested that the choice that most SANEs 
presented is a false one. One explained, 
27 See Du Mont and White (2007), Johnson, Peterson, Sommers, Baskin (2012), and McGregor, Du Mont, 
& Myhr. (2002). 
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I think there is a tendency within the sexual assault treatment program to say 
'women who have been sexually assaulted in the following ways should have the 
following exams, and should have the following medical treatment' and there is a 
tendency to sort of give the choice, but it is sort of a prescribed choice (RCC7). 
These observations suggest that SANEs can at times stage the SAEK in ways that 
reinforce the SAEK's forensic script and stability in medicolegal practice and in so doing, 
place boundaries on a survivor's/victim's choice in the SAEK exam. 
Medical and legal actors stage the SAEK differently for different women. 
According to many rape crisis centre workers, women of colour, Aboriginal women, 
disabled women, women in the sex trade, and women experiencing poverty are far less 
likely to be encouraged to have an SAEK exam and more likely to be dismissed as 
unbelievable (RCCI; RCC7; RCC6; RCC8). Many of these activists contended that 
white, middle class women were far more likely to be seen as "undeserving victims" 
(RCC7) and more likely to be pressured to have the SAEK exam. The SAEK and its 
stability is thus staged differently for different survivors/victims, and therefore is 
experienced unevenly. In this context, choice carries little meaning when women are 
pushed to either adhere to the SAEK's forensic script or accept that the script was not 
designed for them. 
The medico legal staging practices around the SAEK reinforce notions of the ideal 
implicated user of the SAEK who follows the SAEK's forensic script and participates in 
forensic evidence collection to protect herself and others from violence. One 
survivor/advocate recalled how much pressure she felt to be the ideal implicated user 
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during her own experience in the SAEK exam; "all I was thinking was 'be the best 
possible patient, be the best possible victim, answer all the questions" (SAl). Some rape 
crisis centre workers shared a similar sentiment when they described what they often hear 
from survivors/victims: "they say 'well I need to go get the evidence, like I'm not a good 
citizen ifl don't do that and get this guy off the street"' (RCC3) and "am I being a bad 
victim ifl don't want to do this?" [emphasis added] (RCC3). Medicolegal staging of the 
SAEK exam as necessary or an expected action reinforces the SAEK' s forensic script and 
the expectations of being the ideal implicated user that are embedded within it. Medical 
staging of the SAEK thus situates the tool as one that is difficult to refuse for some and is 
unavailable for others. 
3) Obtaining (un)informed consent. 
If a survivor/victim chooses to have an SAEK exam, she must first give her 
consent, which she expresses in the written consent form( s) that accompany the SAEK. 28 
Here, I examine the medical actors' practices of obtaining what I am calling (un)informed 
consent29 to the SAEK exam. 
According to the SAEK protocols, "patients must be able to understand the 
information that is relevant to making a decision about the use of the kit and be able to 
28 In the 2001 revision of the SAEK, two separate SAEK consent forms were drawn up: one that indicates 
consent to the exam, and another that indicates consent to police seizing the SAEK for analysis (Griffiths, 
1999). Survivors/victims can "choose" to skips parts of the SAEK exam (although not the DNA buccal 
swap, which is required for all SAEKs) or stop it at any point once it has begun (SANE 1 ). However, 
according to many rape crisis centre workers, these "choices" can be later used as evidence that she is not 
being truthful. 
29 By using the phrase (un)informed consent, I do not mean to suggest that survivors/victims are not able to 
provide informed consent to the SAEK. Some survivors/victims have past experiences with the SAEK, 
informed advocates, access to resources, and other supports that facilitate their informed consent to the 
SAEK exam. What I trace in this section are the medicolegal practices that limit, and in some cases 
preclude, women's informed consent to the SAEK. 
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appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of decision" 
[emphasis added].30 This definition mirrors the Ontario Health Care Consent Act's (S.O. 
1996) definition of informed consent, which states that consent is only informed if 
patients are given an explanation of a medical treatment's benefits, risks, side affects, 
alternatives, and the consequences of not having the treatment. In the context of the 
SAEK exam, medicolegal actors have significant freedom in defining what information 
about the SAEK is relevant for survivors/victims. 
In her study on women's experiences of the SAEK exam, Doe (2012) found that 
most women are given very limited information about the SAEK. Of the twelve 
survivors/victims that Doe 
interviewed, none were 
informed about how the 
evidence would be used after it 
"It felt more immediate, like this is what we are going to do, 
and this is what happens ... it wasn't necessarily saying 'this is 
how the evidence is going to be used, or not going to be used. ' 
They didn't go into that kind of detail. It was just very concrete, 
like this is what's happening right now ... I don't feel like they 
gave a big back story to the implications of what can happen 
with the evidence or how it can be used or not used" (SA2). 
was collected and the possibility and likelihood that it could be used against her during 
the investigation and/or the trial. From this, it is clear that medical actors narrowly define 
relevant information on the SAEK to the actions within the exam room. 
Several medical and legal actors justified the limited information that 
survivors/victims receive on the SAEK by suggesting that trauma can inhibit or preclude 
survivor's/victim's capacity to understand complexities. One nurse said that she always 
explains the SAEK by describing the steps it involves "in the simplest terms as possible" 
(SANE7) so as not to overwhelm survivors/victims with too much information. While the 
3° CFS, "Hospital Instructions," (2012), obtained through FOI request to the Centre of Forensic Science, 
no. CSCS-A-2012-03930. 
253 
intention driving this practice may be to provide a more sensitive service, it arguably 
reinforces paternalistic and homogenizing understandings of survivors/victims as 
traumatized women who do not want, or cannot handle, a more detailed explanation of 
the SAEK and its implications. One police administrator who trains hundreds of sexual 
assault investigators in Ontario bluntly articulated this understanding of survivors/victims 
when she said; 
People who are sexually assaulted, they are in a terrible terrible turmoil 
and ... when something really awful happens to you can't go to the logical side of 
the brain, you are thinking emotionally, you can't reason, you can't make sense of 
things, and you can't remember things. And we know that (PAI). 
The assumption that women in trauma are incapable of logical thought has pervaded the 
handling of the SAEK since its origins31 and has been used to rationalize the absence of 
detailed information about the SAEK beyond the exam room. Without information about 
how the SAEK can act outside of the exam room, it seems questionable whether 
survivors/victims can give informed consent to the SAEK exam. 
Determining capacity to consent. 
The practices for obtaining (un)informed consent change when a survivor/victim 
is deemed to be incapable of giving consent, such as in cases where she is heavily 
intoxicated or unconscious. In the Ontario Network of SACTCs, debates ensued in the 
mid 201 Os around the efficacy of collecting forensic evidence from unconscious 
31 The booklet that accompanied the first SAEK in 1979 warned medicolegal practitioners that, 
"individuals in crisis are severely disorganized and have difficulty making decisions" (Provincial 
Secretariat for Justice, l 979a, p. 52). This understanding of women who experience sexual assault is clearly 
still firmly entrenched. 
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survivors/victims. These debates are particularly significant as they reveal the value that 
medico legal actors place on informed consent in the context of the SAEK exam. 
According to the Ontario Health Consent Act (S.O. 1996), other individuals, who 
are deemed to be authorized substitute decision-makers, can consent to medical treatment 
on someone's behalf when medical staff deem an individual to be incapable of giving 
consent (s. 40.1). Although this section of the Act gives medical practitioners permission 
to treat unconscious patients, the Act does not formally extend to non-medical forensic 
procedures such as the SAEK exam (Macdonald & Norris, 2007). The debates in the 
Ontario Network of SACTCs in 2010 on collecting forensic evidence from unconscious 
survivors/victims were centered on the larger qµestion about the extent to which the Act, 
and its allowance of substitute decision-makers, informally applies to the SAEK exam. 
In a SACTC Network newsletter in 2005, Alice Stoner, a SANE in Ontario, 
suggested that nurses' decisions to collect evidence from unconscious survivors/victims 
are "ethical dilemma[s]" (p. 3). She argued that there are "equally compelling ethical 
reasons" (p. 3) to give a survivor/victim the ability to consent to an SAEK exam and to 
give a survivor/victim the "opportunity" (p. 3) to have forensic evidence collected, 
despite her unconscious state. In Stoner's analysis, a survivor's/victim's right to consent 
to forensic acts on her body was equally weighted with her right to an SAEK exam. 
Joanne Barbera challenged Stoner in a subsequent newsletter in 2006 when she argued 
that it is not legally or ethically sound to conduct SAEK exams on unconscious 
survivors/victims and that the Ontario Health Consent Act and its allowances for 
substitute decision-makers do not apply to the SAEK exam. These debates were largely 
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settled by 2007 when the provincial network of SACTCs devised a set of guidelines for 
evidence collection from survivors/victims who cannot consent (Macdonald & Norris, 
2007). Although the guidelines state that "collecting evidence without consent is contrary 
to our own program values and philosophy" (p. 2), they lay out a series of steps for 
securing consent from substitute decision-makers to conduct an SAEK exam on 
unconscious survivors/victims. 
Consent given? And private suffering. 
Much of the existing scholarly research on consent in the SAEK exam suggests 
that survivors/victims commonly report that they did not feel that they gave consent to 
the SAEK exam. Du Mont, White, and McGregor (2009) found that many women did not 
know they had the option to consent. 
This finding was supported by Doe 
"It wasn't explained what was going to happen ... I 
have no memory of that ... I didn't know what it 
entailed, I didn't know what it meant" (SA 1) 
(2012) who found that the survivors/victims she interviewed had one of three experiences 
around consenting to the SAEK exam: "a) they had no memory of consent, b) they felt 
coerced into agreeing, or c) they believed their consent was necessary for the state to 
pursue criminal charges or otherwise 
"protect" them" (p. 15). In these 
experiences, I argue, lies some of the 
private suffering within the SAEK's 
stability in medicolegal practice. 
Ironically, many of the 
"That is the really frustrating part ... you had no 
choice in your process over your own body. 
Again, just like the sexual assault. So people are 
doing things to your body and you don 't even 
know what they are going to do next and you feel 
like you don't have a choice. You are trying to be 
as good as possible and oblige by all the rules 
and this is what you are supposed to do so you 
feel like you can't say anything or you can't say 
'no stop this I don't want this done' because that 
is going to influence what happens later" (SAJ) 
medicolegal practices for obtaining (un)informed consent to the SAEK exam would be 
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deemed invalid bases of consent in Canadian sexual assault law. In the Criminal Code of 
Canada, consent in the context of sexual assault is defined as a "voluntary agreement" 
that has not been obtained by "abusing a position of trust, power, or authority" (s. 273.1, 
1992, c. 3 8, s. 1).32 For many survivors/victims, police and medical practitioners are in 
relative positions of trust, power, and authority; and as such, it is questionable how their 
practices of securing consent, often through varying degrees of pressure, can elicit 
voluntary agreement. The Criminal Code clearly states that consent cannot be legally 
assumed if"the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity" (s. 273.1, 1992, c. 
38, s. 1). hi sexual assault law, "incapability" has been most commonly been defined as a 
state of unconsciousness (R. v. Mullaney, 1998).33 Upon this definition, medicolegal 
practices that involve conducting SAEK exams on unconscious survivors/victims is a 
clear violation of a survivor's/victim's bodily integrity. Given the fact that many 
survivors/victims have reported that they experienced the SAEK exam as a "second 
assault" (Doe, 2012; Du Mont, White, & McGregor, 2009; Du Mont & Pamis, 2003), 
perhaps the Criminal Code definitions of consent are more relevant to the SAEK than 
they may first appear. The current consent obtaining practices in the context of the SAEK 
exam may, for some survivors/victims, transform the SAEK into a tool that resembles 
and replicates the very act (sexual assault) that it promises to prevent. 
32 Three other requirements stipulate that the consent cannot b~ expressed by someone other than the 
complainant and that no consent can be assumed if the complainant expresses a lack of agreement to 
~articipate or to continue participating in the sexual activity (s. 273.1, 1992, c. 38, s. I). 
3 Incapability has also been defined as a more general state of incapacity to "understand the risks and 
consequences associated with the activity" (R. v. Siddiqui, 2004). 
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Consensual seizure of evidence? 
According to Canadian common law, obtaining bodily samples from an individual 
in the context of a criminal investigation without her/his consent or a warrant "constitutes 
an intrusive invasion of [her/]his privacy and a clear breach of [her/]his s.8 Charter right 
to be secure from unreasonable search or seizure" (R.v. Farouk, 2004). As I described in 
chapter 5, this common law understanding of 
bodily evidence collection has arisen from the 
legal challenges around the constitutionality of 
collecting bodily evidence from suspects. It 
has been established in common law that 
"You . ..feel like a piece of crap ... Jfelt 
violated ... [S]itting naked on a table with 
your legs spread, and someone in between 
your legs, and you 're just like 'what the 
hell ... this isn't right' ... it was hell ... the last 
thing I wanted is to be violated, sitting in a 
room half-naked having blood-work done 
and being touched" (survivor/victim cited in 
Du Mont, White, & McGregor, 2009, p. 777). 
obtaining bodily evidence without consent is an "intrusion of privacy" (R. v. Farouk, 
2000), a violation of "bodily sanctity" (R.v. Stillman, 1997) and a "threat [to] bodily 
integrity" (R. v. S. F ., 1997). If consent is obtained, common law has established that it 
must, 
... be voluntary in the sense that it is free from coercion. It must be made 
knowingly in that the consenter must be aware of what he is doing and aware of 
the significance of his act and the use which the police may be able to make of the 
consent [emphasis added] (R. v. Goldman, 1979). 
In some cases, DNA samples taken from suspects have been deemed to be inadmissible 
evidence, because the consent upon which they were collected was deemed invalid 
because it was proven to be a product of police coercion (e.g. R. v. Farouk, 2000). 
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Legal understandings of (un)consensual bodily evidence collection have led to 
greater legal protections for suspects, such as the Criminal Code restrictions on obtaining 
warrants for evidence collection (s. 487.05) and the common law rulings on the necessity 
and nature of voluntary consent. I do not know of any existing legal argument that 
extends the well formed legal understanding of (un)consensual bodily evidence collection 
from suspects to the survivor/victim who undergoes the SAEK exam. In the case of the 
SAEK, consent is the hinge upon which the exam is considered to be a legal search and 
seizure of bodily forensic evidence.34 However, given the fact that medicolegal practices 
for obtaining consent to the SAEK at times includes coercion and lack of information 
about the SAEK and its significance, the SAEK exam is perhaps on more dubious legal 
grounds than has been previously considered. Perhaps this will be a source of future 
instability in the SAEK in the years to come. 
Reading the SAEK: Making (meaning of) visible traces. 
Once a SAEK exam has been conducted and submitted to the police for analysis, 
its contents are analyzed and read in the context of the police investigation and possibly 
in a subsequent criminal trial. Reading the SAEK constitutes the final point of 
medicolegal action that I will trace. In chapter 5, I described many of the scientific 
practices that make the SAEK' s contents speak. Here, I describe the practices that 
medical and legal actors use to make the SAEK's contents visible and to interpret the 
meaning of the SAEK's visible contents; a process that I am calling reading the SAEK. 
34 In R. v. Borden (1994), it was found that "where there is no statutory authorization for the seizure of 
bodily samples, consent must be obtained if the seizure is to be lawful [emphasis added]." 
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As I will show, there are several controversies brewing amongst medical and legal 
actors about how to read the SAEK's contents. These controversies, I argue, are creating 
some degree of instability within the contemporary SAEK and its network. Many of these 
controversies, are centered on the question of whether sexual assault is visible on 
sexually violated bodies. As the history of the SAEK has shown, visibility is a product of 
the tools and modes of analysis that medicolegal actors use to see: what is made visible 
shifts with changes in technologies, legal definitions, and medicolegal practices. In 
tracing the controversies around visibility, it is crucial to remember that visibility is an 
outcome of action, and not an inherent state. In the existing controversies around how to 
read the visible SAEK contents of DNA profiles and evidence of injury, I will show how 
the value of the tool itself has been put on trial. 
Seeing traces of injurious sexual assault. 
As I described in chapter 4, SANEs document traces of visible injury on the 
SAEK body maps and with photography. They also use several tools to see traces of 
forceful sexual activity that might not be visible otherwise (White & Du Mont, 2009). 
Some of these include: the colposcope, which is a large binocular microscope that nurses 
use to magnify and photograph micro trauma in and around a woman's vaginal cavity, 
and toluidine blue, which is a liquid dye nurses use to determine the extent of cellular 
damage in and around a woman's vagina. 
Many current victimization surveys, medical reports, and scholarly articles concur 
that visible physical injuries in sexual assault are rare (Brennan & Taylor-Butts, 2008; Du 
Mont & White, 2007). In 2008, Statistics Canada reported that 77% of sexual assaults 
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involve no visible signs of physical injury (Brennan & Taylor-Butts, 2008). While several 
nurses and a few police officers and lawyers interviewed in this study referenced the fact 
that visible injuries are rare, many described the ways that visible injuries are still used as 
indications of lack of consent, and therefore of sexual assault. 
When I asked police officers how they determine if a sexual incident was 
consensual, many responded by saying that they look in the SAEK for evidence of 
trauma (P 11 ), bruises (P2), tom clothing (P9), broken buttons (P2), skin under a 
survivor's/victim's fingernails (P6) and "redness, soreness, or any marks on the vagina" 
(Pl). One police officer described visible injuries as "good solid medical evidence that 
will support the crown's case when [the defence] are arguing consent" (P2). Many crown 
and defence lawyers also described how injuries are useful in illustrating non-consent. 
These statements reveal that legal actors' continued expectation of visible signs of force 
and suggest that many of the legal practices around sexual assault in the 1970s and early 
1980s that required evidence of force and violence, which I described in chapter 3, have 
not significantly changed. 
Over the past several years, SANEs have increasingly been called as expert 
witnesses to testify that consent to a sexual act cannot be assumed from a lack of visible 
injuries (CAl; P4; P5). Through SANEs expert testimonies, current medical 
understandings of how sexual assault appears (or does not appear) on violated bodies 
have moved into the courtroom and have been debated in cross examination. Several 
defence lawyers described their common tactic that involves challenging SANEs' 
capacity to give expert evidence on injuries by arguing that SANEs do not have 
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experience or training in examining women who have consented to the sexual activity, 
and therefore have no valid basis of comparison to the non-consenting bodies that they 
examine. In R. v. Thomas (2006), defence lawyers laid out a clear attack on the testifying 
SANE' s expertise, and in so doing, successfully discredited the existing medical 
knowledge around injuries in sexual assault by proposing that "there is no science that 
can deal with whether the injuries are the product of a consensual sex or not." 
Defence lawyers have used the claim that there is "no science behind" the 
meaning of injuries in sexual assault to argue that the presence of injuries does not 
necessarily indicate a lack of consent. One defence lawyer told me that he commonly 
argues in court that bruising and tearing in a woman's genital area is "fully consistent 
with vigorous or clumsy intercourse or foreplay" 
(DL3) and is therefore meaningless evidence of 
"Jn cases of sexual assault, evidence 
doesn't actually matter" (SAJ). 
lack of consent. Another defence lawyer, touting a similar claim, described how she 
discredits evidence of vaginal redness and soreness by asking women on the stand 
questions such as, "where are you in your cycle? If you are far from ovulation, do you 
have dryness issues? Is that customary? Do you normally have to use a lubricant?'" 
(DL3). According to many rape crisis centre workers, police often mirror these practices 
and discount any signs of violence in the SAEK as indications of sexual activity or bodily 
function. One described this by saying: "we've heard horror stories ... everything from 
'she inserted her tampon roughly' [to] 'the bleeding was probably her 
period' ... everything can get explained" (RCC3). 
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Seeing traces of DNA. 
DNA profiles are another way that the contents of the SAEK become visible. In 
chapter 5, I described some of the scientific practices that are used to transform bodily 
evidence into DNA profiles. 
Despite the excitement around 
DNA evidence as a 
revolutionary technology for 
"I wasn't feeling like I was believed, I wasn't feeling like I 
could provide any more evidence, I'm like 'well what 
about the tear, I don't understand is that not evidence? ' 
And the investigating officer's response was 'oh you could 
have like it like that' meaning, I could have liked it rough. 
So that's that. Basically it's like fruitless evidence" (SA 1). 
sexual assault investigation, it is not routinely found in SAEK contents. In a study at a 
Canadian laboratory, DNA profiles were retrieved from only 32% of SAEKs (Gingras et 
al., 2009). 35 Making DNA visible can be hindered by decay in samples, testing 
procedures, and delayed collection of bodily evidence (FSl). Additionally, if a 
perpetrator uses condoms, masks, gloves, or inanimate objects and/or he does not 
ejaculate during the assault, DNA traces are far less likely to be found (Ledray, 2001). 
Despite the difficulties in making DNA evidence visible, its weight in the 
courtroom still looms large, so much so that the absence of DNA evidence often carries 
its own weight. Many lawyers (both crown and defence) that I interviewed discussed how 
useful no DNA evidence can be for the defence. One defence lawyer described this by 
saying, "non evidence becomes evidence" (DL 1 ). Another explained, 
We live in an era now where everybody has watched all these CSI programs and 
stuff, jurors in particular expect scientific evidence .. .if it comes back with no 
DNA for instance, I find that is helpful, because it is like the science processes 
35 When other exhibits were included, such as the survivor's/victim's clothing, the percentage was raised to 
50%. 
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didn't work, and they haven't come back with anything, that's almost worse than 
not doing any science at all (DL2). 
The prevailing view that DNA analysis is an objective, fail proof science supports the 
inference that the lack of visible DNA indicates that a sexual assault did not happen. 
Another defence lawyer summarized, "from my standpoint the best possible result is we 
did a sexual assault kit and we didn't find anything" (DL6). 
When DNA is visible, many police, nurses, and lawyers I interviewed agreed that 
DNA is rarely useful in legally demonstrating that a sexual assault occurred. While there 
is consensus amongst most actors that DNA evidence can identify who was involved in a 
sexual act, most of the medicolegal actors that I interviewed emphasized that DNA 
evidence does not reveal how a sexual act was committed, in particular, whether the act 
was consensual or not. According to the Criminal Code of Canada, lack of consent must 
be demonstrated in court for a sexual act to be legally considered a sexual assault. In the 
Canadian courtroom, DNA evidence can make a sexual act visible, by revealing traces of 
DNA profiles in regions of the body that are considered to be sexual, but cannot make the 
non-consensual act of sexual assault visible. Several police and lawyers concurred that 
the most common defence that perpetrators use· in sexual assault cases is that the act was 
consensual, and in those cases, DNA evidence is rarely helpful. Legal actors' 
acknowledgment of the SAEK's limitations echoes many of the early arguments anti-rape 
activists forwarded against DNA evidence I charted in chapter 5. 
The SAEK' s inability to reveal consent (or lack thereof) to a sexual act has lead 
many actors to question the value of the tool. Some medicolegal actors criticized the 
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SAEK by suggesting that when a perpetrator's "It is my word against his, and he is 
saying that I consented and I am saying I 
didn't, then the evidence kit is worthless, 
it is nothing. Because I could have 
consented to everything that the kit is 
examining ... it's bullshit" (SAJ). 
defence is consent, the SAEK and its contents 
become a "moot point" (P3) that offers little 
insight into whether a sexual assault occurred. A 
defence lawyer questioned the SAEK's value to the police and crown prosecutor by 
saying, 
So if I'm right that the ... primary benefit of the sex assault kit is to ID the 
perpetrator, because most of them are between people they know, then where 's 
the value? Because even if there are injuries, minor injuries, like nothing major, 
but if there is some minor redness, that doesn't mean they didn't consent 
[emphasis added] (DL3). 
The defence lawyer's question, "where's the value?" was answered by several police and 
defence lawyers, who described how the SAEK is in fact valuable to them, despite the 
fact that it does not reveal consent and has a contested capacity to make sexual assault 
visible. 
Testing "truth" with the genetic technoscientific witness. 
Many police officers and defence lawyers described the SAEK as a valuable tool 
for determining the truthfulness of a survivor's/victim's narrative of sexual assault. In 
doing so, they described how the SAEK acts as the technoscientific witness of sexual 
assault that tests the truth of a survivor's/victim's report of sexual assault. In this section, 
I consider the ways that the SAEK is read in ways to determine "truth" and reveal how 
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the SAEK's stability as the technoscientific witness benefits many medicolegal actors, 
but rarely benefits survivors/victims. 
In the context of police routinely disbelieving survivors/victims and accusing 
them of falsely reporting sexual 
assault, police often use the SAEK to 
determine whether a survivor/victim 
is telling the truth in her sexual 
assault report. According to many of 
the police officers that I interviewed, 
"I believe that the overriding purpose of forensic testing is 
not to collect evidence to catch the rapist but to validate a 
woman's claim that she has been raped ... her story is not 
believed by investigating officers until a medical professional 
confirms it verbally and in writing .. if cuts, bruises, 
emotional trauma or, most important of all, rape sperm are 
not collected in the kit, the police are predisposed to believe 
that the woman is lying, that no crime has occurred ... they 
are experienced as a second assault" (Doe, [a woman who 
was raped], 2003, p. 305) 
the SAEK "helps with false allegations" (P 1; P4; PS) by revealing evidence that it does 
not corroborate with a survivor's/victim's statement and the degree of commitment a 
survivor/victim has to her report of sexual assault. 
Many scholars have noted that the SAEK is used for assembling corroborative 
evidence of sexual assault, despite the 1983 rape law reforms that made corroborative 
evidence unnecessary in cases of sexual assault (F eldberg, 1997; Pamis & Du Mont, 
1999; Doe, 2003, 2012). In keeping with these findings, several police investigators 
described the SAEK as an objective tool for assembling corroborative evidence and 
claimed that it assists them in testing the accuracy of a survivor's/victim's story. Many 
said that when the SAEK reveals evidence that .does not corroborate a survivor's/victim's 
statement, it is invariably the case that the survivor/victim has issued a false complaint of 
sexual assault. In police practice, the SAEK and its evidence are given the status of 
objective truth, and the survivor's/victim's statement, the status of an untested, non-
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credible narrative. Baeza and Turvey's (2002) police training manual explicitly instructs 
police officers to assume the objective accuracy of the SAEK when testing the validity of 
a survivor's/victim's report of sexual assault. They begin their chapter on "false reports" 
with a quote that reads, 
When physical evidence runs counter to testimonial evidence, conclusions as to 
physical evidence must prevail. Physical evidence is that mute but eloquent 
manifestation of truth, which rate high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence 
[emphasis added] (p. 169). 
Reflecting this sentiment, one police officer said of the SAEK, "when you know the 
truth, you know the truth. It's there in black and white. So that's what I use the kit for" 
(P6). From this, it is clear that police use the SAEK as the technoscientific witness that 
promises to tell the truth about women's reports of sexual assault. 
Some police described how they read the SAEK to test a survivor's/victim's 
commitment to her story and determine if 
it is true. These assertions were commonly 
coupled with assumptions that the "real 
rape victim" (Estrich, 1986, p. 1088) 
would want a SAEK exam and that false 
"A kit was done so they could find out if you 
were lying. I thought it was like a proof kit so 
that ... the police had proof that the woman was 
actually telling the truth ... ! never thought it 
was for evidence ... against the 
perpetrator ... against the person who has done 
the crime" (survivor/victim cited in Du Mont, 
White, & McGregor, 2009, p. 777). 
complainants would not. One police officer clearly articulated how the SAEK is used in 
this way, 
Sometimes there's complainants that come in and maybe the details are a little 
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sketchy and you are not sure if this is going to be legitimate or not and you ask 
them to ... have the kit done ... and the prospect of that .. .in a false allegation is too 
big of a step for someone to follow through on and they withdraw their complaint. 
So ... there's definitely going to be the odd case where you are stopping an 
unfounded allegation at the onset, once they realize what is involved (P2). 
In this description, the SAEK is so closely coupled with truth that it can be used to 
threaten potential false complainants. This reveals how the police use the SAEK' s 
stability as the technoscientific witness against survivors/victims. 
The SAEK's stability serves the interests of police who want to test the "truth" of 
women's reports of sexual assault. Alderden and Ullman (2012) suggest that the odds of 
an arrest in sexual assault cases decrease by 57% when a survivor/victim refuses to have 
a SAEK exam. These practices suggest that some police have turned the SAEK on 
survivors/victims, despite anti-rape activists' and many medicolegal actors' hope that the 
SAEK to work in survivors/victims interests (chapter 3). Similar practices exist in the 
sexual assault courtroom. 
"Fodder" for the defence. 
In court, defence lawyers often read the SAEK to discredit survivors/victims and 
their reports of the assault. They use the SAEK's stability as an objective witness against 
the survivor/victim. Many of the crown and defence lawyers stated that, apart from the 
DNA evidence that can identify a perpetrator, the SAEK contents are often more useful 
to defence lawyers than they are to crown prosecutors. One crown prosecutor expressed 
her frustration with her common experience of the SAEK contents "backfiring" on her in 
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court (DL3). She said, "it's always been/odder for cross-examination and rarely would I 
ever tender it for my benefit" [emphasis added] (CA4), an idea that was reiterated by a 
defence lawyer who said that the SAEK is often useful ''fodder for cross examination" 
[emphasis added] (DL3). 
Many defence lawyers described how they use the SAEK to identify 
inconsistencies between the SAEK reports and survivors' /victims' police statements and 
testimonies in court. This strategy, according to some defence lawyers, throws the 
survivor's/victim's credibility into question, and alongside it, her description of the 
assault. The strategy hinges on the assumption that real narratives of trauma are 
consistently told, regardless of who is listening, where, when, for what purpose, and 
under what conditions. One defence lawyer described how a survivor's/victim's level of 
intoxication, which the SAEK reveals, is "usually a big area that is ripe for cross 
examination. Because she will say 'oh no I was terribly intoxicated,' 'really well you told 
the nurse you had two drinks, how intoxicated were you?"' (DL3). Another claimed that 
small details in the nurses' description of how the survivor/victim described her own 
injuries in the SAEK can be useful in cross examination: "[alongside] one of the marks 
[on the body map, it] states 'may have occurred tonight.' So I'm able to say 'that's the 
word that she used? May?" (DL2). Defence lawyers also use the SAEK body maps to 
note inconsistencies between survivor's/victim's description of the force that was used, 
and the visible marks noted on her body. One explained, 
If the narrative that she tells 'I struggled he had me down and then he bit me, then 
he used his knees to pry my thighs' you would expect there to be some kind of 
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marks or bruises that go along with that-narrative. So in that case, you would say, 
things like 'none of those things are there, so when he bit you, there is no mark, so 
he didn't bite you, you are not being truthful, it was on consent' (DL3). 
The ways in which contemporary defence lawyers read the SAEK mirror the defence 
tactics Mr. Edelson proposed in his 1988 training session on "whacking the complainant 
hard" (Schmitz, 1988, p. 43), where he explicitly stated that the doctor's report is one of 
the most useful sources for the defence (chapter 4). 
Given how defence lawyers read the SAEK in court, one defence lawyer claimed 
that the SAEK is often "more helpful to the defence than it is to the crown" (DL3) and 
suggested that more often than not, the outcome is not worth the discomfort the SAEK 
often causes survivors/victims. She gave the following advice on the SAEK, "unless it is 
a stranger, you know, you were the one walking down the street and someone jumped out 
of the bushes, my personal opinion is, I would be telling somebody not to do it" 
[emphasis added] (DL3). Coming from an actor who claims to benefit from a 
survivor's/victim's choice to have a SAEK exam, this advice is quite an indictment of the 
verity of the SAEK. 
Have "they turned it against us?" 
Many of the rape crisis centre volunteers and staff that I interviewed argued that 
the SAEK is a useless tool that perpetuates an ineffective system that disbelieves women 
reporting sexual assault. They described the tool as "absurd," (RCC7) "a joke" (RCC9), 
and "just another procedure ... that revictimizes [women's] bodies" (RCC8). One rape 
crisis centre worker commented on the extent of resources that have been invested into 
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making the SAEK work, from the costs of the SAEKs to the resources supporting 
SANEs, SACTCs, and forensic labs. She said, "it's sort of hilarious, all this for what?!" 
(RCC 1 ). Not all rape crisis centre staff agreed however. Some claimed that the SAEK is a 
"good tool" that has "given some women some comfort" (RCC 11) by providing the 
evidence that is necessary to move some women's reports of sexual assault forward in the 
legal system. These differing claims about the SAEK point to a continued controversy 
amongst marginal actors over the SAEK' s efficacy. 
I asked rape crisis centre workers if they believed that the SAEK had been turned 
against survivors/victims and the activists that fought for its development in the 1970s, as 
the activist at the conference in 2009 suggested at the start of this chapter. Some 
disagreed, claiming that the SAEK "has made a difference" (RCC 11) and others said that 
they did not know the SAEK's history well enough to comment. Several others, however, 
adamantly agreed. One explained, 
Everything that has been brought forward, everything including the kit, has then 
turned around and been used against us ... we fought for that and of course ... it 
doesn't work. And the only reason that none of this works is the institutions 
themselves have never been ones to understand violence against women, protect 
women, or believe women. They are set up to maintain the same oppressive 
structures that create violence against women in the first place (RCC3). 
Another reflected on the relationship anti-rape activists have had over the 34 years of the 
SAEK. She said, 
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We want to be able to have a voice, to have an impact in shaping it. But ... how it 
is used, how it is perceived, we don't have control over that. So you tell yourself 
that if it is going to have one then you midaswell participate to make it the best 
that it can be, and then whoever is using it that will use it according to their own 
framework (RCC 11 ). 
In reflecting on their own history, these anti-rape activists revealed how technologies can 
be reshaped and redefined through practice. They echoed the process that feminist-STS 
scholar Katie Hasson (2012) has described of technologies gaining their politics not 
through their design, but through their use. While there may be no consensus on whether 
the SAEK has been "turned against us," I argue in this dissertation that a diffracted image 
of the SAEK reveals how it has been defined and used in medico legal practice in ways 
that benefit many medicolegal actors but few survivors/victims. 
Concluding Thoughts 
The SAEK acts and is enacted in a flow of medico legal practice that is geared 
towards testing the "truth" of women's reports of sexual assault. Despite continued 
controversies, the SAEK has maintained some stability as the technoscientific witness, 
stability that benefits police and defence lawyers investigating the veracity of women's 
reports of sexual assault. The SAEK's stability for these medicolegal actors has, 
however, come at a cost. It often works against survivors/victims who do not fit the mold 
of the ideal implicated user of the SAEK or do not follow the SAEK's forensic script by 
not preserving their bodily evidence or choosing not to have an SAEK exam. For these 
survivors/victims, the SAEK and its network are not stable, but are instead more likely to 
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be a source of trouble and private suffering. This private suffering is an essential part of 
the SAEK's network for it is central to the contemporary SAEK's stability as the 




In this study, I have diffracted the contemporary Sexual Assault Evidence Kit 
(SAEK) to reveal how the tool and its network have shifted historically through 
technoscientific controversy, anti-rape activism, legal reform, and changing medicolegal 
practice. I have sketched how the SAEK has been reassembled in meaning and in 
material form alongside new technologies, medicolegal spaces, actors, and expertise. 
Next to these changes, I have explored how expert domains of sexual assault nursing and 
forensic sciences for the SAEK have coincided with medicolegal actors displacing rape 
crisis centre workers from the SAEK's network and transforming feminist anti-rape 
advocacy and agendas. I have sketched how rape crisis centre workers began in the 1970s 
as instigators, designers, and assemblers of the SAEK and how in 2013, they have been 
largely displaced by expert actors taking over design, education, and advocacy around the 
SAEK. Through these shifting and entangled relations, this dissertation has shown how 
the SAEK was stabilized as the objective and credible technoscientific witness of sexual 
assault in the contemporary medicolegal network. I have argued that the design, 
continued use, and credibility of the SAEK as the technoscientific witness has been 
fuelled by legal histories and practices in which women who report sexual assault are not 
believed. 
By diffracting the SAEK and illustrating the tool's histories and contemporary 
uses, I have sought to make feminist interference patterns in the contemporary SAEK. By 
illustrating how the contemporary SAEK gained stability and how its stability does not 
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benefit all survivors/victims, I have sought to contribute to future feminist imaginings of 
more ethical and responsible alternatives. Haraway (1997) contends that diffraction and 
feminist technoscience inquiry "is a speculum, 1 a surgical instrument, a tool for widening 
all kinds of orifices to improve observation and intervention in the interest of projects that 
are simultaneously about freedom, justice, and knowledge" (p. 191 ). Through a diffracted 
imagining of the SAEK, I have sought to widen possibilities for observation and further 
feminist intervention into the contemporary SAEK. 
This project of diffracting the SAEK is incomplete and is necessarily so. In this 
chapter, I outline some of the future studies that could build directly on the findings of 
this study. I then trace how the SAEK and its networks may (de )stabilize in the years to 
come. I use these possibilities as a way of imagining more ethical and responsible modes 
of enacting the contemporary SAEK in medicolegal practice. I will conclude with a 
discussion of this study as a potential additional actor in these future networks. 
Future Studies 
As I stated in the introductory chapter, this dissertation is a partial documentation 
of the SAEK' s history. Partial histories are not failed or inadequate histories, but are 
instead inevitable results of methods for inquiry, which according to Law (2004 ), always 
involve bringing certain actors, practices, and relations into the foreground, while 
pushing others into the background. 
1 I insert this metaphor with purpose. As I have described in previous chapters, the SAEK exam quite 
literally involves a speculum, which medical actors use to improve the SAEK's capacities to witness 
vaginal trauma. By using Haraway's assertion that diffraction is a speculum, I am proposing the possibility 
of metaphorically turning the SAEK's literal practices, which often harm and hurt women, onto the tool 
itself. 
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Insofar as I have brought particular actors and ~elations into the foreground, the 
scope of the study has been limited to the historical and contemporary practices and 
controversies that have contributed to (de )stabilizing the Ontario SAEK as the 
technoscientific witness of sexual assault. This scope, along with other boundaries 
imposed by time, access, and ethics have determined which actors and practices appear in 
this partial history. Some of the dimensions and complexities of medico legal practice and 
anti-rape activism that form the background of this study could form the foreground of 
future studies. 
Future studies could examine the SAEK by tracing medical practice translocally2 
with comparative studies and locally with direct observation and the experiences of 
survivors/victims. This work could trace translocal connections between different SAEKs 
and medicolegal practices across Canada. Other studies could ethnographically observe 
local courtroom practices involving the SAEK. Ethnographic observation of how legal 
actors describe the SAEK and how this is related to interrogating witnesses in the 
courtroom would significantly contribute to the predominantly quantitative work on the 
legal uses of the SAEK (McGregor, Du Mont, & Myhr, 2002; Campbell, Patterson, 
Bybee, & Dworkin, 2012; Johnson, Peterson, Sommers, & Baskin, 2012). Future studies 
could also ethnographically observe anti-rape activism around medicolegal practice and 
sexual assault kits in other Canadian provinces. Additionally, future work could examine 
survivor's/victim's experiences of the SAEK and the medicolegal practices that the 
2 l borrow this term from Dorothy Smith (2005), who uses it to describe a form of analysis that moves 
across different locals. Translocal provides an alternative to global, which according to Latour (2005) and 
many other ANT scholars, falsely suggests an all-encompassing entity in which actors and practices are 
erased. 
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SAEK is involved in. These studies would contribute to understanding how the SAEK 
works in contemporary medicolegal networks. 
This study has shown that the SAEK and its networks have been, and to a large 
extent continue to be, in motion. Future work will have to trace how shifts in the SAEK 
and its network continue to reassemble the tool· and medico legal practice it is involved in. 
There are several discernable and impending shifts in technology and practice that could 
(de)stabilize the SAEK and its networks in the coming years. I turn to these now. 
(De)stabilizing Future SAEKs and Networks 
I have illustrated that the SAEK "could have been otherwise" (Hughes, 1971, p. 
552) by tracing contingencies that could have ended controversies in other ways and 
assembled practices, technologies, and networks differently. Haraway (1994) contends 
that feminist technoscience studies must address not only how technoscientific objects 
could have been otherwise and also, how they "can be otherwise" [emphasis added] (p. 
61 ). Here, I reveal how the SAEK can be otherwise through the possible future shifts in 
technology and practice that could (de )stabilize the SAEK and its networks in future 
years. Through an analysis of what is possible, alternative and perhaps more just, ethical, 
and responsible, modes of assembly will become more visible. In what follows, I briefly 
trace the possible future shifts in technology, law, and new medicolegal spaces and tools 
that participants in this study envisioned and draw on the SAEK's history to critically 
consider the possible effects of these changes. 
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Technological change. 
In the context of increasing DNA laboratory submissions and decreasing 
laboratory budgets, forensic scientists at the Centre of Forensic Science (CFS) are 
investigating new technologies that will minimize time, resources, and expertise required 
to conduct DNA analysis (FSl, FSM). A CFS forensic scientist described one technique 
the CFS is considering that may shorten the time required for DNA analysis by 
eliminating serology testing (FS 1).3 While this change would significantly reduce the 
amount of time and resources required for forensic analysis in the laboratory, it will 
preclude forensic scientists reporting on the type of fluid that contained DNA. Forensic 
findings will be reduced to a statement of whether DNA is present or not. 
Eliminating serology testing in laboratory DNA analysis, according to the 
scientist I interviewed, would be "a big paradigm shift" that may or may not "stand the 
scrutiny of the court system" (FS I). Courts will have to be content with the conclusion 
that DNA is found and accept the new blindness to whether the DNA is from semen, 
saliva, sweat, or other bodily fluids from the perpetrator. From the history of controversy 
around DNA analysis, it seems likely that this change in scientific practice would create a 
new set of technoscientific and legal controversies in future sexual assault cases. These 
future controversies could destabilize the SAEK as the technoscientific witness and put 
the meaning and value of the SAEK on trial in the courtroom. 
Another technological change that may destabilize the SAEK is one that would 
move DNA analysis from the laboratory to the crime scene. This new technology would 
3 Serological testing is a process that scientists now use to identify the type of body fluid in which the DNA 
is found. 
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allow non-scientists to conduct DNA analysis at the scene of the crime and would, in the 
words of one forensic scientist, "give a quick answer in a very short period of time" 
(FS2). A forensic manager at the CFS envisioned what this new system might look like 
for sexual assault, 
The technology would be simpler, easier to access, with less expertise 
required ... generating a DNA profile could be done right there at the hospital at 
the time that a sample was taken. So a sample is taken from a complainant, the 
nurse enters the sample into an instrument that is able to generate a DNA profile 
of the semen donor and the profile automatically gets uploaded to the National 
DNA Databank, and a hit to an offender is automatically sent over to a police 
officer somewhere who can then hit the ground running in terms of his or her 
investigation (FSM). 
This technological change will blur the boundaries of the laboratory. Forensic DNA 
analysis will no longer be an expert scientific practice conducted in largely impenetrable 
expert scientific spaces. It will become a new responsibility for the medicolegal non-
scientist. Eliminating the forensic laboratory and assigning new scientific roles to 
medicolegal actors will destabilize the SAEK' s networks and practices and reassemble its 
meaning and material form. The SAEK will likely be reconceptualized and redesigned to 
facilitate its new purpose of aiding non-scientists in collecting and analyzing DNA 
evidence. While this technological change would likely increase efficiencies in DNA 
analysis, it is less clear whether it would be to survivors' /victims' benefits. 
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Advocates of future technological changes around the SAEK might, as they did in 
the past, insist on the necessity of these advancements for protecting the innocent and 
convicting the guilty. Advocates' campaigns might mirror those campaigns in the 1990s 
when DNA analysis was first gaining credibility and women's experiences of sexual 
assault were used as cautionary tales pointing to the necessity of increased technological 
usage and development. As with those in the past, future campaigns will likely mask 
other reasons driving forensic technological change, such as medicolegal and government 
pressures to expand technoscience in law and reduce costs and resources required for 
DNA analysis. They will mask the fact that DNA evidence is often not useful evidence in 
sexual assault cases, particularly in those cases where the survivor/victim knows the 
perpetrator. From the history of technoscientific developments for sexual assault, it is 
safe to assume that any future developments that increase the efficiency of DNA analysis 
will likely offer little to survivors/victims. 
Alongside scientists' imaginings of future technological change, several rape 
crisis centre workers in this study imagined future changes in how the SAEK is used, 
where it is used, and what it entails. These possible changes, if realized, would likely 
invoke much controversy and thus off er a window into how the SAEK and its networks 
could (de )stabilize in future years. Additionally, because it is rape crisis centre workers 
who described these possible changes, they also illustrate how actors who have been 
made marginal in the SAEK' s network could destabilize it in the future. 
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Legal reforms. 
One rape crisis centre worker envisioned a legal reform that if implemented could 
change how the SAEK is used in sexual assault courtrooms. She described a kit-shield 
law. This law, she suggested, would run parallel to the rape shield law for sexual history 
that was developed in the 1990s and would prevent defence lawyers from using a 
woman's choice to have the SAEK exam (or not) as evidence in sexual assault cases. She 
explained, 
Currently it is, 'oh you said no to the test, so obviously you made it up or 
obviously it was consensual.' Well it's not obviously anything. Obviously she 
doesn't want to do it, and there are many reasons for that ... It would be great not 
to have to get up on a soap box and explain ... why it's inappropriate to ask that 
kind of question (RCC 1 ). 
After recounting stories of anti-rape activists organizing in the 1990s to implement the 
rape shield law for sexual history, she described how she might begin to organize 
contemporary activists around the kit-shield law. She left the interview with a plan to 
raise the possibility at the next meeting of the Ontario Coalition of Rape Crisis Centres. 
A kit-shield law would restrict the ways in which the SAEK could be read in the 
sexual assault courtroom. It would prevent defence from drawing inferences about a 
survivor's/victim's truthfulness from her choices about the SAEK. In so doing, it may 
reduce some of the pressures that police, nurses, and others put on survivors/victims to 
consent to SAEK exams. While this legal reform holds some promise as a more ethical 
handling of the SAEK in the courtroom, it will likely have less effect on practice outside 
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of the courtroom. The sexual history rape shield law has had some success in limiting the 
evidentiary use of sexual history in the courtroom (Johnson & Dawson, 2011). However, 
as I showed in chapter 5, it has not prevented police and forensic scientists from 
investigating a woman's sexual history through DNA analysis. From this, it could be 
imagined that a kit-shield law will do little to curb police practices of reading consent to 
the SAEK exam as an indication of truthfulness. 
Assembling new spaces. 
Community-based Sexual Assault Care and Treatment Centres (SACTC) could 
alter the SAEK and its medico legal network. 4 Many rape crisis centre workers suggested 
that removing SACTCs from hospitals and placing them in rape crisis centres and 
community health clinics would give survivors/victims more accessible and less 
institutionalized care and treatment. They suggested that this shift would counter the 
pressures to professionalize and medicalize sexual assault treatment and would grant the 
anti-rape movement, survivors/victims, and their supporters greater control over the 
SAEK and the practices in SACTCs. For these rape crisis centre staff, new spaces have 
the potential to redefine the SAEK as a less invasive, and perhaps more empowering, tool 
for survivors/victims. 
Others disagreed. One in particular argued that the SAEK will maintain its 
meaning and function regardless of where it is situated and who manages its work. She 
said, 
4 Community-based SACTCs already exist in some jurisdictions in the United States (Hatmaker, 
Pinholster, & Saye, 2002; Konradi, 2003). 
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It is still an evidence kit for the legal system. So you would still have to provide 
what the legal system wants you to provide ... What I would see happening there, 
is the sexual assault centres would then be used as a guise to look like they were 
helping women, but in actual fact they are just replicating what the system ~s 
already doing to women, with a guise of it being a more, a nicer place ... That 
would be forcing sexual assault centres to be an institutional space that we don't 
want it to be (RCC6). 
From this, it is clear that tensions may be brewing amongst rape crisis centre workers 
around the question of how the SAEK might be reassembled in more ethical and 
responsible ways. A larger, more theoretical, question is embedded in these tensions: is it 
possible to reassemble and redefine existing technoscientific objects? 
When SAEK exams moved from Ontario emergency wards into SACTCs in the 
1980s and 1990s, new actors, expertise, expert spaces, and material relations formed. 
This history illustrates that changing spaces for technoscientific objects destabilizes and 
potentially restabilizes relations in which the objects are involved and the meanings that 
are made of their material forms. Moving the SAEK out of hospitals and into RC Cs, 
would likely contribute to redefining sexual assault treatment and care as a less 
medicalized practice. The SAEK may be redefined as a tool t~at advocates and 
survivors/victims had greater control over, at least during the exam. However, this 
change would also likely redefine RCCs as spaces that facilitate and support legal 
requirements for SAEK evidence. For those survivors/victims, advocates, and activists 
who rely on RCCs as alternatives to medicolegal spaces, this shift might have negative 
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consequences. Survivors/victims would have no designated collective space untouched 
by the SAEK. RCCs would also be burdened with the new pressures to fund SAEK 
exams (in part or in full) and build the credibility and appearances of objectivity that 
lawyers and judges require for SAEK evidence. 
Changing spaces can destabilize and reassemble objects and their relations. The 
results of shifting spaces for the SAEK, however, will likely not have empowering effects 
for all survivors/victims. Instead, the results will be multifaceted and will require detailed 
analyses of whose purposes they serve. 
Assembling new tools. 
Some participants imagined new intentions for the SAEK. One possibility 
emerged as a survivor/advocate was describing the contemporary SAEK. She said, 
I think it is a damned if you do, damned if you don't situation for women. But if 
there is a way we could twist that dynamic. Should the focus be on women? Or 
should the focus be on the accused? [pause] Could we do a forensic exam of him? 
[laughs] (SA3). 
For this survivor/advocate, a Sexual Assault (Perpetrator) Evidence Kit (SAPEK)5 was an 
ironic twist on a technology that more often than not causes survivors/victims pain and 
trauma. By reimagining the SAEK, this survivor/advocate envisioned a new set of 
medicolegal practices that would shift the discomfort the SAEK causes away from 
survivors/victims and onto perpetrators. For her, the absurdity of this reimagined kit was 
5 I have invented this name to aid my illustration. 
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laughable. However, a SAEK for perpetrators is perhaps not as far out of the realm of 
possibilities. 
Although there is limited forensic scientific literature on the topic, some 
researchers have begun to examine rates of retrieving female DNA from male bodies 
following sexual activity. One team of researchers recovered female DNA in 100% of 
penal swabs taken within 24 hours after intercourse (F armen, Haukeli, Ruoff, & 
Fr0yland, 2012). Another team recovered female DNA from three quarters of the male 
fingernails that were scraped within 12 hours after digital penetration (Flanagan & 
McAlister, 2011).6 Just as scientific findings contributed to fuelling the SAEK, these 
emerging scientific findings might do so for a future SAPEK. A SAPEK could potentially 
transform the focus of medico legal practice from the survivor's/victim's body to the 
perpetrator's. While this transformation seems unlikely under current Canadian law and 
forensic practices, there are hints of an emerging turn. 7 
One police officer I interviewed described a recent case where she and her co-
investigator took a penile swab without a warrant from a suspect of sexual assault. 
Despite successfully obtaining DNA evidence from the penile swab, the police officer 
expressed some hesitations about how it might be received in court. 
This has not gone to court yet so maybe I'm going to get grilled on the stand, 
maybe they won't admit it into evidence, they'll say 'oh no you need a 
6 The short time frames in which these samples were taken likely had a significant effect on the rates of 
DNA recovery. 
7 In the United States (as of June 3, 2013 [Maryland v. King, 2013]) and in the United Kingdom, police can 
legally obtain DNA samples from criminal suspects upon arrest. In Canada, obtaining DNA samples 
without a warrant or court order is currently prohibited under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. With the recent change in American law, future Canadian charter challenges around DNA 
testing may be on the horizon. 
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warrant' ... As long as you are not, what is the heck is the terminology they use? It 
can't be an intrusion of privacy ... We are going to argue that this is not an 
invasion of privacy, this is not an invasive type of procedure, there was no pain 
caused to him, it was very simply a swipe with a Q-tip more or less. His lawyer 
will argue that it shouldn't be admitted. But, we'll see how that pans out (P7). 
Cases like these have the potential to inspire new kits for perpetrators of sexual assault. 
As the history of legal controversy around DNA evidence collection suggests, a SAPEK 
would likely be initially met with legal resistance and controversy. 
Beyond the potential for legal controversy, the SAPEK would likely have little 
impact on rates of sexual assault and outcomes of sexual assault cases, just has been the 
case with the SAEK (McGregor, Du Mont & Myhr, 2002; Johnson, Peterson, Sommers, 
& Baskin, 2012). It would likely not prevent perpetrators from sexually assaulting others 
but might more likely encourage perpetrators to change how they sexually assault: they 
may be more likely to use condoms, wash after a sexual assault, and/or use objects to 
perpetrate. A new sexual assault evidence kit, no matter whose body it is acting on, will 
likely not be of benefit to all survivors/victims. 
A new wave of activism striking the shore. 
Future changes in technology, law, medicolegal spaces, and objects will disrupt, 
destabilize, and potentially reassemble the SAEK and its network. As I have shown, 
small changes in practice and material objects will likely have ripple effects into other 
practices and relations between human and non-human actors in medicolegal networks. I 
have suggested that these ripple effects will likely not benefit all survivors/victims. 
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As this study has detailed, the technoscientific witness of sexual assault rarely 
acts in the interests of survivors/victims. To transform how the SAEK acts and who the 
SAEK acts for will require more substantial shifts in practices and relations amongst and 
beyond medical and legal actors. Transforming the SAEK will require transforming the 
medico legal practices that support and perpetuate the existence of the technoscientific 
witness of sexual assault. It will require transforming medical and legal actors' practices 
of not believing women who are reporting sexual assault. In an alternative/reassembled 
medicolegal network where women's reports of sexual assault are not always viewed 
with suspicion, a technoscientific witness that attests to or contests women's reports 
would have little value. Legal actors could gather credible evidence of sexual assault 
from a survivor's/victim's story and not rely on technoscientific "truths" that medical and 
legal actors and objects produce about her sexual assault. In this alternative network, the 
SAEK would be completely destabilized, medicolegal actors would share no consensus 
about its use, and even further, it may no longer be an actor in the medicolegal network. 
By locating the design and use of the SAEK in particular actors and networks, my 
hope is that this study in some way contributes to future feminist efforts demanding 
renewed accountability for the SAEK and the way in which it acts and imagining more 
ethical and responsible alternatives. Although I have described the SAEK as an actor that 
acts in medico legal networks, I have not done this to diminish the responsibility of the 
human actors who act with it. As Haraway (1997) reminds us, human actors have the 
"emotional, ethical, political, and cognitive responsibility inside these worlds" (p. 10). 
Human actors have the responsibility to envision and enact alternative and more ethical 
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modes of assembly. Over the course of SAEK's history, anti-rape activists have been the 
actors who have most often envisioned and struggled for alternative medicolegal 
practices that support survivors/victims. Perhaps, this is where the impetus of future 
change and reassembly will come. 
When describing the future, many rape crisis centre workers expressed frustration 
and hopelessness about medicolegal responses to sexual assault survivors/victims. Unlike 
many of the anti-rape activists in the 1970s who shared an optimism that their work 
would end male violence and that they would "put [them]selves out of business" (RCC4), 
many contemporary activists and advocates voiced their frustration and anger with the 
lack of change in medicolegal practice. One described the daily frustrations, 
Came in first thing this morning, there is already a call ... I gotta call a woman 
back who just went through a kit. 'Went to the police and for some reason they 
are not taking me seriously.' Here we go again. Exact same scenario (RCC3). 
Amongst these disheartening descriptions were, however, many expressions of optimism 
and hope. One advocate said, "one thing that will not diminish are feminists. We may 
have to find a new venue, create some new spaces, but I remain optimistic" (RCC 13). 
Another reflected on anti-rape activism from the 1970s to present and described how 
future medicolegal practice will be transformed by saying, 
There is still a great need for a wave to strike the shore. It's like rain drops, when 
we strike the shore in tiny tiny bursts you have a momentary impact based on the 
dents in the sand but I think it does require that wave in order to dislodge some of 
the very deep seated thinking and attitudes that are still prevalent (RCC4). 
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We could imagine how this new wave might come from many circles of activity and anti-
rape activism amongst rape crisis centres workers, activists, survivors/victims, and their 
advocates in community centres, academics, law, and medicine. This work will have the 
potential to destabilize and enact the SAEK and medicolegal practice in more ethical and 
responsible ways in the years to come. 
Dissertation as Actor: The Ethics of Diffraction 
Haraway (1997) asserts that diffraction involves not only interfering with existing 
realities but also creating new ones (Haraway, 1997). Law (2000) expands on this by 
saying, "the difference between telling stories and enacting realities isn't so large ... 
which means that our stories ... may make a difference" (p. 3). Telling stories about 
technoscientific objects implies interfering and enacting them in new ways, which has the 
potential to "make a difference" (p. 3). 
By illustrating some of the technoscientific controversies and medico legal 
practices behind the SAEK, I have interfered with the contemporary SAEK's stability as 
an inherently objective credible technoscientific witness. I have enacted a non-innocent 
sketching of the SAEK as a historicized actor whose stability rarely benefits 
survivors/victims. In so doing, I have created a text that has the possibility, however 
small it may be, to make some difference. 
Now that this study has taken its shape in a written, replicable form, it has the 
potential to become a new actor within academic, activist, and medicolegal networks. It 
has the possibility of shifting some action in these spheres. In recognizing the potential of 
academic work to act, I do not mean to over emphasize the significance of academic 
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stories. Rather, I wish to stress the responsibility that is tied to telling stories about 
technoscience. As Law and Singleton (2000) contend, "technological storytelling makes a 
difference .. .it is important to understand how this happens, how our descriptions 
interfere with other performances of technoscience to prop these up, extend them, 
undermine them, celebrate them" (p. 4). 
This dissertation could act in ways that I did not intend. Legal actors wanting to 
discredit the SAEK in the sexual assault courtroom might use this study's descriptions of 
controversies and instabilities to discredit the tool's validity and objectivity in the sexual 
assault courtroom. For those few survivors/victims whose sexual assault cases depend on 
the SAEK, this may diminish the weight of their story in court. Government actors 
wanting to justify reduced spending on sexual assault treatment might use this study's 
conclusion that the SAEK rarely benefits survivors/victims as a rationale for further 
reducing dwindling resources. Neither of these possible outcomes is my intention. I do 
not wish for my work to conspire with those actors working against survivors/victims 
interests. Diffraction is, however, risky. 
In this study, I have argued that a diffracted imagining of the SAEK is necessary 
to understand how the SAEK gained stability in the contemporary medicolegal network 
and how this stability rarely benefits survivors/victims. By diffracting the contemporary 
SAEK, I have made the origins and uses of the technoscientific witness of sexual assault 
more visible. Demanding medicolegal accountability and responsibility for the 
technoscientific witness of sexual assault in future networks will require more diffracted 
imaginings of the SAEK. When all of the SAEK's rays are seen, we can begin to imagine 
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APPENDIX A: Acronyms Used 
ANT: Actor Network Theory (p. 2). 
CFS: Centre of Forensic Science (p. 4). 
DNA: Deoxyribonucleic Acid (p. 163). 
NDDB: National DNA Data Bank (p. 187). 
OCRCC: Ontario Coalition of Rape Crisis Centres (p. 73). 
PCR: Polymerase Chain Reaction (p. 178). 
PSJ: Provincial Secretariat for Justice (p. 79). 
RFLP: Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (p. 173). 
SACTC: Sexual Assault Care and Treatment Centre (p. 145). 
RCC: Rape Crisis Centre (p. 69). 
SAEK: Sexual Assault Evidence Kit (p. 1 ). 
SANE: Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (p. 157). 
STR: Short Tandem Repeat (p. 178). 
STS: Science and Technology Studies (p. 8). 
*Page numbers mark where I first use and define the acronym. 
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APPENDIX B: Interview Participant Codes 
Note: Each interview participant was given a code, which includes letters corresponding 
to their location in medicolegal networks and a number reflecting when they were 
interviewed (e.g. RCCl, SANE2, P3). 
CA: Crown Attorney 
CL: Civil Lawyer 
D: Doctor 
DL: Defense Lawyer 
FS: Forensic Scientist 
FSM: Forensic Scientist Manager 
P: Police 
PA: Police Administrator 
RCC: Rape Crisis Centre Worker. 
SI A: Survivor/advocate at a rape crisis centre 
SANE: Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner 
SW: Social Worker 
VS: Victim Services 
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APPENDIX C: Interview Sample Distribution 
INSTITUTION/FIELD PARTICIPANT TYPE NUMBER TOTAL 
Currently Employed 9 14 
Rape Crisis Centres Retired 5 
Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners 7 9 
Medical Social Worker 1 
Doctor 1 
CFS Administrator 1 4 
Forensic Scientist 1 
Scientific (CFS Biology Section) 
Forensic Scientist (Private Lab) 1 
Forensic Consultant 1 
Investigators (Sexual Assault & 11 17 
Police Major Crime Units) 
Forensic Identification Unit 2 
0 PP Administrators 4 
Director 4 5 
Victim Services Counselor 1 
Crown Attorneys 4 13 





APPENDIX D: Map of SAEK Network 
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